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Abstract 
 
The aim of the experiments reported in this thesis was to investigate the relationship 
between the multisensory based processes involved in the generation of a sense of 
bodily selfhood and the processes involved in social cognition.   
 
The experiments in chapter 2 investigated the effect of skin colour on body 
ownership and found that participants could indeed experience body ownership over 
a rubber hand with the skin colour of a racial out-group. The experiments in chapter 
3 found evidence that synchronous multisensory stimulation over a hand with the 
skin colour of a racial out-group led to more positive implicit attitudes towards 
members of that racial out-group and reduced corticospinal activation when watching 
either tactile or painful stimuli applied to an out-group hand. 
  
The experiments in chapter 4 investigated whether feeling body ownership over an 
elderly hand would lead to activation of the elderly stereotype and thus cause 
participants to imagine their movements as being slower on a motor imagery task. 
They found that it was possible to induce ownership over the elderly hand and that 
participants who experienced higher levels of ownership over the old hand imagined 
their movements as being slower. 
 
Experiments 5.1 and 5.2 investigated whether IMS would lead to increased trust. 
They found that synchronous IMS led to higher ratings of trust and higher offers in a 
trust game. Experiment 5.3 found that trustworthiness leads to increased perceived 
facial similarity. Experiment 6.1 used fMRI to demonstrate that brain areas involved 
in action observation are modulated by the trustworthiness of an actor. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction: The Body, the 
Self and Social Cognition
1
 
  
“Everywhere in the world, self starts with body” 
Roy F. Baumeister (1999, p. 2) 
 
1.1. Theoretical Foundations 
 
 1.1.1. Varieties of Embodied Cognition 
  
The past two decades have seen an increasing move towards emphasising the 
importance of the body for many areas of cognition (Barsalou, 2008; Clark, 1999; 
Valera, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991; Wilson & Golonka, 2013; Wilson, 2002). In this 
time the embodied cognition paradigm has grown increasingly more influential and 
widespread, a search on Google Scholar for academic works using the term 
“embodied cognition” finds only eighty five results published before 1993 but over 
eleven thousand and seven hundred published from 1993-2013. The studies reported 
in this thesis sought to investigate the impact of embodiment on social relationships 
between one‟s self and others. Before proceeding to review the literature that 
motivated these investigations however it is important to first be clear exactly which 
conception of embodied cognition motivates these investigations. 
  
The embodied position is often contrasted with more traditional cognitivist views of 
cognition. This traditional view has been characterised by Hurley (2001) as involving 
three key aspects. The first is the view that action and perception are largely separate 
from each other and as peripheral processes to cognition. The second is that the mind 
                                                 
1 Sections of this introduction published as:  
Farmer, H. & Tsakiris, M. (2012). The bodily social self: A link between phenomenal and narrative 
selfhood. Review of Philosophy and Psychology. 3, pp. 125–144.  
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is essentially modular with different cognitive processes operating separately from 
each other and from perception and action. The final aspect is the view that that at its 
core cognition involves the manipulation of amodal symbolic representations 
according to syntactic structures (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988). This cognitivist 
conception of cognition has been described by Hurley as the “classical sandwich” 
model of the mind as it views action and perception as the peripheral bread that 
surrounds a cognitive filling. Proponents of the embodied cognition approach 
generally deny all three aspects of the cognitivist view of cognition claiming instead 
that action and perception are tightly linked, that they play a vital role in cognitive 
processes and that cognition is not constituted by the syntactic manipulation of 
amodal symbolic representations. 
  
Despite the general opposition to the cognitivist model of the mind among 
proponents of embodied cognition, Alsmith and de Vignemont (2012) note that the 
research programs covered by the umbrella of embodied cognition include a number 
of distinct and incompatible different theoretical positions. A number of authors have 
highlighted the distinct positions that can be held by proponents of embodied 
cognition. Wilson (M. Wilson, 2002) identified no less than six distinct positions that 
are commonly held by researchers working in embodied cognition ranging from the 
importance of viewing cognition as situated within the context of the real-world 
environment to stressing the role of sensory and motor systems in higher cognitive 
processes such as mental imagery, memory and reasoning. Shapiro (2010) also 
distinguishes between different forms of embodied cognition, highlighting three 
distinct viewpoints that proponents of embodied cognition might hold. The first of 
these is conceptualization, the view that the concepts an organism can acquire are 
determined, limited, or constrained by the properties of the organism's body. The 
second is replacement, the view that the dynamics of an organism's bodily interaction 
with the environment replaces the need for representational processing and the third 
is constitution, the view that the constituents of cognition extend beyond the brain 
and into the body and world. 
  
For the purposes of the present thesis however, the most useful distinction between 
different forms of embodied cognition has been made by Clark (1997) who 
distinguished between “radical” and “moderate” version of embodiment.  Radical 
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embodied theories, which are most closely linked to Shapiro‟s (2010) replacement 
viewpoint, (e.g. Hutto, 1999; O‟Regan & Noë, 2001; Thelen & Smith, 1994; Van 
Gelder, 1998, 2008; Wilson & Golonka, 2013) view embodied cognition as a 
radically new paradigm in cognitive science and deny that the mind consists of 
anything like representations. Instead they promote the idea that cognition involves a 
process of dynamic interaction between brain, body and world and hold that many of 
the cognitive processes that have classically been thought to require representation 
can be solved through interaction with the environment, a principle that is often 
expressed using Rodney Brooks‟ claim that “the world is its own best model” 
(Brooks, 1990). In contrast more moderate embodied approaches to embodiment, 
which are most closely linked to Shapiro‟s conceptualisation viewpoint, do not seek 
to deny the existence of representation and are willing to employ both 
representational and non-representational explanatory schemes depending on the 
cognitive task under investigation (Clark, 1997; Wilson, 2002). Instead of denying 
the existence of mental representations entirely, researchers who take the moderate 
approach to embodied cognition instead tend to challenge the classical notion of 
amodal representation, emphasising the importance of sensory and motor systems in 
the creation of offline mental representations of the world (Barsalou, 1999, 2008; 
Kiefer & Pulvermüller, 2012; Lakoff, 2012; Pezzulo et al., 2012; Prinz, 2009; 
Svensson & Ziemke, 2005). 
  
1.1.2. Problems with Radical Embodied Cognition 
  
The radical approach to embodied cognition has had a number of successes in 
demonstrating that tasks normally thought to require complex representation can 
instead be achieved through the dynamic coupling of brain, body and world. The 
most notable of these successes have been in the fields of artificial intelligence (for a 
review see Pfeifer & Bongard, 2006), in explaining how humans and other animals 
accomplish complex sensorimotor tasks such as catching a ball (Fink, Foo, & 
Warren, 2009; McBeath, Shaffer, & Kaiser, 1995)and in explaining certain pervasive 
developmental errors in terms of the immaturity of infants‟ sensorimotor systems 
(Thelen, Schöner, Scheier, & Smith, 2001). It is however notable that the radical 
approach to embodiment has had significantly less success when it comes to 
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explaining more cognitively complex areas such as language, abstract thought and 
social cognition. The issue of the role of embodiment in social cognition has a direct 
bearing on the studies reported in this thesis so it is worth pointing out that, while 
some areas of social cognition relating to direct social interaction may well require 
less use of mental representations than has commonly been supposed (De Jaegher, Di 
Paolo, & Gallagher, 2010; De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007; Fuchs & de Jaegher, 2009; 
Gallagher & Hutto, 2008), it seems dubious that all of the complexity of social 
interactions, such as knowledge of status (Coie, Dodge, & Coppotelli, 1982) dividing 
people between social in-groups and out-groups (Brewer, 1979; Ruffle & Sosis, 
2006) or reasoning about social rewards and punishment (Greene & Haidt, 2002; 
Trevino & Youngblood, 1990) can be accounted for without at least some form of 
stored offline mental representations. 
  
A second reason for scepticism that the radically anti-representationalist approach to 
embodiment is sustainable has been pointed out by Alsmith and De Vignemont 
(2012). The authors note the widespread use of representational concepts within 
research involving the body itself, pointing to “forward model” theories of motor 
control (Davidson & Wolpert, 2005; Jeannerod, 1997; Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000) 
as an exemplar of a well-established theory of motor control in which offline 
representations of the body, decoupled from the actions the body is currently making, 
play an essential part. Forward model theories of motor control posit that, in order to 
deal with the slow and noisy nature of peripheral signal about the movement 
dynamic of the body, motor commands sent to the body are also duplicated within a 
neural model of the bodies motor systems in order to compute the likely sensory 
feedback that would be generated by the movements specified (see e.g. Desmurget & 
Grafton, 2000). These theories therefore directly posit an important role for offline 
representations of the body in the guidance of action itself and are thus in tension 
with an anti-representationalist view of embodied cognition. This tension between 
the radical embodied cognition approach and research into the relationship between 
the body and the brain has been further increased by the recent popularity of 
predictive coding approaches to cognition (Apps & Tsakiris, In Press; Brown, 
Salverda, Dilley, & Tanenhaus, 2011; Friston, 2005, 2010; Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 
2007; Lee & Mumford, 2003; Rao & Ballard, 1999; see Clark, 2013 for a recent 
review and discussion). These accounts extend the key insight of “forward model” 
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theories, the functional importance of comparing incoming sensory input with 
predictions generated through offline simulation of that sensory input, into 
perception (Lee & Mumford, 2003; Rao & Ballard, 1999), including perception of 
the body itself (Apps & Tsakiris, In Press; Kilner et al., 2007b), and higher level 
cognition (M. Brown et al., 2011; Friston, 2005, 2010) 
  
Due to these two objections to the radical embodied cognition position, the studies 
undertaken in the current thesis are based on a more moderate version of the 
embodied cognition thesis which accepts the existence of low level sensorimotor 
representations and holds that these representations play a vital part in structuring 
cognition and allowing for the creation of representations referring to more complex 
and abstract concepts. This conception of embodiment has been most developed by 
Barsalou and colleagues in their grounded cognition framework (Barsalou, 1999, 
2010; Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005; Pezzulo et 
al., 2012). In brief this framework posits that cognitive agents do not come pre-
equipped with arbitrary representations but rather that they acquire “grounded modal 
symbols” through development and sensorimotor interaction, with genetic constraints 
presumably also playing a role. Furthermore, the model holds that more abstract 
concepts develop on top of the architecture for sensorimotor control, and the gradual 
maturation of the latter constitutes a scaffold for the former and that higher level 
cognitive processes recruit and reuse lower level sensorimotor competencies in order 
to process increasingly complex problems. In the current thesis, this grounded 
cognition framework will be applied to the relationship between two distinction 
conceptions of selfhood, the bodily self and the social self. This studies presented 
will show that perceptions of social closeness between one‟s self and others can both 
be affected by and in turn affect perceptions of bodily closeness and similarity. 
  
1.1.3. Two forms of Selfhood 
  
The distinction between two important conceptions of selfhood can be found in 
thinkers across academic disciplines and traditions. Zahavi (2005) addresses this 
issue from the perspective of the phenomenological tradition and draws on the 
analyses made by Husserl (1982), Merleau-Ponty (1962) and Sartre (1956) to argue 
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for the existence of both a phenomenal form of selfhood, which is considered to be 
an essential component of all subjective experience and a socially situated narrative 
form of selfhood, which is seen as social constructed  and formed in a large part by 
the way we relate to others.  A similar view of the self has also been put forward in 
analytic philosophy by Bermúdez (1998) and Strawson (1999) who both distinguish 
between forms of selfhood which require conceptual and linguistic mastery of the 
first person pronoun and a more basic non-conceptual self-consciousness. 
  
In psychology Neisser (1991) distinguishes between an ecological self which is 
developmentally primary and more advanced forms of selfhood such as possession of 
an extended self or a self-concept which require the ability to reflect on one‟s 
experiences over long time periods and to be able to identify one‟s self as part of a 
larger social group respectively. Finally both Damasio (1999) and Edelman (2004) 
have used neuroscientific  findings to distinguish between a continuously present 
form of self-awareness, based on  (which Damasio terms the “core self” and 
Edelman terms “primary consciousness”) and a higher level, temporally extended 
sense of self. 
  
While these various accounts of selfhood differ on a number of details it is clear that 
there is a broad agreement in their division of selfhood between a minimal non-
conceptual pre-linguistic self which is a prerequisite for having any form of 
phenomenal experience and higher level forms of selfhood which depend on the 
possession of complex cognitive abilities such as episodic memory, language and a 
conceptual understanding of one‟s self as being a distinct and separate entity. In the 
following two sections of this introduction I will first consider the phenomenal self 
(PS) and make the case that it should correctly be viewed as a bodily form of 
selfhood and then consider the narrative or social self (SS) and highlight the social 
nature of this conception of selfhood. 
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1.2. Phenomenal Selfhood and the Body 
  
1.2.1. The Phenomenal Self as a Bodily Self 
  
The PS has been closely linked to the body by a number of recent thinkers 
(Bermúdez, 1998; Blanke & Metzinger, 2009; Damasio, 1999; Gallagher, 2003; 
Hurley, 1998; Legrand, 2006; Zahavi, 2002, 2005). Many draw on the work of 
phenomenologists such as Merleau-Ponty (1945); others (Bermúdez, 1998, for 
example) draw on the work of Gibson (1979) to highlight the importance of the body 
as a source of sensory and motor information (e.g. vision, touch, proprioception) that 
can be used to differentiate between self and non-self in the absence of a linguistic 
concept of the self. 
  
Proponents of the link between the body and the PS commonly stress the role of the 
body as a point of unification between sensory inputs and motor outputs and thus as 
the source of a unified and spatially localised first person perspective (1PP). Legrand 
(2006) expresses this role of the body as unifier by saying that: 
  
“the self at the bodily level is the body itself. It is [...] the body as it is acting 
and perceiving, that is, the body as the point of convergence of action and 
perception.” (Legrand, 2006, p.108). 
  
A similar point is made by Susan Hurley in her seminal work Consciousness in 
Action (1998) when she states that: 
  
“having a unified perspective involves keeping track of the relationship of 
interdependence between what is perceived and what is done, and hence 
awareness of your own agency. In this sense, perspective already involves self-
consciousness. But the sense of self-consciousness that makes good this 
thought is already tied to ordinary motor agency and spatial perception and 
need not involve conceptually structured thought or inferences.” (Hurley, 
1998, p. 141). 
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This conception of the bodily self as the nexus of action and perception has also been 
put forward within the cognitive sciences. Neisser‟s (1991) account of the ecological 
self, which draws heavily on Gibson‟s (1979) theory of the importance of motor 
affordances in perception, views the ecological self as being specified largely by 
objective information which allows for the perception of both the location of the 
body and how it is interacting with the environment. Neisser considers this 
information to be largely dependent on knowledge of the body‟s movements and 
their relationship to vision. As an example of how this relationship can allow for the 
specification of the ecological self, Neisser highlights the fact that for a perceiving 
agent the layout of any visual scene is always seen from a particular point of 
observation and then explains how various transformations in the structure of a 
visual scene that occur when the point of observation moves (e.g. the kinetic depth 
effect, looming or optic flow) serve to provide an organism with independently 
existing forms of visual information which can be used to uniquely specify the 
location of the ecological self in the environment. This unique specification through 
the interaction of the mind independent properties of a visual scene and an 
organism‟s own movements, thus demonstrates one important way that a bodily form 
of self can emerge from an interaction of perception and action. 
  
In addition to arguments for a bodily form of selfhood based on the interaction of 
action and perception more recent theories of the self, such as that put forward by 
Damasio (1999, 2010), have stressed the importance of other forms of bodily 
information.  In his model of the “core self” Damasio acknowledges the importance 
of musculo-skeletal information such as emphasised by Neisser (1991) in his account 
of the ecological self and is involved in sensing the movements of the 
musculoskeletal system and, through the vestibular system, the position of the body 
in space. However Damasio also emphasises the importance of the internal milieu 
and viscera division which includes neural and chemical signals indicating the 
homeostatic environment of the body‟s cells, the state of the smooth muscles of the 
body and sensory signals from receptors for pain, itch, temperature (and also the 
more recently identified C-afferent fibres which appear to transmit the sensation of 
pleasant touch (Johansson, Trulsson, Olsson, & Westberg, 1988; Loken, Wessberg, 
Morrison, McGlone, & Olausson, 2009). 
  
28 
 
  
This emphasis on the importance of the perception of internal states of the body, or 
interoception, in providing a background to conscious experience has also been 
suggested by Seth, Suzuki, and Critchley (2011) who have developed a model of 
“presence”, defined as the “the sense of being there” (Lombard & Ditton, 1997) or 
“being now there” (Metzinger, 2003), and roughly equivalent to the PS as discussed 
by thinkers in the phenomenological tradition such as Gallagher (2003), Legrand, 
(2006) and Zahavi (2005). On this model the sense of presence is the result of a 
successful top-down prediction of changes in interoceptive signals evoked by 
autonomic control systems and by the body‟s reactions to sensory signals from the 
external world. In addition to explaining the sense of presence through the brain‟s 
successful prediction of internal states Seth et al.‟s model also takes account of the 
importance of the brain‟s predictions of the consequences of motor actions in 
producing a sense of agency, as specified by predictive accounts of the sense of 
agency (Fletcher & Frith, 2009; Haggard & Tsakiris, 2009; Tsakiris & Haggard, 
2005a), meaning that it can take account of the contributions of both interoceptive 
and exteroceptive systems in generating a sense of PS. Thus in the case of both 
Damasio‟s (1999, 2010) and Seth et al.‟s (2012) models, information about the 
body‟s movements and internal states is integrated with afferent sensory information 
about the external world and it is this process of integration that is thought to 
underlie constant sense of phenomenal selfhood that we experience. 
  
If this conception of PS as relying on the integration of different modalities of 
sensorimotor information is correct then greater understanding of the PS might be 
gained by investigating how bodily representations in these different modalities are 
integrated into a coherent whole and perceived as belonging to a cognitive agent. 
Recent work on this issue has distinguished between two distinct ways that one‟s 
body can be perceived as being linked to one‟s self, agency and body ownership 
(Gallagher, 2000; Graham & Stephens, 1994; Marcel, 2003; Stephens & Graham, 
2000; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008; Tsakiris, Schütz-Bosbach, & Gallagher, 
2007; E. van den Bos & Jeannerod, 2002) Briefly, having a sense of agency 
corresponds to feeling that the actions one‟s body makes were determined by one‟s 
own will, while having a sense of body ownership corresponds to the feeling that I 
am the one who is experiencing an action, or other bodily sensation. To see how 
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these two concepts can come apart it is only necessary to consider the difference 
between moving one‟s own arm voluntarily, a scenario which involves both agency 
and body ownership and a second case in which one‟s arm is moved by another 
person grabbing it, a scenario in which one experiences ownership over one‟s arm, 
i.e. it is my arm that is moving, but not agency, i.e. I did not will this movement to 
happen. When considering the processes that lie at the core of the PS it is of note that 
while it seems easily possible to have a feeling of body ownership without having a 
feeling of agency over one‟s body it is less plausible that one could have a feeling of 
agency over one‟s body without also experiencing a feeling of body ownership. 
These phenomenological reflections suggest therefore that the feeling of ownership 
over one‟s body is the more fundamental of these two senses and that body 
ownership alone, with or without a sense of agency, might be sufficient for the 
possession of a PS. Given the apparent primacy of body ownership for the possession 
of a PS I will now proceed to review the empirical research that has been conducted 
on the nature of the sense of body ownership. 
  
1.2.2. The Phenomenal Self in Infancy 
  
One of the key aspects claimed for the PS is its non-linguistic nature. Therefore one 
important question when justifying the claim that the PS is primarily based in a 
bodily form of self-consciousness is whether pre-linguistic infants are capable of 
integrating the information about the current state of their body being transmitted 
from different modalities?  Here I will briefly note a few findings that demonstrate 
that, far from the traditional view of the infants world as a “blooming, buzzing, 
confusion,”  (James, 1890, p. 462),  there is now considerable evidence that infants 
are able to integrate signals from different perceptual modalities to form a unified 
representation of their body and its location in the world. First, neonates are able to 
distinguish between self and other touch. Rochat and Hespos (1997) demonstrated 
this through manipulating the rooting mechanism in which touch to the infants face 
leads to purposeful orientation and movement by the infant until a sold object e.g. a 
nipple or finger comes into contact with the mouth.  Rochat and Hespos touched the 
faces of neonates either with the neonate‟s own hand or with the finger of another 
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person and found that the infants rooted significantly more to tactile stimulation 
generated by another person compared to that generated by their own hand. 
  
Second, infants possess the ability to recognise self-generated stimuli even when this 
stimuli is divorced from current self-generated movements. This was demonstrated 
by the finding that they are able to distinguish the sound of their own crying from the 
cries of other infants and respond in a markedly different manner (Martin & Clark, 
1982). In addition Rochat and Striano (1999) showed that by the age of 2 months 
infants can discriminate between auditory tones that were modulated by their own 
motor actions, via the pressure the infant placed on a pacifier, and auditory tones that 
were not affected by their sucking and that infants display distinctly more 
exploratory patterns of sucking when sucking had an effect on the tones compared to 
when it did not. 
  
Third, infants are able to combine information across both perceptual and motor 
modalities and to situate themselves in the environment according to this 
information.  For example they are able to adjust their head and body posture to the 
illusion of movement created by optic flow to their peripheral vision (Jouen, Lepecq, 
Gapenne, & Bertenthal, 2000) and are capable of adjusting their posture in a moving 
room long before they are capable of self-locomotion (Bushnell & Boudreau, 1993; 
D. N. Lee & Aronson, 1974). 
  
Finally there is evidence that even very young infants are able to detect visual and 
tactile congruencies in the environment and in particular to objects that resemble 
their own bodies. A recent study by Zmyj, Jank, Schütz-Bosbach and Daum  (2011) 
demonstrated that infants at aged 7 months will look significantly longer at a doll‟s 
leg that is stroked in synchrony with their own leg compared to a leg stroked 
asynchronously or a neutral object (e.g. a piece of wood) stroked in synchrony. A 
final relevant study, conducted by Cowie, Makin and Bremner (2013) investigated 
the experience of the rubber hand illusion (RHI, see below) among children between 
the ages of 4 to 9 years; the authors found that children experienced the illusion of 
body ownership after synchronous stimulation as strongly as adults did. The children 
also showed a stronger effect of proprioceptive drift than did adults, although 
regardless of synchrony of visuo-tactile (VT) stimulation children felt their hand to 
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be closer to the rubber hand than did adults suggesting that children are more 
susceptible to the “visual capture” of touch (Pavani, Spence, Driver, & Psicologia, 
2000) than adults are. 
 
1.2.3. Investigating Body Ownership 
  
For much of the history of cognitive science there was no known methodology that 
allowed for the manipulation of participant‟s sense of body ownership. Although it 
was known that some neurological conditions could lead to somatoparaphrenia, the 
loss of a feeling of body ownership over one‟s limbs (see Vallar & Ronchi, 2009, for 
a review), examining the sense of body ownership in healthy participants seemed 
impossible due the difficulty in separating participants from what William James 
memorably described as “the feeling of the same old body always there” (James, 
1890, p. 242). In the past decade however a large amount of research into the factors 
affecting body ownership has been carried out based on a study by Matthew Botvinik 
and Jonathan Cohen (1998) which showed that it is possible to induce a feeling of 
body ownership over an artificial hand by combining the visual stimulation of the 
artificial hand with synchronous tactile stimulation of the participant‟s own hand, the 
resultant feeling of ownership over the artificial hand has led to this paradigm being 
known as the “rubber hand illusion” (RHI). In addition Botvinik and Cohen found 
that experiencing ownership of the rubber hand led participant‟s proprioceptively 
based judgments of the location of their own, unseen, hand to drift towards that of 
the rubber hand, indicating a reliable behavioural measure of the experience of body 
ownership. This finding indicates that, as well as involving the integration of visual 
and tactile signals, the RHI also exerts an influence of proprioceptive representations 
of the state of the body suggesting that all three sensory modalities are involved in 
generating the feeling of ownership over one‟s body. 
  
Following the finding that synchronous VT-stimulation can induce the feeling of 
ownership over a foreign body part researchers have demonstrated that the 
integration of other body related senses can also produce a feeling of body 
ownership. Several studies have now demonstrated that observing the movement of 
another‟s hand in synchrony with the movement of one‟s own hand can also lead to a 
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sense of body ownership (Dummer, Picot-Annand, Neal, & Moore, 2009; Riemer, 
Kleinböhl, Hölzl, & Trojan, 2013; Sanchez-Vives, Spanlang, Frisoli, Bergamasco, & 
Slater, 2010; Walsh, Moseley, Taylor, & Gandevia, 2011). A non-visual version of 
the RHI has also been developed in which participants use one of their hands to 
apply touch to a rubber hand while receiving synchronous tactile stimulation to their 
other hand. This tactile-motor version of the illusion leads to the perception that the 
participant is touching their own other hand (Ehrsson, Holmes, & Passingham, 2005; 
Lopez, Bieri, Preuss, & Mast, 2012; White, Aimola Davies, & Davies, 2011; White, 
Aimola Davies, Halleen, & Davies, 2010). 
  
The role of the integration of sensory information from different modalities in 
creating the feeling of ownership is also revealed by the “rubber voice illusion” (Z. 
Z. Zheng, Macdonald, Munhall, & Johnsrude, 2011). In this illusion hearing a 
stranger‟s voice while saying the same words one‟s self led participants to 
experience the other voice as a distorted version of their own voice and also led to a 
change in participants‟ vocal output to make their speech more closely match that of 
the stranger. 
  
Interestingly, given the links that Damasio (1999, 2010), Seth et al. (2012) and others 
(e.g. Craig, 2003) have made between representations of the internal state of the 
body and the PS,the sense of body ownership is also modulated by awareness of 
body from within (Capelari, Uribe, & Brasil-Neto, 2009; Kammers, Rose, & 
Haggard, 2011; Suzuki, Garfinkel, Critchley, & Seth, 2013; Tajadura-Jiménez & 
Tsakiris, In Press; Tsakiris, Tajadura-Jiménez, & Costantini, 2011). Capelari et al. 
(2009) showed that the application of synchronous painful as well as tactile 
stimulation could induce the feeling of ownership over a rubber hand demonstrating 
that, despite the greater affective importance of painful compared to tactile stimuli, 
pain localization is also modified by visual cues. 
  
Other recent studies have shown that synchronous VT-stimulation is more likely to 
induce the experience of ownership over a rubber hand (Tsakiris et al., 2011) or the 
face of another (Tajadura-Jiménez & Tsakiris, In Press) in participants with lower 
interoceptive sensitivity. Interoceptive sensitivity is calculated by comparing 
participant perception of their own heart beat with their actual heartbeat and the 
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results of these studies suggest that those who are less able to sense their own bodies 
from the inside are more reliant on integrating exteroceptive sensory signals in order 
to determine what is and is not part of their body. Interestingly Suzsuki et al. (2013) 
demonstrated that synchrony between exteroceptive and interoceptive cues can 
modulate the RHI. In their study synchronous VT-stimulation was applied to a 
rubber hand which turned red either in or out of synch with the participant‟s 
heartbeat. They found that the strength of the RHI was increased when the virtual 
hand changed colour in synchrony with a participant‟s heartbeat. Kammers et al. 
(2011) investigated the role of temperature in modulating the RHI and found that 
lowering the temperature of participant‟s own hands prior to VT-stimulation led 
them to experience a stronger RHI illusion while warming the hand led to a decrease 
in the strength of the RHI. In line with the findings on interoceptive sensitivity above 
this finding may reflect the fact that cooling the body decreases the transmission of 
somatosensory signals (Markand, Warren, Mallik, King, & Mahomed, 1990; Phillips 
& Matthews, 1993) while warming the body increases them (Russ, Sticher, Scheld, 
& Hempelmann, 1987). 
  
More evidence of the close relationship between body representation and the PS 
comes from studies showing that similar synchronous VT-stimulation of a participant 
and whole body avatars can induce a feeling of ownership over the avatar (Ehrsson, 
2007; Lenggenhager, Tadi, Metzinger, & Blanke, 2007) or even over the body of 
another person (Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008). It has also been shown that experiencing 
ownership over this full body leads to a whole body variant of proprioceptive drift. 
When blindfolded participants were moved from the position they experienced the 
illusion in and then asked to return to it, their final location was significantly closer 
to the location of the avatar if they had experienced synchronous rather than 
asynchronous stimulation (Lenggenhager et al., 2007). 
  
Further studies using the full body illusion have shown that it is possible to 
manipulate perceptions of participant‟s body size (van der Hoort, Guterstam, & 
Ehrsson, 2011) or limb length (Schmalzl & Ehrsson, 2011)and that experiencing 
ownership over the avatar‟s body leads to the disownership of one‟s own body 
(Guterstam & Ehrsson, 2012). The latter finding is particularly important as it 
implies that the spatial location of the PS is dependent on representations of the 
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location of one‟s body generated by the constant integration of multiple modes of 
sensory information. These findings have led Blanke and Metzinger (2009) to make 
the case that the possession of a minimal form of a PS requires  three conditions to be 
met.  On their account in order for a system to possess an MPS the system must first 
have a weak 1PP defined as an unconscious “purely geometrical feature of a 
perceptual or imagined model of reality possessing a point of projection functioning 
as its origin in sensory and mental processing” (Blanke & Metzinger, 2009).  In order 
for phenomenal selfhood to emerge this weak 1PP must also be represented as taking 
up a certain volume in the world by being mapped onto a global body model.  This 
body model is represented as transparent meaning that the system fully identifies its 
sense of self with the global model of the body and cannot perceive this global model 
as a representation from any amount of introspection. 
 
 1.2.4. Conditions for Body Ownership 
 
One key question for researchers investigating the experience of body ownership is 
what conditions under which the feeling of body ownership can be elicited. An early 
study by Armel and Ramachandran (2003) claimed that synchronous visuo-tactile 
(VT) stimulation of the participant‟s own hand and another object alone was 
sufficient to evoke feelings of ownership over the observed object. Notably however, 
both subjective ratings of ownership and SCRs to threatening stimuli for a non-hand 
object, in this case the surface of a table, in the experimental condition were not 
higher than rating of ownership over a rubber hand in a control condition. This 
finding indicates the importance of the visual form of the stimulated object 
determining the intensity of the illusion of ownership. The study also found that 
increased feelings of body ownership led to higher skin conductance responses 
(SCRs) in response to threatening stimuli being applied to the observed object, 
identifying a physiological proxy for the illusion. 
  
The importance of factors other than synchrony of VT-stimulation in determining 
feelings of body ownership was further underlined by Tsakiris & Haggard (2005b), 
who systematically examined the influence of the stimulated object‟s visual form and 
anatomical location on participant‟s experience of body ownership. Tsakiris and 
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Haggard found that the illusion of ownership over the rubber hand only occurred 
when the object being stimulated was a rubber hand of the same laterality and 
located in the same anatomical position as the participant‟s own hand (a finding also 
noted Ehrsson, Spence, & Passingham, 2004; Farnè, Pavani, Meneghello, & 
Làdavas, 2000; Pavani et al., 2000), while no feelings of body ownership were 
induced for non-hand shaped objects, for a rubber hand placed at an angle of 90º 
from the participant‟s own hand or for a rubber hand of the opposite laterality from 
the participant‟s hand. The importance of anatomical and postural congruency in 
inducing feelings of body ownership has also been replicated by several further 
studies. In terms of postural congruency an number of studies (Lloyd, 2007; Makin, 
Holmes, & Ehrsson, 2008; Preston, 2013) have demonstrated that that the experience 
of body ownership over a rubber hand only occurs when that rubber hand is 
presented within peripersonal space of the body. Moreover Cadieux, Whitworth and 
Shore (2011) found that the RHI is not experienced when the rubber hand is placed 
on the opposite side of the midline of the body from the participant‟s own hand. The 
importance of the orientation of the rubber hand compared to the participant‟s own 
has also been investigated. Costantini and Haggard (2007) systematically modulated 
the posture of the rubber hand, the participant‟s own hand or the direction of 
stimulation on either hand. Mismatch between the stimulation delivered to the 
subject‟s hand and the rubber hand abolished the illusion. It was found that the RHI 
survived small changes in the subject‟s hand posture, provided that the stimulation 
applied was congruent in hand centred, rather than external space. However no RHI 
was induced when same posture transformations were applied to the rubber hand. 
Many other studies (e.g. Ehrsson et al., 2004; Guterstam, Petkova, & Ehrsson, 2011; 
Holle, Mclatchie, Maurer, & Ward, 2011; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005; Zopf, Savage, 
& Williams, 2010) have demonstrated that rotating the rubber hand by 90º or 180º 
serves to prevent the experience of the RHI. 
  
Further studies have replicated and expanded upon the effects found by Tsakiris and 
Haggard (2005b). Haans, Ijsselsteijn, & de Kort (2008) found that VT-stimulation 
over a rubber hand led to greater reports of body ownership than did VT-stimulation 
over a similarly textured rubber matt, while Tsakiris, Carpenter, James and 
Fotopoulou  (2010) systematically varied the similarity of the stimulated object to a 
hand and found that only when an actually rubber hand was used did synchronous 
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stimulation evoke the RHI, as measured by subjective reports and proprioceptive 
drift. Attempting to identify the brain areas responsible for this sensitivity to the 
visual form of the object Tsakiris, Costantini and Haggard (2008) used repetitive 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to disrupt neural activity in the temporal 
parietal junction (TJP) lesions to which have been implicated in impairments in body 
ownership (Berlucchi & Aglioti, 1997; Bottini, Bisiach, Sterzi, & Vallarc, 2002; 
Fotopoulou et al., 2008; Frassinetti, Maini, Romualdi, Galante, & Avanzi, 2008; 
Mort et al., 2003). The study revealed that, subsequent to TMS over the TPJ, 
participants showed reduced proprioceptive drift for a rubber hand after synchronous 
VT-stimulation but increased proprioceptive drift for a wooden block. This suggests 
that the TPJ plays an important role in comparing the visual form of a stimulated 
object with a stored visual representation of the participant‟s own hand (Tsakiris, 
2010). 
  
Two other recent studies have however shown that some situations do seem to allow 
for the experience of body ownership over non-hand objects. A recent study by 
Guterstam, Gentile and Ehrsson (2013) found that when an experimenter stimulated 
the empty air in front of a participant in a pattern that matched the touch felt on the 
participant‟s own hand, many participants reported the sensation of having 
ownership over an invisible hand in the location of the stimulation. This finding 
could be reconciled with the findings of the studies noted above by the fact that the 
absence of any physical object being stimulated leads to a decreased error signal in 
the brain areas involved in comparing visual form than does the presence of a 
physical object that does not match the neural model of the participant‟s own hand. A 
second recent study by Hohwy and Paton (2010) found synchronous visual tactile 
stimulation could lead to the referral of touch onto a cardboard box. Interpretation of 
this study is difficult however as the experimenters did not collect subjective reports 
of the participants experience of ownership over the cardboard box and the illusory 
referral of touch to the box only occurred after participant‟s had experienced a period 
of synchronous VT-stimulation over a rubber hand. 
  
Based on the findings described above Tsakiris (2010) proposed a neurocognitive 
model of body ownership in which the strength of experience of body ownership 
over a foreign object is determined by a series of comparisons between sensory 
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information entering the brain and various different representations of the body (See 
Figure 1-1). In the first comparison the visual form of the object being viewed is 
compared with a model of the visual, anatomical and structural properties of the 
participant‟s body. Based on the findings of Tsakiris et al. (2008), Tsakiris (2010) 
suggests that the right TJP is involved in this comparison. The second comparison is 
between the current postural and anatomical features of one‟s own body and those of 
the observed object. Based on findings from PET and EEG studies (Press, Heyes, 
Haggard, & Eimer, 2008; Tsakiris, Hesse, Boy, Haggard, & Fink, 2007; Tsakiris, 
Schütz-Bosbach, et al., 2007) the anterior parietal cortex and in particular the 
primary and secondary somatosensory cortices were implicated in this comparison. 
 
 
Figure 1-1. Tsakiris’ (2010) model of body ownership. Crossed circles indicated 
different comparators (1 = comparator between visual form of the object and a 
stored body-model; 2 = comparator between the visually specified posture of the 
object and the current body state; 3 = comparison between vision of touch, felt touch 
and the current body state). Recycling sign indicates a loop. 
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The final comparison is between the vision of touch on the observed object and the 
felt touch on one‟s own body and has been argued to have its neural basis in activity 
in the posterior parietal cortex (PPC; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Makin et al., 2008) which 
resolves the conflict between visual and tactile information and recalibrates the 
visual and tactile coordinate systems resulting in the referral of touch which is 
underpinned by activity in the premotor cortex (Ehrsson et al., 2004). The final 
connection in Tsakiris‟ (2010) model is between the change in experience of body 
ownership, reflected in activity in the right posterior insula (Tsakiris, Hesse, et al., 
2007; Tsakiris, Schütz-Bosbach, et al., 2007) and changes to the neural models of the 
body. Thus on this model body ownership is dependent on the integration of bottom 
up information coming from sensory signals and top-down information coming from 
neural representations of the body. In the next section I will elucidate a number of 
ways that manipulations of body ownership have been shown to affect 
representations of the body. 
 
1.2.5. The Effects of Multisensory Induced Changes in Body 
Ownership 
  
Many of the studies reported in this thesis sought to investigate whether multisensory 
induced changes of participants‟ representation of their own body could affect 
representations of the relationship between self and others.  In view of this it is 
instructional to first consider the evidence that such changes can alter how 
participants perceive both their own body and physical objects in the world. 
  
The first way in which (or by which) changes in body ownership affects body 
representations is the phenomena of proprioceptive drift described above. However 
several other modalities of body related information have also been shown to be 
affected by experiencing ownership over a rubber hand. Longo, Schüür, Kammers, 
Tsakiris and Haggard (2009) found that, after experiencing synchronous, but not 
asynchronous, VT-stimulation over a rubber hand, participants rated the rubber hand 
as being more visually similar to their own than those who did not experience 
ownership over the hand. This effect occurred despite the fact that objective 
similarity between the participant‟s hand and the rubber hand, as measured by skin 
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luminance, hand shape, and third-person similarity ratings, did not appear to 
influence participants‟ experience of the RHI, indicating that it was the experience of 
ownership over the rubber hand that led to the perception of increased similarity, 
rather than greater similarity between the participant‟s hand and the rubber hand 
leading to a greater feeling of ownership. Additionally the study by Hohwy and 
Paton (2010) referenced above found that after experiencing ownership over a rubber 
hand participants were more likely to experience ownership over a non-hand object, 
suggesting that experiencing ownership over one non-self object leads to greater 
fluidity in the neural model of one‟s own body. 
  
In addition, experiencing ownership over a non-self hand also leads to effects on the 
acuity of judgments of tactile stimuli applied to one‟s own. Longo, Cardozo and 
Haggard  (2008) demonstrated this effect of ownership using the paradigm of visual 
enhancement of touch (VET) in which observing a hand while making judgments 
regarding the location or orientation of tactile stimuli on one‟s own hand leads to 
increased accuracy in one‟s judgments (Haggard, 2006; Kennett, Taylor-Clarke, & 
Haggard, 2001; Press, Taylor-Clarke, Kennett, & Haggard, 2004; Taylor-Clarke, 
Kennett, & Haggard, 2002; Tipper et al., 1998). Longo et al., (2008) delivered 
synchronous or asynchronous stimulation to the participant‟s own hand and a rubber 
hand and then had participants judge the orientation of different gratings applied to 
their own hand. It was found that those who were low in accuracy on the task 
performed significantly better following synchronous stimulation than following 
asynchronous stimulation. In addition a recent functional magnetic imaging (fMRI) 
study by Brozzoli, Gentile, and Ehrsson (2012) used a reputation suppression 
paradigm to show that experiencing body ownership over a rubber hand leads to a 
recalibration of peripersonal space such that objects approaching the rubber hand 
lead to the same patterns of neural activation as observed normally when objects 
approached the participant‟s own hand. 
  
Changes in body ownership have also been shown to modulate the internal states of 
the body. Moseley et al. (2008) and Hohwy and Paton (2010) both found that 
experiencing the RHI lead to a drop in the temperature of the participant‟s real hand 
suggesting that that the exclusion or inclusion of a body part in a neural model of the 
physical self and the physiological regulation of the body are closely linked in a top-
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down manner. Further Barnsley et al. (2011)found that experiencing ownership over 
a rubber hand led to increased histamine reaction in the participant‟s own hand 
indicating that immunosuppressive as well as homeostatic systems are modulated by 
the attribution of ownership from one‟s own hand to a foreign object. 
  
I will now move to examine evidence that multisensory induced changes to body 
representations can also lead to changes in the perception of objects in the external 
world. Most of the experiments that have investigated this issue so far have 
concentrated on the effect of altering perceived body size on the perception of 
physical objects in the world. Marino, Stucchi, Nava, Haggard, & Maravita (2010) 
used the RHI to increase or decrease the perceived size of participants‟ hands and 
then asked them to grasp a series of different objects that they could see at their real 
size. They measured the maximum grip aperture (MGA) of participants‟ grasping 
movements and found that, after experiencing VT-stimulation over a hand of a larger 
size than their own participants showed a smaller MGA relative to when they made 
the grasping movement after experiencing VT-stimulation over a hand of a normal 
size. This finding suggests that due to the fact that they perceived their hand as larger 
participants thus perceived the objects they had to grasp as smaller than they actually 
were. Interestingly the reverse effect was not found after VT-stimulation of a smaller 
hand, possibly due to the fact that VT-stimulation over small hands seems to lead to 
a reduced RHI. Bernardi et al. (2013) showed that a similar change in MGA held 
when hand size was manipulated within a virtual world. 
  
As well as affecting the action, changes in perceived body size can also affect 
sensory judgments of objects. Haggard and Jundi (2009) demonstrated that 
participants perceived objects as being heavier after experiencing ownership of a 
large hand. The authors interpreted this finding in terms of the „size-weight illusion‟ 
in which a smaller object is perceived as heavier than a larger object of the same 
weight, although again no effect was found when the hand was shrunk. 
(Linkenauger, Leyrer, Bülthoff, & Mohler, 2013) used a virtual reality setup to 
increase or decrease the perceived size of participants‟ hands and found that 
participant‟s judged objects as smaller when they had a larger hand and larger when 
they had a smaller hand. Interestingly in this study, an effect of changes in hand size 
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occurred in both directions although this may be due to the different method by 
which the feeling of ownership was induced (visuo-motor vs. visuo-tactile) 
  
Experiments with the full-body illusion have shown that multisensory induced 
changes in the size of the whole body can also lead to changes in the perception of 
the external world. Van der Hoort et al. (2011) used multisensory stimulation of their 
participant‟s body and that of different sized mannequins to alter participants‟ body 
representations and then asked them to judge the distance and size of various objects. 
It was found that participants felt equal feelings of ownership over a larger or smaller 
body than their own, a fact that may be due to the difference in scope of experiencing 
a change in ownership over just a hand compared to the feeling of being in a 
completely different body. Additionally after feeling ownership over the small body 
they judged objects as being larger and distances as further than they did after 
experiencing ownership of a normal sized body, and the reverse was true when they 
experienced ownership over a large body. This finding was recently replicated 
by Banakou, Groten and Slater (2013) who showed that experiencing ownership of 
the virtual body of a child led to an increase in the perceived size of objects. 
  
The evidence presented here supports arguments for the bodily basis of the PS and 
the power of multisensory induced changes in the perception of one‟s body to affect 
perceptions of both one‟s body and the external world. Less well explored so far 
however, is the question of how much changes in the representation of the bodily self 
can affect perceptions of the social relationship between self and other. Before 
moving to review the current literature surrounding this question however, it is first 
necessary to briefly outline the second key form of selfhood involved in this thesis, 
the social self. 
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1.3. The Social Self 
   
1.3.1. Social and Narrative Selfhood 
  
The SS is an explicit conceptual form of selfhood which emerges through our 
interactions with others, and in particular through linguistic and cultural 
identifications of selfhood (Gallagher, 2000; Mead, 1913, 1935; Neisser, 1991). The 
phrase “the social self” was first used by Mead (1913)who argued that the sense of 
having a self is dependent on the prior presence of social interaction with others.  
According to Mead: 
  
“The mechanism of introspection is ... given in the social attitude which man 
necessarily assumes toward himself, and the mechanism of thought, in so far as 
thought uses symbols which are used in social intercourse, is but an inner 
conversation.” (Mead, 1913, p. 377). 
  
For Mead (1913, 1935) then having a sense of selfhood involves taking a perspective 
on one‟s own experience that is first developed when thinking about others.  Mead 
also emphasised that it is only through internalising the way that others think of and 
define us that we are able to turn the social practices we have learned to apply to 
others back on to ourselves.  Mead distinguished between the “I” and the “Me” as 
two different forms of self-experience.  While the “I” represents the self as a living 
subject, the “Me” represents the self as the internalised attitudes that others show 
towards us.  In contrast however to the conception of the self as subject being 
dependent on bodily experience, for Mead the “I” only comes to exist after the “Me” 
is learned through social interaction with others. 
  
The social self is closely related to the concept of the narrative self (NS). The NS has 
been elucidated by thinkers from different traditions, with differing conceptions of 
narrative (e.g. Dennett, 1991; MacIntyre, 1985; Ricoeur, 1985; see Schechtman 
(2011) for a review). But all emphasise that the experience of a self as unified and 
continuous across a lifetime relies upon the ability to situate one‟s memories, 
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personality traits, goals and values within a coherent narrative structure. The aspect 
of the NS which I wish to emphasise is the role played by social interaction in 
shaping the stories we tell about ourselves. 
  
For example Dennett (1991) notes the importance of social practices such as 
storytelling in allowing children to construct their own narratives later in life and 
MacIntyre (1985) points out that: “We are never more (and sometimes less) than the 
co-authors of our own narratives. Only in fantasy do we live what story we please” 
(MacIntyre 1985, p.213). In life, in contrast to fictional stories, we can be affected by 
the goals and desires of others around us. In the earliest periods of our life we are 
almost totally dependent on the care of others in order to survive and as we grow 
older we emerge into a social world in which we must define ourselves according to 
concepts that have specific cultural and historical traditions. In real life we are rarely 
living out one simple role but instead have multiple and often conflicting memories 
and beliefs about who we are (Goffman, 1959). The type of narrative that guides one 
at work is likely to be very different from the narrative one has when with one‟s 
partner or friends. So, while at one level the role of the NS is to bring a sense of unity 
to our lives, it is also important to recognise that this greater narrative is made up of a 
variety of different sub-narratives that are shaped by different social situations. 
 
1.3.2. The Social Self in Psychology 
  
This theme of the self as composed of different social narratives is also reflected in 
approaches to the self in social psychology. In a recent review McAdams (2013) 
highlights three distinct aspects commonly reflected in psychological theories of the 
self, the self as actor, agent and author and notes the important social influences that 
are necessary for developing a full sense of selfhood. By the self as actor McAdams 
seeks to capture the sense of the self as slotting into various different social roles in 
order to gain a sense of identity within a social group and the process of learning, 
through feedback from one‟s social group, exactly which positions in the social 
hierarchy one should take up. This form of selfhood is closely related to the 
framework set out by social role theory which argues that our behaviour and attitudes 
regarding ourselves develop through the social roles we take up. On this conception a 
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social role is a comprehensive pattern of behaviour and attitudes that constitute a 
strategy for coping with a recurrent set of situations (Turner, 1990). These social 
roles are hypothesised to emerge from an interaction between the individual in the 
role, the other people they interact with while in that role and the social norms that 
govern that role (Charon, 2009). In this way the self is both defined by and plays a 
part in defining the social roles ascribed to it. In discussing the development of the 
self as actor McAdams highlights the work of Harter (2006) who has shown that by 
the time children enter their second decade of life they have moved away from 
describing themselves based purely on their observable traits e.g. physical 
appearance or favourite foods and have instead began to attribute themselves traits 
that capture their broad dispositional tendencies focused on social behaviour. 
  
McAdams (Mcadams, 2013) second conception of selfhood is the self as agent. This 
aspect of selfhood is intended to capture the self as able to set personal goals for the 
future and plan towards them. While this agentive self is less obviously social than 
the actor aspect of the self McAdams highlights the necessity of socialization in 
allowing children to develop the capacity for planning and reflection necessary for 
the full development of the agentive self. In doing so he cities the theories of 
Vygotsky (1978) who emphasised the role of social interaction and support in the 
development of cognitive capabilities, such as the language, attention and memory 
all of which are necessary for the greater self-reflection and planning necessary for 
an agentive self. 
  
The final aspect of selfhood discussed by McAdams is the self as author. By this 
McAdams refers primarily to the NS concept described above. Here I merely wish to 
highlight the empirical research that suggests the importance of social interaction in 
the development of the ability to create a narrative self.  This aspect has been 
addressed by Nelson (2003), among others, who has detailed the way that as children 
begin to learn language they are taught by care-givers to begin to narrate the events 
of their lives.  Although these narratives begin by being highly localised and 
simplistic and require a large amount of prompting from the care giver, e.g. “What 
sort of animals were seen at the circus?” (Fivush & Nelson, 2006). Over time 
children learn to develop these narratives on their own which adds a new awareness 
  
45 
 
of self in past and future experiences and the contrast of that self to others‟ narratives 
of their past and future experiences. 
  
The role of caregivers in scaffolding the child‟s development of a narrative self is not 
just necessary for the development of a sense of narrative self in adulthood.  In 
addition the type of scaffolding that the child receives plays a key role in the shaping 
distinct variations in self-perception across culture and gender. For example girls talk 
more about feelings and thoughts in personal experiences than boys (Fivush, 2011) 
and Fivush and Nelson (2004) argue that the cultural differences in conceptions of 
selfhood between Western and Eastern cultures (for reviews see Cohen, Leung, & 
Hoshino-Browne, 2007; Markus & Kitayama, 2010) can be traced back to 
differences in the way that carers in the West and East support their children in 
developing narratives in autobiographical memory. They note findings that mothers 
from Western cultures talk about the past in more elaborate and emotional language 
and tend to focus on the child‟s own experience of events while mother‟s from 
Eastern cultures tend to emphasis the communal setting of events and to highlight the 
moral emotions and lessons that emerge from experiences (Leichtman, Wang, & 
Pillmer, 2003). These differences in the style of scaffolding appear to continue across 
life with both older children and adults from Western cultures tending to have more 
detailed, elaborate and emotional narratives of their past than their counterparts in 
Eastern cultures (Pillmer, 1998). 
 
 1.3.3. The Gap between Phenomenal and Narrative Selfhood 
  
How does the bodily coupling of sensory and motor information that specifies the PS 
relate to the development of the more cognitively sophisticated SS, with its sense of 
being a self with a narrative history intertwined with others around it? This issue has 
received little attention so far, in part due to the different methodologies and 
traditions that have been involved in defining these two forms of selfhood and their 
associated forms of self-consciousness. Scientific investigation of bodily self-
consciousness has been primarily driven by an emphasis on a solipsistic approach 
that examines the role of multisensory input and body representations for the subject, 
while neglecting the role of interaction with others in the emergence of more 
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complex forms of self-consciousness (Berlucchi & Aglioti, 2010; Lenggenhager et 
al., 2007). 
  
Conversely social psychological approaches to self-consciousness remain largely 
focused on the concept of the self as a cognitive, often disembodied, process. The 
self is treated as an abstract symbolic structure, largely separate from both perception 
and action, and self-consciousness is largely treated as explicit and reflective. As far 
as there is interest in the body within social psychology it tends to focus on the role 
of society in shaping perceptions of body image (O‟Dea & Abraham, 2000; 
Rangkakulnuwat, Pothiban, Metzger, & Tiansawad, 2008; Strauman, Vookles, 
Berenstein, Chaiken, & Higgins, 1991) or in the alteration of the body as a means for 
self-expression (Sweetman, 1999). As an example of the lack of development of the 
links between the bodily and social selves it is worth noting that the quote at the start 
of this chapter “Everywhere in the world, self starts with the body” comes from 
Baumeister‟s (1999) introduction to a collection of essays on The Self in Social 
Psychology. However, both in the rest of his introduction to the self and in the rest of 
the book it is clear that for most researchers in the field, the social self is an entity 
which only happens to be embodied, the body does not even receive an entry in the 
index. 
  
Thus the more general relation between complex forms of social self-consciousness 
and bodily experience remains a mystery. However from the embodied cognition 
perspective outlined in section 1.2 it is a reasonable hypothesis that the bodily 
representations underlying the PS would play a vital role in scaffolding the 
development of social conception of the self. Therefore it is possible that body 
representations of self and other may have an important role in shaping our 
perceptions of our social similarity to others. The experiments described in this thesis 
aim to begin to fill this lacuna in the literature by examining the relationship between 
perceptions of bodily similarity between self and social cognition. Before moving to 
outline these relationship however I will briefly review a number of forms of 
research in the current literature that suggest a connection between the bodily self 
and social cognition. 
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1.4. The Bodily Self in Social Cognition 
  
1.4.1. Embodied Concepts in Social Cognition 
 
The first source of evidence for a link between the body and social cognition comes 
from research showing that many social concepts are closely linked to sensorimotor 
representations of the body.  Many of these studies are motivated in part by the 
embodied metaphor theory put forward by Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999) which 
argues that higher level abstract concepts are grounded in more concrete sensory and 
motor conceptual schemas whose relations are then mapped on to our thinking of the 
more abstract concepts. Here I will briefly consider a small number of examples that 
demonstrate evidence for the mapping of embodied metaphors on to concepts and 
behaviour involved in social cognition. 
  
The first mapping between body and concepts that I wish to highlight is that of 
height and social dominance. The relationship between height and dominance has an 
obvious evolutionary justification, throughout the animal kingdom larger males are 
more likely to attain social dominance through dominance displays and fights 
(Goodall, 1986; McElligott et al., 2001; Schuett, 1997). In developmental terms the 
association between height and power is created early in life as larger parents hold 
dominance over smaller children (B. Schwartz, Tesser, & Powell, 1982). The link 
between dominance and height appears to exert an influence in success in later life 
with taller people earning higher salaries (Frieze, Olson, & Good, 1990; Judge & 
Cable, 2004), being more likely to be found in higher status occupations (Egolf & 
Corder, 1991; Melamed & Bozionelos, 1992), to emerge as leaders (Higham & 
Carment, 1992) and to win presidential elections (Young & French, 1996). 
  
A number of studies have found evidence that this link between height and 
dominance is present at a very general level (Epperson, 2000; Gagnon, Brunyé, 
Robin, Mahoney, & Taylor, 2011; Robin, 2001; Schubert, 2005). For example 
Gagnon and colleagues (2011) showed that people show an implicit link between 
images of elevated terrain and greater social dominance and also between a more 
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abstract representation of height (the cardinal direction north) and social dominance. 
Of more interest to the current thesis however are findings that specifically 
demonstrate a bi-directional link between the perception of power and body size. 
Duguid and Goncalo (2012) found that being primed with stimuli evoking power or 
being placed in a powerful role led participants to underestimate an object‟s height 
relative to their own height, made participants overestimate their own height and 
caused participants to choose a taller avatar to represent them in a second-life game. 
Yap, Mason and Ames (2013)showed that similar manipulations led participants to 
underestimate the height of other people demonstrating the inherent social effects of 
this mapping. In addition research by Fessler and colleagues has also demonstrated 
that increasing the power of another person by giving them a weapon leads that 
person to be perceived as taller (Fessler, Holbrook, & Snyder, 2012) while the 
presence of male companions led men to give lower estimates of the height of a 
potential opponent (Fessler & Holbrook, 2013).   Most intriguing, for the hypothesis 
that altering the bodily self will lead to a change in social behaviour, is a study by 
Yee and Bailenson (2007) which showed that giving people a taller avatar in a virtual 
environment led them to subsequently behave more confidently in a negation task. 
While the manipulation used in this study did not involve the perception of body 
ownership over the virtual body it does serve to show that even relatively abstract 
changes to how we imagine our bodies to be can lead to changes in social behaviour. 
  
The second mapping between the body and social cognition I wish to highlight is the 
relationship between judgements of social closeness or pleasantness and temperature. 
In this case the relevant mapping is between physical warmth and social closeness 
and the converse relationship between being physically cold and loneliness. This 
relationship has been highlighted in the social psychology literature for a long time, 
for example Asch (1946) proposed psychological warmth as being the central 
dimension in which people judge one another and later proposed a relationship 
between physical and psychological warmth (Asch, 1958). As in the case of height 
there is a clear developmental relationship between feeling warm and being close to 
another. In infancy the experience of physical warmth is closely associated with 
being held closely by one‟s carers and protected from the environment and Bowlby 
(1969) argued that this association has resulted in an innate drive for the young of 
many species, including humans, to maintain close distances to their parents and kin. 
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Indeed Fransson, Karlsson and Nilsson (2005) demonstrated that being held by a 
carer led to a much lower difference between infants core and skin temperature than 
did being in a cot.  
 
A number of recent studies have highlighted the bidirectional nature of this 
association between temperature and social closeness. Williams and Bargh (2009) 
showed that simply holding a warm beverage led participants to perceive a person as 
being more socially warm than did holding a cold beverage and, in a second 
experiment, that experiencing a warm as opposed to cold sensation led participants to 
be more likely to choose a gift for a friend rather than for themselves as payment for 
the study. Further work by Bargh and Shalev (2012) showed that people seem to be 
unconsciously aware of the relationship between temperature and social closeness 
finding that greater chronic loneliness was associated with taking warm baths, that 
physical coldness led to increased feelings of loneliness (see also Zhong & 
Leonardelli, 2008) and that experiencing physical warmth led to a decrease in the 
need for social affiliation after recalling a past social rejection. A recent study by 
Ijzerman and colleagues (2012) found evidence for a direct relationship between the 
actual temperature of the body and social isolation, demonstrating that that being 
excluded from an online interaction led to a decrease in skin temperature.  
  
The final mapping between the body and social cognition I will highlight is the 
mapping of a relationship between bodily purity and moral purity, this mapping is of 
interest due to its greater affective aspect than the previous two examples. A number 
of researchers in morality have argued that our sense of morality is grounded in 
emotion and the link between bodily and moral purity is closely linked to the 
emotion of disgust which can be felt towards both physically and morally repellent 
stimuli (e.g. Haidt, Rozin, McCauley, & Imada, 1997). Empirical evidence for the 
association between moral and physical cleanliness has been found in a number of 
different studies. For example Zhong & Liljenquist (2006) showed that after 
recalling some previous immoral behaviour participants were more likely to desire to 
be clean or to choose a cleansing product as a reward for taking part in the study and 
further that using a cleansing product following such recall lessened the likelihood of 
taking part in moral compensatory behaviours (i.e., helping others). Interestingly this 
desire for cleanliness appears to be specific to the effector involved in a morally bad 
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act so that after saying something bad participants are more likely to want 
mouthwash but after typing something bad they are more likely to want hand 
sanitizer (Lee & Schwarz, 2010). Further studies have shown that perceived 
cleanliness can also affect moral judgements, participants judge a transgressor less 
severely when cleanliness was attributed to the transgressor (Schnall, Benton, & 
Harvey, 2008), but more severely when cleanliness was attributed to the self (Zhong, 
Strejcek, & Sivanathan, 2010). The perception of cleanliness also appears to promote 
prosocial behaviour. Liljenquist, Zhong and Galinsky (2010) found that people in a 
room which had recently been sprayed with air freshener were more likely both to 
reciprocate in a trust game and to donate to charity. Evidence has also been found for 
the reverse association between disgust and moral disapproval (Schnall, Haidt, Clore, 
& Jordan, 2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). For example, Inbar, Pizarro and Bloom 
(2012) showed that smelling a disgusting odour can lead to increased disapprobation 
of gay men, while Eskine, Kacinik and Prinz (2011) showed that tasting a disgusting 
(bitter) drink led participants to judge various moral transgressions more harshly than 
did tasting a sweet drink. 
  
The studies covered in this section highlighted three examples of the way that 
representations based on sensorimotor processes can ground concepts involved in 
social cognition. However the role of bodily representations of the self in grounding 
more socially relevant concepts of selfhood is one that has largely been overlooked. 
Attempting to address this lacuna provides one motivation for the studies reported in 
this thesis. 
 
 1.4.2. Shared Body Representations 
  
Another strand of recent research in cognitive science which makes consideration of 
the role of the bodily self in social cognition timely is the increasing interest over the 
past two decades about the role of shared representation of one own body and the 
bodies of others in social cognition.   This interest has been motivated largely by 
findings from cognitive neuroscience that indicate the existence of a frontal-parietal 
system of “mirror neurons”, defined as firing during both the observation and 
execution of particular actions.  These neurons were first directly observed in 
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monkeys through the use of single cell recordings (di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, 
Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992; Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Gallese, 
Fogassi, Fadiga, & Rizzolatti, 2002; Rizzolatti et al., 1988) and have recently been 
identified in humans (Mukamel, Ekstrom, Kaplan, Iacoboni, & Fried, 2010).  There 
have also been a large number of imaging studies that suggest the existence of a 
similar shared neural system of shared representations of action execution and 
observation in humans (for recent reviews see: Bonini, Ferrari, & Fogassi, 2013; 
Fogassi, 2011; Molenberghs, Cunnington, & Mattingley, 2012; Rizzolatti & 
Sinigaglia, 2010). 
  
Further research has found evidence that similar pattern of shared activation also 
occurs in brain areas involved in the perception of touch (Banissy & Ward, 2007; 
Blakemore, Bristow, Bird, Frith, & Ward, 2005; Ebisch et al., 2008; Keysers et al., 
2004), pain (Jackson, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2005; Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 2011; 
Singer & Frith, 2005) and emotion perception (Bastiaansen, Thioux, & Keysers, 
2009; Jabbi, Bastiaansen, & Keysers, 2008; Wicker et al., 2003).  The finding of 
multiple mirror systems in the brain has led several authors to argue that these neural 
systems offer the possibility of a unified theory of social cognition by giving a 
neurofunctional account of how the behaviour, sensations and emotions of others, 
observed from a third person perspective (3PP), can become represented in the same 
way as one‟s own actions, sensations and emotions, which are felt from a first person 
perspective (1PP) thus explaining such social skills as imitation, empathy and mind 
reading (Bernhardt & Singer, 2012; Hurley, 2008; Iacoboni, 2009; Keysers & 
Gazzola, 2009). 
  
The evidence from studies on mirror neurons thus suggests a strong link between 
representations of one‟s own body and the representation of the body of others. 
However the mechanism behind the formation of mirror neurons is currently 
disputed. Some authors (Meltzoff & Decety, 2003; Ramachandran, 2000; Rizzolatti 
& Arbib, 1998; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001) 
have argued mirror neurons are evolved and have used the claims by Meltzoff and 
Moore to have found evidence of imitative gestures in neonate (Meltzoff & Moore, 
1977, 1983, 1989, 1997) to justify this view. However there is increasing evidence to 
suggest that, rather than being present at birth, mirror neurons in fact develop via a 
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combination of associative learning and experiential canalisation (Del Giudice, 
Manera, & Keysers, 2009; Heyes, 2010). 
  
First, despite being regularly cited, the evidence for neonatal imitation is less 
convincing than is often assumed.  In particular only a very small number of 
gestures, such as tongue protrusion have been found to be reliably imitated by 
neonates and these gestures can also be interpreted as generalized, exploratory 
responses to arousing stimuli, and response competition rather than true imitation 
(for more thorough critiques of neonatal imitation see Anisfeld, 2005; Jones, 2009; 
Ray & Heyes, 2011). Second there is now considerable evidence that mirror neurons 
can be altered by experience. Haslinger et al. (2005) showed greater mirror activation 
in pianists than in non-pianists during the observation of piano-playing and Calvo-
Merino, Glaser, Grèzes, Passingham and Haggard (2005) found greater mirror 
activation in classical ballet dancers than in capoeira dancers during observation of 
ballet movements. Further studies have shown that even a short period of 
sensorimotor training is capable of enhancing (Press, Gillmeister, & Heyes, 2007), 
abolishing (Heyes, Bird, Johnson, & Haggard, 2005) and even reversing mirror 
activation in human subjects (Catmur et al., 2008; Catmur, Walsh, & Heyes, 2007). 
  
If the associative learning account of mirror neurons is correct then shared 
representations of self and other emerge due to the close match between one‟s own 
actions and the actions of others. In the next section of this introduction I will 
consider one phenomenon that generates such matching situations, non-conscious 
mimicry, and examine its role in social cognition. 
  
1.4.3. Mimicry and Social Cognition 
 
The importance of synchrony in social interaction can perhaps most clearly be seen 
in the tendency of people to unconsciously mimic the actions of those they are 
around (for recent reviews see: (Chartrand & Lakin, 2013; Chartrand & van Baaren, 
2009).  This tendency exists for both individual actions (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; 
Lakin & Chartrand, 2003; Macrae, Duffy, Miles, & Lawrence, 2008) and for 
temporally extended sequences of action such as postural adjustments, facial 
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expressions and verbal communication (Bernieri, 1988; Cappella, 1997; Likowski, 
Mühlberger, Seibt, Pauli, & Weyers, 2008; van Baaren, Holland, Steenaert, & 
Vanknippenberg, 2003). 
  
Mimicry has been shown to exert a number of effects on social interaction.  For 
example being mimicked leads to an increased sense of liking (Chartrand & Bargh, 
1999) and affiliation (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003) towards the mimicker. This 
increased liking translates into behavioural consequences as demonstrated by the fact 
that people give larger tips to waitresses who repeat their exact words (van Baaren, 
Holland, et al., 2003).  Mimicry also makes people more pro-social, and participants 
who had been mimicked during an interaction were more likely to help an  
experimenter pick up a dropped box of pens and to donate money to charity (van 
Baaren, Holland, Kawakami, & van Knippenberg, 2004; van Baaren, Horgan, 
Chartrand, & Dijkmans, 2004).  As well as these socio-cognitive effects mimicry 
also seems to influence  how well people remember others with people being more 
likely to remember the details of a social encounter with a person who mimicked 
them than with one who did not (Macrae et al., 2008). 
  
There is also evidence that people are unconsciously aware of the role of mimicry in 
building social bonds and that social factors can affect how likely people are to 
mimic others. Lakin and Chartrand (2003) found that participants who were given 
the goal, either consciously or unconsciously through priming, to affiliate with others 
mimicked an experimenter more than those who did not have the goal to affiliate. 
They also found that when participants failed to affiliate with the other they 
subsequently increased mimicry. Cheng and Chartrand (2003) followed up these 
findings by showing that people with high self-monitoring, i.e. a greater awareness of 
the image they present to others (Snyder, 1974), displayed increased mimicry when 
interacting with someone of equal or higher status compared to someone of lower 
status. This effect was not found in people with low self-monitoring suggesting that 
high self monitors unconsciously recognise the power of mimicry in facilitating 
social interactions. 
  
Two recent studies have demonstrated that the effect of social attitudes on mimicry 
was direct and beyond participants‟ control.  Likowski et al. (2008) used written 
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reports to give participants positive, negative or neutral feelings towards three actors 
and found that participants showed the most facial mimicry of the expressions of the 
person they had a positive view of and the least for the person they felt negatively 
towards. Leighton, Bird, Orsini and Heyes (2010) had participants observe hand 
actions and they were required to perform either the same or a different action with 
their own hand. Participants were primed with either pro-social or anti-social words 
and it was found that those primed with pro-social words were faster to perform an 
action in congruent trials than those primed with anti-social words but slower to 
perform the action in incongruent trails. This finding shows that the modulation of 
bodily mimicry is directly modulated by social attitudes as oppose to being mediated 
by other processes i.e. attention and thus further emphasises the close link between 
higher level social cognition and sensorimotor processing. 
  
Non-conscious mimicry is also affected by how much one identifies with the person 
to be mimicked. Yabar, Johnston, Miles and Peace (2006) found greater mimicry of a 
non-Christian confederate than a Christian confederate among non-Christian 
participants.  They also found that the amount of actions of the Christian that 
participants mimicked was positively correlated to their implicit attitudes towards 
Christians. In a similar study Bourgeois and Hess (2008) found greater facial 
imitation of in-group compared to out-group models. Evidence for the modulation of 
mimicry by in-group or out-group identification has also been found by several other 
authors (Liebert et al., 1972; Neely, Heckel, & Leichtman, 1973; van der Schalk et 
al., 2011; Weisbuch & Ambady, 2008). 
  
Other self-related attitudes can also affect mimicry. In a series of three experiments, 
(van Baaren, Maddux, Chartrand, de Bouter, & van Knippenberg, 2003) investigated 
the effect self-construal on mimicry.  In the first two studies participants were primed 
with either an independent or interdependent self-construal and it was found that 
those primed with an interdependent self-construal showed greater mimicry than 
those primed with an independent self-construal. In the third study participants from 
either an independent (American) or interdependent (Japanese) culture were 
observed while watching a person and the same effect was found. Hogeveen and 
Obhi (2011) also investigated the relationship between self-construal and non-
conscious mimicry. They primed participants with either independent or 
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interdependent self-construal while they perform the same task as used in Leighton et 
al. (2010). The study found that participants were slower to act on incongruous 
compared to congruous trial and that this effect was stronger when participants 
received an interdependent prime compared to an independent prime. Mimicry has 
also been shown to be affected by competitiveness (Weyers, Mühlberger, Kund, 
Hess, & Pauli, 2009); feelings of closeness or liking towards the person being 
imitated (Fischer, Becker, & Veenstra, 2012; Mcintosh, 2006) and whether or not the 
action to be imitated is carried out by a human or not (Longo & Bertenthal, 2009; 
Press et al., 2007). 
  
The propensity for unconscious mimicry is so widespread that Lakin et al. (2003) 
have argued that it must be an evolutionary adaptation which acts to build a sense of 
affiliation between people like a kind of “social glue.” While this theory does offer 
an explanation for why people so commonly mimic others around them, it fails to 
address the issue of why mimicry leads to increased feelings of closeness in the first 
place.  The studies on multisensory stimulation‟s effects on body ownership viewed 
above suggest one possible answer to this question. When one‟s own actions are 
mimicked by a social partner it creates a form of multisensory stimulation in which 
one‟s own action intentions are reflected in the actual bodily movements of the 
mimicker.  This synchrony between one‟s own actions and those of the other could 
lead to the same blurring of the boundary between self and other and cause me to 
expand my sense of bodily selfhood to include the other in it, creating the feeling of 
affiliation and closeness observed in the studies detailed above. 
 
1.4.4. The Power of Synchrony 
 
Further evidence suggesting that the effects of mimicry may be due to the increased 
overlap it creates between one‟s own bodily self and the body of others comes from 
research that has demonstrated the power of synchronous movement to increase 
cooperative and pro-social behaviours. The study of human movement has 
demonstrated that people naturally synchronise their body movements to each other 
across a variety of different activities including: limb movements (Issartel, Marin, & 
Cadopi, 2007; Schmidt, Carello, & Turvey, 1990), walking (van Ulzen, Lamoth, 
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Daffertshofer, Semin, & Beek, 2008; Zivotofsky & Hausdorff, 2007) and the motion 
of rocking chairs (Richardson, Marsh, Isenhower, Goodman, & Schmidt, 2007). 
Such cases of synchronised action are one of the most basic forms of human 
interaction (Knoblich & Sebanz, 2008). Indeed, there is now evidence that 
behavioural synchrony occurs not only in humans but also in other social animals 
such as monkeys (Nagasaka, Chao, Hasegawa, Notoya, & Fujii, 2013) and dolphins 
(Connor, Smolker, & Bejder, 2006). 
  
Behavioural synchrony has been shown to have an effect on how people perceive 
observed social interactions. Miles, Nind and Macrae (2009) asked participants to 
rate the rapport between two walking figures that could be in a variety of different 
phases of synchrony and found that participants perceived the rapport between two 
people walking was strongest when their steps where most synchronised with one 
another and weakest when they were least synchronised. In a similar vein Lakens and 
Stel (2011) showed that both stick figures and real people were more likely to be 
perceived as belonging to a cohesive group when they were waving synchronously 
compared to asynchronously and Bernieri, Davis, Rosenthal and Knee (1994) found 
that participants judged people moving in synchrony as having a better rapport even 
when the observed videos had been edited so that only gross bodily actions were 
visible. 
  
As well as affecting judgements of other people‟s interactions acting in synchrony 
has been shown to exert a significant effect on people‟s feelings towards their own 
interaction partners. Hove and Risen (2009) demonstrated that synchronous 
movements between partners also lead to greater feelings of affiliation and Valdesolo 
and Desteno (2011) showed that participants felt greater compassion towards the 
victim of a moral transgression when they had previously engaged in synchronous, 
compared to asynchronous, hand tapping with them. In a related manner Nowak, 
Watt and Walther (2005) showed that people who interacted remotely using 
synchronous, as opposed to time delayed communication media, felt increased social 
attraction to their partners. 
  
There is also evidence to suggest that synchronous movement boosts the cognitive 
processes involved in social interaction. A recent study by Pellegrini and Ciceri  
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(2012) found that participants who synchronised their breathing to audio recordings 
of another person‟s breathing were more accurate when asked to judge the mental or 
physical difficulty of the task that person had been performing. Moreover 
synchronous movement also seems to increase performance in cooperative tasks. 
Valdesolo, Ouyang and DeSteno (2010) demonstrated that rocking in synchrony 
enhanced individuals‟ perceptual sensitivity to the motion of other entities and 
thereby increased their success in a subsequent joint-action task. 
  
As mentioned above synchronous movements have been shown to have effects on 
participant‟s ratings of affiliation and compassion, however such self report measures 
have a number of limitations including being open to demand characteristics  and 
having questionable validity in predicting behaviour (MacCann, Matthews, Zeidner, 
& Roberts, 2003; Naef & Schupp, 2009; Spector, 1994). A number of other studies 
have therefore used techniques from behavioural economics to investigate how far 
synchrony can affect people‟s actual behaviour. Wiltermuth and Heath (2009) 
showed both walking and singing in synchrony with a group of others subsequently 
led to greater group cooperation in both a public-goods game and a weak link 
coordination exercise. In subsequent studies one of the authors also highlighted the 
negative behavioural consequences of increased affiliation due to synchronous 
movement demonstrating that participants who moved in synch with an experimenter 
were subsequently more likely to comply with requests to either kill insects 
(Wiltermuth, 2012b) or administer a noise blast to another group of participants 
(Wiltermuth, 2012a). 
  
In addition, Launay, Dean and Bailes (2013) recently showed that simply hearing 
what they believed were sounds made by another person tapping in time with their 
own actions, although in fact the study used virtual partners, was enough to lead to 
participants offering greater amounts of money in a trust-game. Fischer, Callander, 
Reddish and Bulbulia (2013) used an even more ecologically valid approach by 
having participants take part in real religious rituals that involved varying degrees of 
synchronised movement and showed that the amount of synchrony involved in a 
ritual was a key factor in increasing the amount of money offered by participants in a 
subsequent public goods game.  In another study the same group demonstrated that 
the effect of synchronous action on pro-social behaviour was not confined to 
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interaction partners but also encompassed non-partners, indicating that synchronous 
action can act as a general prime towards pro-social behaviour Reddish, Bulbulia and 
Fischer (2013). 
  
Additional support for the idea that synchronous movement plays an important part 
in creating social links can be seen in considering the role of synchronous bodily 
movement in many social situations that encourage affiliation within a group.  
Dancing represents perhaps the most universal example of interpersonal 
synchronisation.  From the campfires of traditional hunter gatherer societies to night 
clubs in the industrialised world people from all cultures gather to dance and feel a 
sense of bonding and togetherness while doing so. A number of authors (e.g. Brown, 
2000; Levitin, 2008) have argued that the human propensity for dance and music has 
emerged as the result of an adaptation to facilitate group bonding and the sense of 
being part of a tight knit community.  However there are many other examples; 
crowds at sporting events, religious gatherings and political rallies will often chant, 
sing and move in synchrony, Japanese corporations have long used communal 
exercise such as Tai Chi as a way to encourage a sense of team work among their 
employees and soldiers are trained to march in step in order to develop the feeling of 
being part of a well-oiled machine.  At the most extreme level such group activities 
can lead to a loss of one‟s sense of self as a distinct individual and the feeling of 
being absorbed into a larger group identity, a phenomenon known as deindividuation 
(Mann, Newton, & Innes, 1982; Mullen, Migdal, & Rozell, 2003; Zimbardo, 1969). 
  
1.5. Investigating the Relationship between the 
Bodily Self and the Social Self 
  
The aim of the experiments reported in this thesis was to investigate the relationship 
between the multisensory based processes involved in the generation of a sense of 
bodily selfhood and the more abstract socially constructed forms of self that are 
involved in social cognition. Based on the review of the current literature regarding 
self, body and social cognition conducted above, such research fills a notable lacuna 
in the current research on the self. Based on the review of the empirical research 
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above there are two key motivations for filling this lacuna. The first is to examine 
whether, in line with the predictions of the embodied cognition paradigm, the 
sensorimotor processes involved in the formation of the bodily self also serve to 
ground conceptual representations of the self that are involved in social cognition. 
The possibility of such a relationship is suggested by the previously reviewed work 
demonstrating that sensorimotor processes play a role in grounding other concepts 
involved in social cognition. The second motivation comes from the literature 
showing the power of imitation and synchronous movement to create the perception 
of social closeness. These findings, together with the large amount of research 
demonstrating the role of synchronous multisensory and sensorimotor signals in 
structuring the experience of body ownership, suggest that the feeling of greater 
bodily similarity may, by leading to an association between self and other, drive 
feelings of greater social similarity.  Given the evidence presented above on the role 
of multisensory stimulation in changing representations of the bodily self, the 
investigation of this question is important in ascertaining whether the social effects 
that have been found for synchrony are mediated by changes in the bodily self. 
  
In the rest of this thesis I will present a series of studies that seek to investigate the 
relationship between bodily and social conceptions of the self from both directions. 
These experiments thus sought to discover whether multisensory stimulation, and the 
resultant feelings of body ownership, can change our social perceptions of others, as 
well as the reverse question of whether the amount of social closeness we feel 
towards others affects how closely our representations of their body overlaps with 
those of our own. 
  
The work presented in this thesis all aims to examine the relationship between bodily 
and social representations of self and other. Conceptually however, the studies 
reported can be roughly divided into two distinct, but complementary streams.  The 
first, comprising of the experiments in chapters 2, 3 and 4, investigated how 
multisensory induced changes in body representation could affect the perception of a 
different social group. The second, comprising the experiments contained in chapters 
5 and 6, investigated the relationship between interpersonal social interaction and 
representations of one‟s own and others‟ bodies. 
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Chapter 2 investigates the effect of skin colour on inducing sense of body ownership 
and the effect of feeling ownership over the hand of a racial out-group on attitudes 
towards that out-group. Experiment 2.1 employs a within subject design to 
investigate the role of skin colour in the rubber hand illusion using measures of 
participant self-report (Likert scale responses), proprioceptive drift and physiological 
response to painful stimuli and also investigated the relationship between body 
ownership and implicit racial bias as measured by the Implicit Association Task 
(IAT).  Experiment 2.2 built on the results of experiment 2.1 by examining the role 
of skin colour in the RHI using a more controlled means of measuring physiological 
response to painful stimuli and by including an additional control of synchronous 
stroking of a hand from a third person perspective in order to examine whether 
changes in physiological response to threat were primarily due to synchronous 
stroking or the experience of body ownership. 
  
Chapter 3 investigates the role of experiencing body ownership over a hand from a 
different racial group in changing social and bodily signatures of prejudice. 
Experiment 3.1 follows up the findings from experiment 2.1 by using a between 
subjects design to investigate whether multisensory stimulation over a hand from a 
different racial group can alter participants‟ implicit attitude towards that racial group 
as measured by the IAT. Experiment 3.2 uses a within subject design to investigate 
whether multisensory stimulation over a hand from a different racial group can alter 
sensorimotor racial bias as measured by TMS induced motor evoke potentials 
(MEPs) in response to painful stimuli. 
  
Chapter 4 moves from examining the effects of body ownership on racial attitudes to 
examining the power of multisensory induced body ownership to lead to stereotype 
activation. Experiment 4.1 uses a between subjects design to investigate whether 
multisensory stimulation over an elderly hand can lead to slower imagined 
movements in a motor imagery task.  Experiment 4.2 attempts to better control for 
experimenter effects by using a within-subject design to examine the same question. 
  
In chapter 5, I move into the second stream of research and investigate the 
relationship between social interaction, in this case a trust game, and representations 
of bodily similarity. Experiment 5.1 investigates, using a between subject design, 
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whether synchronous IMS between the face of the participant and the face of a 
trustee in a trust game would lead to greater offers of money than asynchronous IMS. 
Experiment 5.2 investigates the same question but using a within subject design and 
with a more sensitive measure of the amount of money participants were willing to 
send. Experiment 5.3 on the other hand investigates the reverse question of whether 
evidence of trustworthy behaviour leads to a perception of greater facial similarity. 
Participants took part in two trust games; in one, trust was reciprocated, and in the 
other, trust was betrayed. Prior and subsequent to these trust games participants 
performed self-face recognition tasks with the faces of the two trustees. 
  
In the final experiment chapter 6 investigates, using fMRI, whether observing the 
actions of a trustworthy person while they take part in an economic game with the 
participant leads to greater activation of neural areas involved in action execution 
than does observing the same actions made by an untrustworthy person. 
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 Chapter 2. Beyond the Colour of My 
Skin: How Skin Colour Affects the 
Sense of Body Ownership
2
 
 
"'First of all,' he said, 'If you can learn a simple trick, Scout, you'll get along a 
lot better with all kinds of folks. You never really understand a person until you 
consider things from his point of view-' 
'Sir?' 
'-until you climb into his skin and walk around in it.'" 
  Harper Lee, (1960, p. 31) 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Recent studies on the role of multisensory integration for body-awareness have aptly 
demonstrated the malleability of body representations. In particular, bodily illusions 
such as the RHI, (see Botvinick & Cohen, 1998), the full body illusion (Ehrsson, 
2007; Lenggenhager et al., 2007) and the body swap illusion (Petkova & Ehrsson, 
2008) suggest that synchronized visuo-tactile (VT) stimulation between one‟s own 
body and a foreign body can change the sense of body ownership. The previous 
chapter Several studies have shown that factors such as the corporeality of the 
stimulated object (Haans et al., 2008; Tsakiris et al., 2010), the anatomical 
congruency (Pavani et al., 2000; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005b), the volumetric 
congruency (Pavani & Zampini, 2007), the postural congruency (Austen, Soto-
Faraco, Enns, & Kingstone, 2004; Costantini & Haggard, 2007) and the spatial 
relation between viewed and felt body-part (Lloyd, 2007), modulate the induction of 
the RHI and the experience of body ownership. For example, greater discrepancies 
                                                 
2
 The experiments reported in this chapter are published as:  
Farmer, H., Tajadura-Jiménez, A., & Tsakiris M. (2012). Beyond the colour of my skin: How skin 
colour affects the sense of body ownership. Consciousness and Cognition, 21, 3, pp. 1242-1256.  
 
  
63 
 
between the visual form of the viewed object relative to the participant‟s hand or 
between the posture of the rubber hand relative to the participant‟s hand diminish or 
even abolish the RHI (Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005b). 
 
Less is known however about how more surface level differences between the 
participant‟s own hand and the rubber hand affect the RHI. One area of particular 
interest is whether the skin colour of the rubber hand compared to that of the 
participant has an effect on the inducement or strength of the RHI. Skin colour is a 
particularly salient difference between racial groups and, as such, appears to be a 
default method of separating others into in-group and out-group categories, 
participating in several social cognition processes (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; 
Hewstone, Hantzi, & Johnston, 1991; though see Kurzban, Tooby, & Cosmides, 
2001). Therefore the extent to which skin colour affects the RHI provides a viable 
way of investigating both whether social distinctions influence body ownership, but 
also how body ownership can influence social distinctions. 
 
The question of whether factors such as skin colour have an effect on body 
ownership is further motivated by the findings of a number of recent studies. Using 
behavioural and neuroimaging methods these studies have shown that the activation 
of shared bodily representations for self and other (Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2010; 
Keysers & Gazzola, 2009; Rizzolatti & Fabbri-Destro, 2010; Thomas, Press, & 
Haggard, 2006) can be modulated by whether the other person being observed is 
considered to be a member of an in-group or an out-group (Désy & Théoret, 2007; 
Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2010; Molnar-Szakacs, Wu, Robles, & Iacoboni, 2007; Serino, 
Giovagnoli, & Làdavas, 2009). For example Serino and colleagues (2009) 
investigated the effect of in-group/out-group distinctions on the visual remapping of 
touch (VRT), an effect in which the observation of touch on another‟s body leads to 
greater sensitivity to tactile stimulation on one‟s own body. Participants were more 
accurate in detecting touch when they observed touch delivered on the face of 
someone from the same ethnic or political group as themselves. The second of these 
findings is especially interesting as it involves a purely social distinction between 
self and other with no greater bodily dissimilarity (e.g. same skin colour) between a 
politician with the opposing views to one‟s own than to one with the same views. 
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Given this evidence for a distinction between in-group and out-group in the 
activation of shared bodily representations the question that the current study seeks 
to address is whether changes in the sense of body ownership induced by the RHI 
can also be elicited for a hand of a different skin colour. To date only two studies 
have commented on this question, but without testing this hypothesis directly. 
Longo, Schüür, Kammers, Tsakiris and Haggard, (2009) reported that the actual 
similarity of skin colour between the participants‟ hands and the rubber hand, as 
measured by both third person ratings and skin luminosity, seemed to have no effect 
on the strength of the RHI. Similarly, Holmes, Snijders and Spence, (2006) examined 
the effect of visual exposure to a white rubber hand on participants‟ reaching 
movements and found no difference between white and non-white participants in 
either the alteration of reaching movements or the sense of perceived body 
ownership over a white rubber hand, suggesting that skin colour does not affect body 
ownership. Although Holmes et al.‟s study did not induce the RHI using VT 
stimulation but rather only through visual exposure to a rubber hand perceived as 
being in the spatial location of the participant‟s own hand and overall participants did 
not experience strong feelings of ownership over the rubber hand. However, neither 
of these studies directly addressed the question of how skin colour impacts on 
feelings of body ownership. Both Longo et al. and Holmes et al. used a white rubber 
hand, the skin colour of the culturally dominant group, and only included a small 
number of non-white participants (around 25% of all participants in both Longo et al. 
and Holmes et al. (Longo et al., 2009, N. Holmes, personal communication, 7
th
 
December, 2011) and neither study directly manipulated the skin colour of either the 
rubber hand used or the population tested. 
 
The current study is the first to directly investigate in a systematic manner whether 
the inducement and strength of the RHI is modulated by the skin colour of the rubber 
hand. Rather than testing different racial groups, we opted for the direct control of 
the skin colour of the rubber hand. Therefore, across two experiments, the skin 
colour of the rubber hand (i.e. white vs. black) was manipulated in order to examine 
the extent to which white participants experienced a sense of body ownership for a 
body-part from a same or different racial group. The change in body ownership was 
quantified using introspective (i.e. RHI questionnaire), behavioural (i.e. 
proprioceptive drift) and physiological (i.e. skin conductance response, SCR) 
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measures.  Experiment 2.1 examined the effect of synchronous vs. asynchronous 
visuo-tactile (VT) stimulation on the experience of body ownership for hands of both 
skin colours. Experiment 2 built on these findings by including a new condition in 
which participants observed synchronous stimulation of the hands from a third 
person perspective (3PP) in addition to the synchronous and asynchronous conditions 
in which the rubber hand appeared from a 1st person perspective (1PP). A pre-VT 
stimulation measure of SCR was also introduced in order to examine any differences 
in baseline SCR to threatening stimuli between the black and white rubber hands. 
 
In order to examine whether the participants‟ psychosocial attitudes had an effect on 
the strength of their feelings of body ownership over the black hand, their implicit 
bias in favour of people of white ethnicity compared to people of black ethnicity was 
measured. Due to its prevalence and societal importance, people‟s attitudes towards 
members of different racial groups have been extensively studied (for a review see 
Dunham & Degner, 2010). However, research in this area is complicated by the fact 
that attitudes towards racial out-groups are a socially sensitive area, and therefore 
few people will admit to being prejudiced against those of a different race if 
explicitly asked. Therefore in order to gain a measure of attitudes towards other races 
that goes beyond explicit declarations, researchers have had to develop ways of 
tapping into people‟s implicit attitudes which are more difficult to disguise or inhibit 
due to social pressure. One method for measuring such implicit attitudes is the 
Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). The IAT 
functions by presenting participants with stimuli of two particular types (e.g. pictures 
of faces and words) and asking them to put these stimuli into one of two categories 
(e.g. black or white faces and good or bad words).  The response buttons for the 
categories are then paired together (e.g. good words and white faces vs. bad words 
and black faces) and participants‟ reaction times are measured, then the categories 
are switched around (e.g. good words and black faces vs. bad words and white faces) 
and participants do the task again.  Then reaction times for the two conditions are 
compared and a ratio is derived that reflects how strong the participants associate the 
two different types of stimuli. In the race IAT participants are typically much faster 
to respond when pairing good words with white faces and bad words with black 
faces than vice versa. 
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Scores on the race IAT have been shown to correlate with behavioural measures of 
racial bias, including hiring recommendations for black versus white applicants 
(Ziegert & Hanges, 2005), prosocial behaviour towards black people (Stepanikova, 
Triplett, & Simpson, 2011), physicians treatment decisions for black and white 
patients (Green et al., 2007) and other people‟s judgments of participants‟ racial bias 
based on viewing an interaction with a black confederate (McConnell & Leibold, 
2001; Richeson & Shelton, 2005). The wide range of correlations suggests that the 
IAT provides an accurate measure of people‟s underlying racial attitudes.   
 
Experiment 2.1 also investigated whether there was a converse relationship between 
body ownership and racial bias by having participants complete the same IAT again 
after the VT stimulation. In addition participants‟ trait empathy was also measured 
using the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI, Davis, 1980, 1983) to examine the 
relationship between empathy and the RHI and to determine whether those with 
greater empathic traits were more likely to feel ownership over a hand of a different 
skin colour. 
 
2.2. Experiment 2.1 
 
2.2.1. Methods 
 
2.2.1.1. Design 
The study used a repeated measures design with 3 factors, each with 2 levels. The 
first factor was the mode of VT stimulation between the participant‟s hand and the 
rubber hand (synchronous vs. asynchronous); the second factor was the skin colour 
of the rubber hand (white hand vs. black hand); and the third factor was the type of 
stimulus appearing at the end of the VT stimulation (pain vs. touch). Therefore there 
were a total of 8 conditions (See Table 2-1). Each condition was presented once per 
participant and conditions were presented in a randomised order. 
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Table 2-1. Design of Experiment 2.1. 
Condition 
Synchrony of V-T 
stimulation 
Skin colour of the 
rubber hand 
Type of stimuli applied 
to the rubber hand 
1 Synchronous White Pain 
2 Synchronous White Touch 
3 Synchronous Black Pain 
4 Synchronous Black Touch 
5 Asynchronous Black Pain 
6 Asynchronous Black Touch 
7 Asynchronous White Pain 
8 Asynchronous White Touch 
 
2.2.1.2. Procedure 
Participants were asked to attend 2 experimental sessions within 7 days of each 
other. In the first session participants were asked to complete a demographic 
questionnaire and the IRI (Davis, 1980, 1983). Following this, participants carried 
out a computer administered version of the race-IAT. The associations between 
stimuli and response key and the order of associations (i.e. positive words and white 
faces or positive words and black faces) were counterbalanced across participants 
(Greenwald et al., 1998; Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). The data from the 
IATs were analysed using the improved IAT scoring algorithm recommended by 
Greenwald et al. (2003; see Table 2-2). The IAT‟s were performed using 
Presentation® software (Version 16.03, www.neurobs.com) 
 
At the beginning of the second experimental session two electrodes were attached to 
the index and middle fingers of the participant‟s right hand in order to measure skin 
conductance response (SCR) to the stimulus (pain or touch) presented at the end of 
VT stimulation. SCR is a sensitive and valid indicator for arousal (Boucsein, 1992). 
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Physiological signals were sampled at a rate of 250 Hz and amplified (AD 
Instruments). 
Table 2-2. Steps of the improved IAT scoring algorithm (adapted from Greenwald, 
Nosek and Banaji, 2003). 
Step Procedure 
1 Use data from block 3, block 4, block 6 and block 7 
2 
Eliminate trials with latencies > 10,000 ms, eliminate subjects for 
whom more than 10% of trials have latency less than 300 ms 
3 Use all trials 
4 Compute mean of correct latencies for each block 
5 
Compute one pooled SD for all trials in block 3 & block 6; another for 
block 4 and block 7 
6 
Replace each error latency with block mean (computed in Step 5) - 600 
ms 
7 Average the resulting values for each of the four blocks 
8 Compute two differences: Block 6 - block 3 and block 7 - block 4 
9 Divide each difference by its associated pooled- trials SD from Step 6 
10 Average the two quotients from Step 11 
 
In each of the eight experimental conditions participants received VT stimulation 
while looking at a rubber hand (see Figure 2-1). The technique used to deliver VT 
stimulation and collect participants proprioceptive judgements was identical to that 
used by Tsakiris and Haggard (2005, see experiment 2.1). Participants sat in front of 
a table with a frame on it covered by a two way mirror. The two way mirror was used 
to make the rubber hand appear (during stimulation) and disappear (during 
proprioceptive judgements and questions). For each condition participants saw a 
ruler reflected on the mirror. The ruler was positioned 18 cm above the mirror, to 
appear at the same gaze depth as the rubber hand. Participants were asked, “Where is 
your index finger?” and in response, they verbally reported a number on the ruler. 
They were instructed to judge the position of their finger by projecting a parasagittal 
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line from the centre of their fingertip to the ruler. During the judgments, there was no 
tactile stimulation, and the lights under the two-way mirror were switched off to 
make the rubber hand invisible, leaving only the ruler visible. Following the 
judgement, the lights under the two-way mirror were switched on so that participants 
could see the rubber hand, and the experimenter commenced VT stimulation for 120 
seconds. During VT stimulation the participant‟s left hand and the rubber hand were 
stimulated, on the index, middle and ring fingers alternately, from the knuckle to the 
tip with two identical paintbrushes with a frequency of approximately 1 Hz. In the 
synchronous condition the hands were brushed at the same time, while in the 
asynchronous condition they were brushed 180° out of phase. 
 
After VT stimulation, the experimenter either, produced a hypodermic syringe and 
thrust it into the rubber hand‟s index finger (pain stimulus), or produced a cotton-
bud, and touched the rubber hand‟s index finger with it (touch stimulus). To 
minimize the effect of surprise, participants were shown the syringe and cotton-bud 
before the experiment began and were assured that these would not touch their own 
hand. To control for the timing of events across conditions, the experimenter was 
listening to an audio file that prompted them when to cease VT stimulation and when 
to apply the pain or touch stimuli to the rubber hand. 
 
4 seconds after the delivery of the pain or touch stimuli, the lights under the two-way 
mirror were switched off, so that participants could no longer see the rubber hand, 
and a second judgement of felt location was obtained. Participants were then asked to 
remove their left hand from the table, and to use a 7-point Likert Scale (ranging from 
-3, i.e. strongly disagree, to +3, i.e. strongly agree) to indicate their agreement on 
three statements related to their own subjective experience during each VT condition, 
which were adapted from Longo, Schüür, Kammers, Tsakiris and Haggard (2008). 
Longo, Schüür, et al. asked partcicipants to indicate the extent of their agreement or 
disagreement with 27 statements in each block, using a 7-item Likert scale, they then 
carried out a principal component analysis on the responses to the questions and 
identified four factors into which the questions fell, embodiment, loss of own hand, 
movement and affect. A further analysis revealed that the embodiment facotor could 
itself be broken down into three subfactors, ownership, location and agency. Of the 
three questions used in the current study questions 1 and 3 loaded onto the location 
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factor, question 1 to the location of the touch from the paint brush during VT-
stimulation and question 3 to the location of the touch from the cotton bud or syringe 
following VT stimulation, while question 2 loaded onto the ownership factor.    
Participants were also asked a fourth question on their perception of pain when the 
stimuli touched the rubber hand which was rated on a 7 point scale from 0 (no pain) 
to 6 (intense pain). Once this was completed the next block began. Blocks were 
presented in a random order across participants. Finally, once all blocks had been 
completed, participants again carried out the race IAT. 
 
2.2.1.3. Analysis of Behavioural and Physiological Data 
Proprioceptive drift was calculated by subtracting participants‟ pre-stimulation 
proprioceptive judgements from their post-stimulation proprioceptive judgements for 
each condition. 
 
SCR values were calculated by taking the mean SCR from the 6 seconds starting 1 
second after the appearance of the pain/touch stimuli and subtracting from this the 
mean SCR between 3 and 1 seconds before the appearance of the stimulus (baseline; 
Dimberg, 1990). This interval was chosen to be the region of interest, because 
changes in SCR normally occur between 1 and 2 seconds after stimulus onset, 
although the response can be delayed up to 5 seconds (Edelberg, 1967). Following 
standard guidelines for the analysis of electrodermal responses, SCR amplitudes 
below 0.05 μS were scored as zero responses (Boucsein, 1992; Dawson, Schell, & 
Filion, 2007). Participants who had zero responses in more than half of the trials in 
which the pain stimuli appeared were considered „null-responders‟ and were 
excluded from the analysis (Phelps, Connor, Gatenby, Gore, & Davis, 2001). The  
failure to detect an SCR can be due to a number of factors such as individual 
differences in SCR (Christie, 1981), rapid habituation to threatening stimuli, or a loss 
of contact between the electrodes and the participant‟s skin, since it was not possible 
to determine which of these factors was the cause of the null responses in any 
particular case, the removal of null responders from SCR analysis is necessary to 
prevent their SCR values from distorting results. This left 17 participants in the SCR 
analysis. All data were individually z-scored to control for individual differences in 
responsiveness (Boucsein, 1992; Venables & Christie, 1980). 
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2.2.1.4. Participants 
20 participants (mean age ± SD: 21 ± 2.49, 6 male) gave their informed consent to 
participate and were paid for their participation. All participants self-identified as 
white. The study was approved by the Departmental Ethics Committee, Royal 
Holloway, University of London. 
 
2.2.2. Results 
 
2.2.2.1. Introspective Measures 
In order to examine the effectiveness of the manipulation of body ownership the 
number of people experiencing ownership over the white and black hand in the 
synchronous condition was calculated based on participants‟ responses to the 
statement “I felt like the rubber hand was my hand”. Participants with a mean 
response greater than 0 were considered to have felt body ownership over the rubber 
hand, while those with a response less than or equal to 0 were not. The manipulation 
was largely successful with 75% of participants experiencing body ownership over 
the white rubber hand and 60% of participants experiencing body ownership over the 
black rubber hand during synchronous VT stimulation across the pain and touch 
conditions. 
 
In order to further analyse the relationship between skin colour and introspective 
judgements of body ownership separate repeated measures ANOVAs were run on 
each of the four questions. Each ANOVA contained three within-subjects factors: the 
mode of VT stimulation (asynchronous/synchronous), the skin colour of the rubber 
hand (white/black), and the type of stimulus appearing at the end of the VT 
stimulation (pain/touch). 
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Figure 2-1. Trial structure of experiment 2.1 (E = experimenter, P = participant). 
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Both the first question “It seemed like the touch I felt was caused by the paintbrush 
touching the rubber hand.” and the second question “I felt like the rubber hand was 
my hand.” showed the same pattern of results (See Figure 2-2). A significant main 
effect was found for the mode of VT stimulation (Q1: F(1, 19) = 25.97, p < .001; Q2: 
F(1, 19) = 31.32, p <  .001), because overall synchronous VT stimulation (Q1: M = 
1.26, SD = 1.76; Q2: M = 0.68, SD =  1.71)  resulted in significantly higher ratings 
compared to asynchronous stimulation (Q1: M = -0.8, SD = 1.79; Q2: M = -1.14, SD 
= 1.61) across all levels of the other factors. A main effect was also found for the 
skin colour of the rubber hand (Q1: F(1, 19) = 7.89, p < .01; Q2: F(1, 19) = 16.62, p 
< .01), because overall the white rubber hand (Q1: M = 0.51, SD = 1.63; Q2: M = 
0.1, SD = 1.63) resulted in higher ratings across all levels of the other factors than the 
black rubber hand (Q1: M = -0.5, SD = 1.56; Q2: M = -0.56, SD = 1.45). For both 
questions, the main effect of type of stimulus and all interactions were not 
significant. 
 
For both the third question “It seemed as if the needle/cue-tip touched my own 
hand.” and the fourth question “Did you experience any pain when the needle/cue tip 
touched the rubber hand?” a significant main effect of VT stimulation was found 
(Q3: F(1, 19) = 31.32, p < .001; Q4: F(1, 19) = 4.89, p < .05, see Figure 1). This was 
because overall synchronous VT-stimulation (Q3: M = -1.01, SD = 1.4; Q4: M = 
0.35, SD = 0.42) resulted in higher ratings than asynchronous VT-stimulation (Q3: M 
= -1.99, SD = 0.91; Q4: M = 0.16, SD = 0.32) across all levels of the other two 
factors. No other significant main effects or interactions were found for question 3 or 
4. 
 
Overall, the analysis of the psychometric data suggests that an in-group rubber hand 
is more likely to be experienced as self-relevant independently of the pattern of VT 
stimulation, but at the same time, the critical manipulation of synchronous vs. 
asynchronous multisensory stimulation shows synchronous VT stimulation can elicit 
a sense of body ownership independently of the skin colour of the rubber hand.  
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Figure 2-2. Mean responses to the four introspective questions by synchrony and skin colour of the rubber hand. Error bars represent SEM.
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The question of whether the magnitude of the change between synchronous and 
asynchronous conditions in the subjective experience captured by questions 1 and 2 
was the same when looking a white rubber hand versus a black rubber hand 
(averaged across pain and touch conditions) was further examined. The ratings 
obtained in the asynchronous condition were subtracted from those obtained in the 
synchronous condition, for each hand, and directly compared the resulting values 
which reflect the magnitude of change in the subjective experience between 
synchronous and asynchronous. The differences between black (Q1: M = 1.9, SD = 
2.14; Q2: M = 1.87, SD = 1.78) and white rubber hand (M = 2.22, SD = 1.96; Q2: M 
= 1.75, SD = 1.48) conditions were not significant (Q1: t(19) = 0.76, p > .05; Q2: 
t(19) = 0.58, p > .05), suggesting that the magnitude in the change of the experience 
between synchronous and asynchronous stimulation was comparable between the 
two different rubber hands. 
 
2.2.2.2. Proprioceptive Drift 
In order to investigate the effect of skin colour on behavioural measures of body 
ownership a repeated measures ANOVA with mode of VT-stimulation 
(asynchronous/synchronous) x skin colour of rubber hand (white/black) x type of 
stimulus (pain/touch) was carried out on the proprioceptive drift values. 
 
A significant main effect was found for the mode of VT stimulation (F(1,19) = 
11.47, p <.05; see Figure 2-3), because overall synchronous VT-stimulation (M = 
1.74, SD = 1.44) resulted in greater proprioceptive drift than asynchronous VT-
stimulation (M = 0.49, SD = 2.02) across all levels of the other two factors. No main 
effect of skin colour or type of stimulus was found and there were no significant 
interactions, suggesting that the increases in proprioceptive drift following 
synchronous stimulation were not affected by the skin colour of the rubber hand or 
the stimulus that appeared at the end of stimulation. 
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Figure 2-3. Mean proprioceptive drift by synchrony and skin colour of the rubber 
hand. Error bars represent SEM. 
 
2.2.2.3. Skin Conductance Responses 
In order to assess whether physiological response to observing painful stimuli 
touching the rubber hand was modulated by the skin colour of the rubber hand, a 
mode of VT stimulation (asynchronous/synchronous) x skin colour of rubber hand 
(white/black) x type of stimulus (pain/touch) repeated measures ANOVA was run on 
the z-scored SCR values from each condition (see Figure 2-4). As indicated in the 
method section, participants who had responses of less than 0.05 μS in more than 
half of the trials in which the pain stimuli appeared were considered null-responders. 
Due to the exclusion of null-responders the sample for the SCR analysis was made 
up of 17 participants. 
 
A main effect was found for type of stimulus (F(1, 16) = 28.3, p < .001), because the 
painful stimulus elicited higher SCRs (M = 0.32, SD = 0.26) than the observation of 
non-painful stimulus (M = -0.32, SD = 0.26) touching the rubber hand. A main effect 
was also found for the mode of VT stimulation (F(1, 16) = 11.96, p < .01), because 
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overall SCRs were higher following synchronous VT stimulation (M = 0.29, SD = 
0.3) compared to asynchronous stimulation (M = -0.29, SD = 0.3). 
 
An interaction between type of stimulus and stimulation was also found (F(1, 16) = 
5.38, p < .05). Paired comparisons revealed that this interaction was due to 
significantly higher SCRs after synchronous stimulation than after asynchronous 
stimulation for the pain white hand (Synch: M = 0.93, SD = 1.15; Asynch: M = -0.14, 
SD = 0.78), t(16) = 2.52, p < .05; pain black hand (Synch: M = 0.56, SD = 1.1; 
Asynch: M = -0.09, SD = 0.55), t(16) = 2.27, p <  .0; and touch white hand (Synch: 
M = 0.56, SD = 1.1; Asynch: M = -0.09, SD = 0.55), t(16) = 3.11, p < .01 conditions, 
but not for the touch/black hand condition (Synch: M = -0.55, SD = 0.63; Asynch: M 
= -0.22, SD = 0.75), t(16) = 3.11, p < .01. Finally an interaction between colour and 
stimulation was found, F(1,16) = 8.76, p < .01. However, paired comparisons 
indicated that this interaction was due to significantly higher SCRs for the white 
hand compared to the black hand in the touch synchronous condition,  t(16) = 2.89, p 
< .05, and not in the pain synchronous, t(16) = 0.59, p > .05; pain asynchronous t(16) 
= -0.01, p > .05; or the touch asynchronous conditions t(16) = -1.87, p > .05. The 
failure to find an effect in the pain synchronous condition rules out the possibility 
that synchronous stimulation elicited significantly higher SCRs for the painful 
stimulus when applied to the white hand than to the black hand. Since it is unclear 
how to interpret SCR data to a non-threatening stimuli and the fact that the touch 
conditions were primarily included to control for participants becoming habituated to 
the appearance of painful stimuli this effect will not be addressed further. No main 
effect of skin colour was found and nor were there any other significant interactions. 
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Figure 2-4. Mean standardised SCR to painful stimuli. Error bars represent SEM. 
 
2.2.2.4 Relationship between Empathy and Body Ownership for In-group and 
Out-group Hands  
In order to analyse the factors that predicted the strength of the experience of body 
ownership for the white and black rubber hands, the mean of each participant‟s 
response to question 2 (e.g. “I felt like the rubber hand was my hand”) of the 
questionnaire were averaged across the pain- and touch-synchronous stimulation 
conditions and the resulting values were used as dependent variables in two multiple 
regressions (entry method) using participants‟ scores on the four sub-scales from the 
IRI as predictors. For the regression carried out on ownership scores for the white 
rubber hand the overall model fit was significant, F(4, 15) = 5.88, p < .01 (see Table 
2-3). This was due to a significant positive regression weight on the fantasy subscale 
of the IRI. For the regression carried out on ownership scores for the black rubber 
hand the overall model fit was also significant, F(4, 15) = 6.17, p < .01 (see Table 2-
4). This was again due to a significant positive regression weight on the fantasy 
subscale of the IRI. In neither analysis were any of the other IRI subscales significant 
predictors.  
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Table 2-3. Summary of linear regression analysis for variables predicting with 
ownership ratings for the white rubber hand.  
Variable β P 
Perspective Taking 0.00 .976 
Empathic Concern 0.17 .35 
Fantasy 0.24 .001 
Personal Distress -0.09 .172 
Note. r
2
adjusted = .78. 
 
Table 2-4. Summary of linear regression analysis for variables predicting with 
ownership ratings for the black rubber hand.  
Variable β P 
Perspective Taking 0.9 .346 
Empathic Concern 0.05 .656 
Fantasy  0.25 .001 
Personal Distress -0.05 .442 
Note. r
2
adjusted = .79. 
 
2.2.2.5. Relationship between Racial Bias and Body Ownership for In-group and 
Out-group Hands 
In order to investigate whether racial bias, as measured with the IAT, had an effect 
on the experience of body ownership for the white and black rubber hands, the mean 
of each participant‟s responses to question 2 of the questionnaire were averaged 
across the pain- and touch-synchronous stimulation conditions and the resulting 
values were used as dependent variables in two linear regressions (entry method) 
using participants‟ scores on the pre VT stimulation IAT as the predictor. In this 
study only question 2 of the questionnaire was used rather than an average of all four 
questions because the key hypothesis of the study was that ownership of the rubber 
hand would be the defining factor in determining the effect of VT-stimulation on 
racial bias. Neither regression however, produced a significant model (for the white 
rubber hand: F(1, 18) = 2.08, p > .05, r
2 
adjusted = .05; for the black rubber hand: 
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F(1, 18) = 0.79, p > .05, r
2 
adjusted = -.11) suggesting that participants‟ implicit 
racial bias did not predict whether they would experience the RHI for either the 
white or black hand. 
 
To investigate whether feeling body ownership over a hand of a different skin colour 
changed participant‟s racial bias as measured with IAT, two multiple regressions 
(entry method) were carried out, the first with participants‟ ratings for question 2 
after synchronous VT stimulation for both the white and black rubber hands 
(averaged across pain and touch conditions) as predictors and the second with 
participants‟ ratings for question 2 after asynchronous VT stimulation for both the 
white and black rubber hands (averaged across pain and touch conditions) as 
predictors. In both regressions participants‟ score on the post VT stimulation IAT 
was the dependent variable. For the synchronous condition the overall model fit was 
significant, F(2, 17) = 3.96, p < .05, indicating that the stronger the sense of body 
ownership participants experienced over the rubber hands the lower their post testing 
racial bias, as measured with the IAT (see Table 2-5 and Figure 2-5). Interestingly, 
the experience of ownership over either the white or the black rubber hand were not 
individually significant predictors, suggesting that the post-RHI IAT score was 
predicted by a generalised experience of ownership over any rubber hand rather than 
exclusively by the experience of ownership of a white or black hand. For the 
asynchronous condition the overall model fit was not significant, F(2, 17) = 0.36, p > 
.05, r
2
 adjusted = -.07. 
 
Table 2-5. Summary of linear regression analysis for variables predicting with post 
VT-stimulation IAT score in the synchronous condition.  
Variable β P 
Ownership rating for white hand -0.11 .153 
Ownership rating for black hand -0.01 .928 
Note. r
2
adjusted = .32. 
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Figure 2-5. Introspective reports of ownership after synchronous VT-stimulation 
against post VT-stimulation IAT scores.  
 
To investigate whether feeling body ownership over a hand of a different skin colour 
led to a significant reduction in racial bias a measure of change in racial bias was 
calculated by subtracting the participants‟ scores in the pre-stimulation IAT from 
their scores in the post stimulation IAT. The resulting values were entered as the 
dependent variable in a multiple regression (entry method) and participants‟ ratings 
for question 2 after synchronous VT stimulation (averaged across pain and touch 
conditions) for both the white and black rubber hands were used as the predictors. 
The overall model fit was not significant, F(2, 17) = 0.35, p > .05, r
2
 adjusted =-.07. 
 
2.2.3. Discussion 
 
The results from experiment 2.1 suggested that synchronous VT stimulation could 
lead to the feeling of body ownership over a hand of a different skin colour as 
measured by introspective reports, behavioural and physiological measures. Analysis 
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of the introspective reports showed that synchronous VT results in body ownership 
independently of the skin colour. However, subjective reports also indicated that skin 
colour did have an effect on subjective feelings of body ownership which was 
independent to that of multisensory stimulation. Unlike subjective reports, the 
behavioural and physiological data revealed no main effect of skin colour. For the 
SCR data, significant differences between the synchronous and asynchronous 
stimulation for the pain stimulus were observed for both the white and the black 
hand. This finding was consistent with the effect of stimulation observed on 
proprioceptive drift. In addition multiple regressions indicated a role of empathy in 
individual differences in the experience of the RHI for both white and black hands. 
The overall strength of experienced body ownership during the RHI was also found 
to predict the participants‟ post-illusion implicit racial bias, with those who 
experienced a stronger RHI showing a lower bias.  Importantly, across all these 
measures, the effect of synchronous multisensory stimulation, over and above the 
mere presence of multisensory stimulation (i.e. asynchronous conditions), revealed 
comparable changes in the experience of body ownership for hands of both skin 
colours, suggesting that synchronous stimulation can lead to ownership over a hand 
of a different skin colour. 
 
It is possible however that the observed changes in introspective, behavioural and 
physiological measures of body ownership were due to factors unrelated to the 
feeling of body ownership. For example, it might be the case that increased SCRs to 
threatening stimuli reflect a purely attentional effect that result from the association 
of synchronous events occurring on one‟s own body and on an external body-part, 
rather than a change in the experience of body ownership per se. One way to 
dissociate the pure effect of synchrony from the effect of synchrony on body 
ownership is to deliver synchronous VT stimulation under conditions that either 
induce body ownership or not. To that end, in Experiment 2.2 we included an 
additional control condition at which participants received tactile stimulation on their 
own unseen hand, synchronous with that observed on the rubber hand, but the rubber 
hand was viewed from a third person perspective (3PP). It has been shown that this 
condition does not induce a sense of body ownership (Ehrsson et al., 2004). Another 
potential limitation of experiment 2.1, which Experiment 2.2 sought to address, was 
the absence of a pre-stimulation baseline measure of SCR to observation of 
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threatening objects approaching the hands. Obtaining pre-stimulation SCR measures 
is important for examining whether there are differences in baseline SCR to 
threatening stimuli between the black and white rubber hands, and for quantifying 
the change in SCR as a function of the colour of the rubber hand, the stimulation 
pattern and the experience of ownership. In order to address these weaknesses a 
second experiment was conducted. 
 
2.3. Experiment 2.2 
 
2.3.1. Methods 
 
2.3.1.1. Design 
The study used a repeated measures design with 2 factors. The first factor was the 
type of VT stimulation delivered to the participant‟s hand and the rubber hand. The 
first two levels of this factor were the same as those in experiment 2.1, that is 
synchronous and asynchronous stimulation delivered to the participant‟s hand and a 
hand seen from a first person perspective (1PP). In addition another level was added 
in which synchronous VT stimulation was delivered to the participant‟s hand and 
another hand which was rotated 180˚ from the position of the participants own hand, 
so that the hand was viewed from a third person perspective (3PP). Previous studies 
have demonstrated that the RHI does not occur when the rubber hand is viewed from 
this perspective (Ehrsson et al., 2004). The second factor was the skin colour of the 
hand (white hand vs. black hand).Therefore there were a total of six conditions (see 
Table 2-6). Each condition was presented once per participant and conditions were 
presented in a randomised order. 
 
2.3.1.2. Materials 
Rather than using a physical rubber hand as in experiment 2.1, in this study videos of 
real hands were used in order to increase the accuracy of the timing of events; 
however, for the sake of simplicity, the hands displayed in the video will be referred 
to as “rubber” hands. Twelve videos were used in this study: male participants saw 
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videos of male hands while female participants saw videos of female hands. For both 
male and female hands there was one video for each of the six conditions (see Figure 
2-6). The videos were presented using Presentation® software (Version 16.03, 
www.neurobs.com). 
 
Table 2-6. Design of Experiment 2.2. 
Condition Condition of V-T stimulation Skin colour of the rubber hand 
1 1PP Synchronous White 
2 1PP Asynchronous White 
3 3PP Synchronous White 
4 1PP Synchronous Black 
5 1PP Asynchronous Black 
6 3PP Synchronous Black 
 
2.3.1.3. Procedure 
At the beginning of the experiment, participants were asked to complete 
demographic and IRI questionnaires. Following this, participants carried out the 
same computer administered version of the IAT as used in experiment 2.1. Following 
the completion of the IAT participants were asked to sit in front of the experimental 
setup (see Figure 2-6). In this setup the participant‟s left hand was hidden beneath a 
sheet of card while a computer screen was visible with its centre at the midline of the 
participant‟s body. Two electrodes were attached to the index and middle fingers of 
the participant‟s right hand in order to measure SCR. In each of the six experimental 
conditions participants first viewed the hand in the video being cut by a knife in 
order to record a baseline measure of arousal to threatening stimuli prior to VT 
stimulation. Following this, participants received VT stimulation for 120 seconds 
while looking at the video of the hand. VT stimulation was delivered manually by the 
experimenter with the use of the same paintbrush as seen in the video. 
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Figure 2-6. Diagram of the experimental setup used in experiment 2.2 (E = 
experimenter, P = participant). 
 
During VT stimulation the participant‟s hand and the hand in the video were 
stimulated on the index finger in the same way, from the knuckle to the fingertip 
with a frequency of 1 Hz. In the synchronous condition, the participant‟s hand was 
brushed at the same time as the hand in the video, while in the asynchronous 
condition it was brushed 180° out of phase with the video. Following VT 
stimulation, the video again showed the hand being cut by a knife in order to 
measure arousal to threatening stimuli subsequent to VT stimulation (See Figure 2-
7). After each video, participants were asked to remove their left hand from the table 
and were asked the same 4 questions used in experiment 2.1. Once this was 
completed the next block began. Blocks were presented in a random order across 
participants and each block was presented once per participant. 
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Figure 2-7. A) Example of pain stimuli being applied to a white hand seen from the 
first person perspective. B) Example of VT-stimulation being delivered to a black 
hand seen from the third person perspective. C) Time course of experimental videos. 
 
2.3.1.4. Analysis of Physiological Data 
Mean SCR change in response to observation of the knife appearing was taken for 
both the appearance at the beginning (pre-stimulation) and the end (post-stimulation) 
of VT stimulation. In both cases SCR change was calculated, as in experiment 2.1, 
by subtracting a baseline measure from the mean SCR over 6 seconds starting 1 
second after the appearance of the knife (Edelberg, 1967). The baseline was the mean 
SCR between 1 and 3 seconds before the appearance of the knife (Dimberg, 1990). 
SCR amplitudes below 0.05 μS were scored as zero responses (Boucsein, 1992; 
Dawson et al., 2007). Participants who had zero responses in more than half of the 
post stimulation trials were considered „null-responders‟ and were excluded from the 
analysis which left 42 participants in the SCR analysis (Phelps et al., 2001). All data 
were individually z-scored to control for individual differences in responsiveness 
(Boucsein, 1992; Venables & Christie, 1980). 
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2.3.1.5. Participants 
48 white participants (mean age ± SD: 26.5, ± 8.34, 14 male) gave their informed 
consent to participate and were paid for their participation. All participants self-
identified as white. The study was approved by the Departmental Ethics Committee, 
Royal Holloway, University of London. 
 
2.3.2. Results 
 
2.3.2.1 Introspective Measures 
As in experiment 2.1 the number of people experiencing ownership over the white 
and black hand in the synchronous 1PP condition was calculated based on 
participants‟ responses to the statement “I felt like the rubber hand was my hand”. 
Participants with a mean response greater than 0 were considered to have felt body 
ownership over the rubber hand while those with a response less than or equal to 0 
were not. The manipulation for the white hand was largely successful, with 77% of 
participants experiencing body ownership in the synchronous 1
st
 person perspective 
(1PP) VT stimulation condition. For the black hand the manipulation was less 
successful than in experiment 2.1, with only 50% participants experiencing body 
ownership over the black hand during synchronous 1PP VT stimulation. Possible 
reasons for this discrepancy between the two experiments are addressed in the 
discussion. 
 
In order to investigate the role of stimulation, perspective and skin colour on the 
strength of the RHI a 3x2 repeated measures ANOVA with type of VT stimulation 
(synchronous 1PP, asynchronous 1PP, synchronous 3PP) and skin colour of the 
viewed hand (white, black) as the factors was run for each of the four questions (see 
Figure 2-8). 
 
For the first question, “It seemed like the touch I felt was caused by the paintbrush 
touching the hand in the video.” Mauchly‟s test indicated that the assumption of 
sphericity had been violated (χ2(2) = 10.06, p < .01), therefore degrees of freedom 
were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = 0.84).  A 
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significant main effect was found for type of VT stimulation, F(1.67, 78.57) = 75.68, 
p < .001, because, overall, synchronous 1PP VT stimulation (M = 1.49, SD = 1.55) 
resulted in higher ratings than asynchronous 1PP stimulation (M = -1.18, SD = 1.66), 
t(47) = 10.92, p < .001,  or synchronous 3PP stimulation (M = 0.51, SD = 1.69), t(47) 
= 5.98, p < .001, and synchronous 3PP stimulation resulted in higher ratings that 
asynchronous 1PP stimulation, t(47) = 7.02, p < .001.  A main effect was also found 
for skin colour, F(1, 47) = 18.84, p < .001, because, in all condition VT stimulation 
ratings for the white hand (M = 0.59, SD = 1.39) were significantly higher than those 
for the black hand (M = -0.04, SD = 1.54). There was no significant interaction 
between stimulation and skin colour, replicating the findings of experiment 2.1. 
 
For the second question, “I felt like the hand in the video was my hand.”, a 
significant main effect was found for type of VT stimulation, F(2, 94) = 32.3, p < 
.001, because, overall, synchronous 1PP VT stimulation resulted in higher ratings (M 
= 0.65, SD = 1.85) compared to both asynchronous 1PP stimulation (M = -1.01, SD = 
1.64), t(47) = 7.05, p < .001, and synchronous 3PP stimulation (M = -0.84, SD = 
1.41), t(47) = 7.07, p < .001. A main effect was also found for skin colour (F(1, 47) = 
35.170, p < .001) because, overall, the white hand (M = 0.26, SD = 1.7) resulted in 
higher ratings than the black hand (M = -1.07, SD = 1.39). There was no significant 
interaction between stimulation and skin colour. 
 
For both the third question, “It seemed as if the knife touched my own hand.” and the 
fourth question, “Did you experience any pain when the knife touched the hand in 
the video?”, Mauchly‟s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been 
violated (Q3: χ2(2) = 12, p < .01, Q4: χ2(2) = 16.89, p < .001), therefore degrees of 
freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (Q3: ε = 
0.81, Q4: ε = 0.77).  In both questions a significant main effect of type of VT 
stimulation was found (Q3: F(1.63, 76.45) = 27.19, p < .001; Q4: F(1.53, 71.9) = 
18.65, p < .001) because, overall, synchronous 1PP stimulation (Q3: M = -0.13, SD = 
1.98; Q4: M = 1.04, SD = 1.32) led to higher ratings than both asynchronous 1PP 
stimulation (Q3: M = -1.61, SD = 1.53, t(47) = 6.2, p < .001; Q4: M = 0.43, SD = 
0.81, t(47) = 5.28, p < .001) and synchronous 3PP stimulation (Q3: M = -1.36, SD = 
1.59, t(47) = 5.13, p < .001;  Q4: M = 0.44, SD = 0.84, t(47) = 4.33, p < .001). There 
was no effect of skin colour or any interaction between stimulation and skin colour. 
  
 
8
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Figure 2-8. Mean responses to the four introspective questions by synchrony and skin colour of the rubber hand. Error bars represent SEM. 
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As in experiment 2.1 the analysis of the introspective data suggests that an in-group 
rubber hand is more likely to be experienced as self-relevant independently of the 
pattern of VT stimulation, but at the same time, the critical manipulation of 
synchronous vs. asynchronous multisensory stimulation shows synchronous VT 
stimulation leads to a greater sense of body ownership independently of the skin 
colour of the rubber hand. As in experiment 2.1 the question of whether the 
magnitude of the change between synchronous and asynchronous conditions in the 
subjective experience captured by questions 1 and 2 was the same when looking a 
white rubber hand (Q1: M = 2.83 , SD = 2.06; Q2: M = 1.6, SD = 1.87) versus a black 
rubber hand (Q1: M = 2.5, SD = 2.01; Q2: M = 1.71, SD = 2.22) was examined. The 
differences between black and white rubber hand conditions were not significant 
(Q1: t(47) = 1.03, p > .05, Q2: t(47) = -0.29, p > .05), suggesting that the magnitude 
in the change of the experience between synchronous and asynchronous stimulation 
was comparable between the two different rubber hands. We also examined whether 
the magnitude of the change between synchronous 1PP and synchronous 3PP 
conditions in the subjective experience captured by questions 1 and 2 was the same 
when looking at a white rubber hand (Q1: M = 1.02 , SD = 1.43; Q2: M = 1.54, SD = 
1.7)  versus a black rubber hand (Q1: M = 0.94 , SD = 1.86; Q2: M = 1.44, SD = 1.8). 
The differences between black and white rubber hand conditions were not significant 
(Q1: t(47) = 0.24, p > .05, Q2: t(47) = 0.38, p > .05), suggesting that the magnitude 
in the change of the subjective experience of ownership between 1
st
 person and 3
rd
 
person perspectives was comparable between the two different rubber hands. 
 
2.3.2.2. Skin Conductance Responses 
In order to investigate the effect of stimulation, perspective and skin colour on 
physiological responses to the observation of painful stimuli touching the hand a 
3x2x2 repeated measures ANOVA was run on the z-scored SCR data. The factors 
were: the type of VT stimulation (1PP synchronous, 1PP asynchronous, 3PP 
synchronous), the skin colour of the hand (white, black) and the timing of the 
appearance of threatening stimuli (pre-VT stimulation, post-VT stimulation). 
 
No significant main effects were found. However, a significant interaction was found 
between timing and type of VT stimulation (F(2, 82) = 4.46, p < .05) (see Figure 2-
10). Pairwise comparisons revealed that this was driven by significant increases in 
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post- stimulation (M = 0.5, SD =1.05) compared to pre- stimulation (M = -0.19, SD = 
0.97) SCRs following synchronous 1PP VT-stimulation, t(41) = -2.7, p < .01. 
Importantly there was no difference between pre- and post- SCRs following either 
asynchronous 1PP (Pre: M = 0.27, SD = 0.97; Post: M = -0.13 SD = 0.96), t(41) = 
1.89, p > .05, or synchronous 3PP VT-stimulation (Pre: M = -0.22, SD = 0.89; Post: 
M = -0.29, SD = 0.91), t(41) = 0.39, p > .05. These results support the hypothesis that 
increased SCRs following synchronous 1PP VT stimulation are due to the experience 
of ownership rather than to a mere attentional effect due to synchronous VT 
stimulation. 
 
 
Figure 2-9. Mean standardised SCR to painful stimuli. Error bars represent SEM. 
 
2.3.2.2. Effect of the Experience of Body Ownership for the Black Hand on Skin 
Conductance Responses 
Due to the fact that half of the participants tested in this study did not experience 
feelings of body ownership over the black hand, the relationship between feeling 
body ownership and the black hand was further investigated. Participants were 
divided into two groups based on whether they reported ownership over the black 
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hand or not as measured by their response to question 2 after synchronous 1PP VT 
stimulation with the black hand (a response greater than 0 was taken as indicating an 
experience of body ownership). As in experiment 2.1, only question 2 of the 
questionnaire was used rather than an average of all four questions because the key 
hypothesis of the study was that ownership of the rubber hand would be the defining 
factor in determining the effect of VT-stimulation on racial bias. This resulted in two 
groups; 21 participants who experienced ownership of a black hand, and 21 who did 
not experience ownership of the black hand. 
 
A 3x2x2x2 mixed factors ANOVA was then run on the z-scored SCR data. The three 
within subject factors were: the type of VT stimulation (1PP synchronous, 1PP 
asynchronous, 3PP synchronous), the skin colour of the hand (white, black) and the 
timing of the appearance of threatening stimuli (pre VT, post VT) and the between 
subjects factor was the experience of ownership over the black hand in the first 
person synchronous condition. 
 
As in the previous analysis a significant interaction was found between timing and 
type of VT stimulation (F(2, 80) = 4.35, p < .05) (see Figure 2-10). A significant 
interaction was also found between timing, skin colour of the hand and whether or 
not the participant experienced body ownership over the black hand (F(1, 40) = 8.18, 
p < .01). Pairwise comparisons suggested that this effect was driven by the fact that 
those who experienced ownership of the black hand showed higher SCRs for the 
black hand in the 1PP synchronous post-stimulation (M = 0.19, SD = 0.94) compared 
to 1PP pre–stimulation condition (M = -0.29, SD = 0.87), t(20) = -2.33, p < .05. In 
contrast no significant differences were found between the 1PP synchronous post-
stimulation (M = 0.03, SD = 0.85) compared to 1PP pre–stimulation condition (M = -
0.12, SD = 0.97), t(20) = -0.68,  p >.05, among those who did not experience 
ownership of the black hand. 
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Figure 2-10. Change between pre and post VT-stimulation mean standardised SCR 
to painful stimuli by experienced ownership. Error bars represent SEM. 
 
2.3.2.3. The Role of Empathy and Racial Bias in Predicting Body Ownership 
As in experiment 2.1 in order to investigate whether or not participants‟ empathy 
predicted their experienced body ownership for the white or the black rubber hand, 
participant‟s ratings for question 2 in both the white and black hand synchronous 1PP 
condition were entered as the dependent variables in separate multiple regressions 
(entry method) using participant‟s scores on the four sub scales from the IRI as 
predictors. One participant was excluded from these regressions as they failed to 
correctly complete the IRI. The overall model fit was not significant for the 
regression carried out on ownership scores for the white rubber hand, F(4, 42) = 
1.07, p > .05, adjusted r
2
 = .01. A significant model fit was however found for the 
regression carried out on ownership scores for the black rubber hand F(4, 42) = 3.18, 
p <.05 (see Table 2-7). This was due to a significant positive regression weight on 
both the fantasy and the personal distress subscales of the IRI. None of the other IRI 
subscales were significant contributors to the model. 
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Table 2-7. Summary of linear regression analysis for variables predicting with 
ownership ratings for the white rubber hand.  
Variable β p 
Perspective Taking 0.14 .087 
Empathic Concern -0.08 .42 
Fantasy  0.14 .031 
Personal Distress 0.14 .026 
Note. r
2
adjusted = .16. 
 
In order to investigate whether racial bias as measured with the IAT had an effect on 
the experience of body ownership for the white and black rubber hands, participant‟s 
ratings for question 2 in both the white and black hand synchronous 1PP condition 
were entered as the dependent variables in separate linear regressions (entry method) 
using participant‟s scores on the pre VT stimulation IAT as the predictor. Neither 
regression however, produced a significant model (for the white hand: F(1, 46) = .46, 
p >.05, adjusted r
2
 = .01; for the black hand: F(1, 46) = .23, p >.05, adjusted r
2
 = -
.02. 
 
2.4. General Discussion 
 
The two experiments reported in this chapter are the first to directly investigate the 
extent to which the sense of body ownership induced with the RHI depends on the 
skin colour of the observed hand. The findings of these studies demonstrate that 
multisensory stimulation can induce a sense of body ownership over a rubber hand 
with the skin colour of a different racial group than that of the participant. In 
experiment 2.1 it was found that synchronous, but not asynchronous, VT stimulation 
led to a feeling of body ownership for both the white and black rubber hands as 
measured introspectively, behaviourally and physiologically. Almost two thirds of 
the participants in this experiment reported a sense of body ownership over a black 
rubber hand, as well as showing the expected proprioceptive drift towards the rubber 
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hand and increase in autonomic responses when viewing a painful stimulus being 
applied to either the white or the black rubber hand. 
 
Experiment 2.2 expanded on these results by replicating the pattern of findings seen 
in experiment 2.1 for both the introspective and physiological measures, but with 
improved control conditions. For example, the inclusion of a form of synchronous 
VT stimulation that does not induce body ownership (i.e. 3PP, Ehrsson et al., 2004) 
was used to show that the observed increase in SCR is caused by the experience of 
body ownership, rather than merely synchronous VT stimulation. This can be seen 
by the fact that, for hands of both skin colours, synchronous stimulation of a hand 
seen from a 3PP led to significantly lower introspective reports of body ownership 
and SCRs to threatening stimuli than did stimulation of a hand seen from a 1PP. The 
link between experiencing ownership over the observed hand and increased SCR to 
threatening stimuli can also be seen in the finding that those participants who 
experienced body ownership for the black hand showed a significantly higher 
increase in SCRs following 1PP synchronous stimulation of the black hand, while 
participants who did not experience ownership showed no such increase. 
 
One notable difference in the findings of Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 is that, while in 
experiment 2.1 almost two thirds of participants reported feelings of ownership for 
the black hand, in experiment 2.2 only half of all participants reported such feelings. 
One possible cause of this reduction in the number of participants experiencing body 
ownership is the different nature of the stimuli used. While the first experiment 
involved the use of a physically present prosthetic hand, the second used videos 
instead. A previous study by Ijsselsteijn, de Kort and Haans (2006) investigated 
differences in the strength of the RHI when induced using a physically present rubber 
hand or using a ”virtual” projection of a rubber hand and found that the illusion was 
less vivid when using projection than when using the unmediated hand. 
 
Interestingly, while no effect of skin colour on size of proprioceptive drift 
(experiment 2.1) or SCR size (experiments 2.1 and 2.2) was found, introspective 
reports involving the sense of ownership and the location of tactile stimulation were 
affected by the skin colour of the observed hand, with participants reporting a more 
vivid experience of the RHI for the white than the black hand. Note, however, that 
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the effect of skin colour was independent of stimulation as higher ratings on these 
two questionnaire items for the white hand were recorded after both synchronous and 
asynchronous VT stimulation and in Experiment 2, for hands seen from both the 1PP 
and the 3PP. This general effect of skin colour implies that a hand of the same skin 
colour as that of the participant might result in a baseline effect of skin colour which 
“primes” higher cognitive processes of self-attribution involved in the sense of body 
ownership, allowing an easier incorporation of the fake hand of same skin colour. 
Thus, although the skin colour of the rubber hand affected the perceived body 
ownership, this effect was independent of that of VT stimulation or anatomical 
congruency. Rather it seems that these findings reflect a greater incorporation of a 
white hand into the participant‟s body in general rather than a stronger effect of VT 
stimulation in inducing body ownership of the white hand. In fact the magnitude of 
the effect of stimulation, that is the difference between synchronous and 
asynchronous VT, was equal for both white and black hands, suggesting that 
multisensory stimulation can change the sense of body ownership equally for hands 
of same or different skin colour. 
 
The finding that skin colour does affect the subjective reports of induced body 
ownership across both stimulation conditions is in line with other studies that have 
shown that the visual properties of the observed hand can affect the strength of the 
RHI (Austen et al., 2004; Costantini & Haggard, 2007; Haans et al., 2008; Pavani et 
al., 2000; Pavani & Zampini, 2007; Tsakiris et al., 2010; Tsakiris & Haggard, 
2005b). It is also in line with studies showing that mere visual exposure to an 
observed hand can influence both proprioception (Holmes et al., 2006) and tactile 
perception (Durgin, Evans, Dunphy, Klostermann, & Simmons, 2007). Tsakiris 
(2010) suggested that during the RHI the visual form of the external object is 
compared against a body model that contains a reference description of the visual, 
anatomical and structural properties of one‟s own body. However, the findings from 
previous studies (Holmes et al., 2006; Longo et al., 2009) suggested that more 
surface level visual features like skin texture and colour do not enter into this 
comparison. The current study‟s results provide partial support for this claim, in that 
observing VT stimulation of a hand with a different skin colour still led to the 
experience of ownership in the majority of participants. However, taken together 
with the results of Haans et al. (2008), which found stronger subjective judgements 
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of ownership after multisensory stimulation of a rubber hand with a skin like texture 
compared to a rubber hand with a non-skin texture, the current results suggest that 
surface level features such as skin colour and texture are used as a comparator at a 
late stage and have a modulating effect on conscious perception of the ownership 
although not on its behavioural or physiological correlates. 
 
Several recent studies have suggested a link between the experience of body 
ownership induced by RHI and empathy (Asai, Mao, Sugimori, & Tanno, 2011; 
Durgin et al., 2007; Schütz-Bosbach & Prinz, 2007). Asai et al. (2011) found a link 
between the empathic concern subscale and tendency to experience the RHI. The link 
between empathy and experiencing the RHI was also found in the present study, 
although in a slightly different way. In experiment 2.1, the experience of the RHI for 
both the white and black hand was predicted by participants‟ scores in the fantasy 
subscale (FS) of the IRI. The finding that participants‟ FS scores were a significant 
predictor for experiencing the RHI for the black hand was replicated in experiment 
2.2, which in addition indicated that the score on the personal distress subscale was 
also a significant predictor. Davis (1983) characterises the FS of the IRI as tapping 
into respondents' tendencies to transpose themselves imaginatively into the feelings 
and actions of fictitious characters in books, movies, and plays. It is interesting to 
note that Rochat (2003), in characterising the different levels of self-awareness that 
occur in adults, relates the ability to step outside one‟s own embodied self and 
project one‟s self into a novel or film to a state of confusion between self and world. 
The relationship between FS and experience of the RHI found in this study seems to 
corroborate this view suggesting that those who find it easier to step into the shoes of 
fictional characters may have a more malleable representation of their own body. 
Overall, these findings add to the evidence that, along with other factors e.g., 
schizotypy (Asai et al., 2011), body image dissatisfaction (Mussap & Salton, 2006), 
and interoceptive sensitivity (Tsakiris et al., 2011), empathy plays a significant role 
in determining individual differences in the vividness of the RHI. A relative strength 
of the present study is the that our results do not rely solely on participants‟ 
introspective reports of the illusion (which may reflect individual differences in 
suggestibility or other unknown cognitive factors) but also on participants‟ 
autonomic reaction to painful stimuli being administered to the rubber hand 
(experiments 2.1 and 2.2) and on participants‟ judgements of the proprioceptive 
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location of their own hand (experiment 2.1). In particular, the pattern of our 
physiological variable reflects a change in participants‟ autonomic regulation that at 
least cannot be changed or controlled at will. 
 
The role of empathy in the RHI ties into the question of whether social factors such 
as in-group/out-group identification can also play a role in the strength of the rubber 
hand illusion. The lack of any relationship between participants pre-illusion racial 
bias and the strength of the RHI suggests that, unlike sensorimotor empathy for pain 
(Avenanti, Sirigu, & Aglioti, 2010), the processes involved in the generation of a 
sense of body ownership seem immune to the effects of top-down socio-cognitive 
factors such as racial bias, at least as measured with the IAT. 
 
More interesting however is the finding of an effect of experiencing the RHI on post-
illusion racial bias. A number of recent studies have suggested that sensory 
processing might alter the perceived physical (Longo et al., 2009) and psychological 
similarity between self and other, and possibly between in-group and out-group 
members. For example, seeing a face being touched at the same time as your own 
face might change self-face recognition (Tsakiris, 2008) but also the felt closeness to 
the other (Paladino, Mazzurega, Pavani, & Schubert, 2010). Synchronous movement 
between people has also been shown to increase perceived rapport and affiliation 
(Hove & Risen, 2009; Lakin & Chartrand, 2003; Miles et al., 2009), to improve 
performance in joint action tasks (Valdesolo et al., 2010)and to improve co-operation 
in economic games (Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009). 
 
Experiment 2.1 of the present study adds to this literature on the social effect of 
synchrony by showing, for the first time, that the experience of body ownership as 
induced by synchronous VT stimulation can exert a bottom-up effect on participants‟ 
perceptions of an out-group. A multiple regression on the change in IAT score 
between pre- and post-stimulation IATs did not find that experiencing ownership of 
the rubber hand lead to a significant reduction in racial bias. However, it was found 
that when the ownership ratings for both the white and black rubber hand were 
entered as predictors into a multiple regression they significantly predicted 
participants‟ post-testing racial bias. Neither predictor was significant independently 
of the other due to the fact that ownership scores for the white and black rubber hand 
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were themselves highly correlated. There are two possible explanations for this 
finding. One is that the decrease in racial bias was caused by simply experiencing the 
RHI for a hand of any skin colour. The other is that the change in IAT scores was 
driven by ownership of the black rubber hand specifically but that due to the strong 
correlation between ownership of the black and white rubber hands both ownership 
scores predicted the decrease.  Unfortunately the repeated-measures design used in 
this study means that it is not possible to determine which of these possibilities is 
correct. Nonetheless this finding is a promising first step towards demonstrating that 
synchronous multisensory stimulation can alter higher level socio-cognitive 
processes. Further investigation of this issue using a between subjects design to 
separate out the effect of multisensory stimulation of a hand with an in-group as 
opposed to out-group skin colour on implicit racial bias would help to resolve the 
ambiguity in the results found in the present study. 
 
In conclusion, to the extent that race is a strong modulator of social cognition and its 
underlying neural processes, understanding if and how multisensory processing can 
alter self-representations across the boundaries of racial groups might be important 
for probing the sensorimotor basis of social cognition. The present chapter takes a 
first step towards that direction by showing that changes in body-awareness as a 
result of multisensory stimulation can go beyond one‟s own skin colour. 
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Chapter 3. Change My Body Change 
My Mind: Multisensory Stimulation, 
Race and Prejudice
3
  
 
"The completeness of this transformation appalled me. It was unlike anything I 
had imagined. I became two men, the observing one and the one who panicked, 
who felt Negroid even to the depths of my entrails. I felt the beginnings of great 
loneliness, not because I was a Negro but because the man I had been, the self 
I knew, was hidden in the flesh of another."  
                                                                       John Howard Griffin, (1961, p. 11) 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The studies detailed in chapter 2 demonstrated that multisensory stimulation can lead 
to the experience of body ownership over a hand of a different skin colour.  The two 
studies in this chapter expand on this finding by investigating whether this 
experience of ownership over a hand of a different skin colour can change 
participant‟s responses to a racial out-group at both a cognitive and a bodily level.  
 
In the quote above from his book Black Like Me (1961) John Howard Griffin 
describes his feelings on first looking into the mirror after taking large oral doses of 
the anti-vitiligo drug Methoxsalen, spending long periods under a UV and staining 
his skin in order to transform his appearance into that of a black man.  Griffin then 
spent six weeks travelling through the states of the southern USA experiencing the 
daily inequalities suffered by black people under the “Jim Crow” regime of racial 
segregation.  Griffin‟s experiences were clearly much more rich and detailed than a 
                                                 
3
 Experiment 3.1 is published as:  
Farmer H, Maister L & Tsakiris M (2014). Change my body, change my mind: the effects of illusory 
ownership of an outgroup hand on implicit attitudes toward that outgroup. Frontiers in Psychology, 
4:1016. 
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mere change in skin pigmentation; however the quoted remarks above help to 
illustrate how much of our identity is defined by our physical appearance.  Looking 
into the mirror at his newly darkened skin Griffin expresses the feeling that “the self 
[he] knew, was hidden in the flesh of another”, but at the same time this experience 
of being inside another‟s skin created a feeling of closeness and identity with the 
black people he encountered during his travels. This allowed him to gain much 
greater insight into the many injustices they experienced than he could have gained 
had he made the same journey with his biological skin tone.     
 
While experiencing ownership over a hand of a different racial group is not of course 
comparable with living as a member of a different race for weeks, it is possible that 
even the temporary link between one‟s self and the other racial group may exert an 
effect of participants‟ attitudes towards that racial group. Research on stereotype 
change has shown that people adjust their perception of groups to their personal 
experiences with individual members of those groups (Johnston & Hewstone, 1992; 
Kunda & Oleson, 1997; Weber & Crocker, 1983). Thus positive experiences with 
those of another skin colour can lead to a change, and hopefully a decrease, in racial 
bias (e.g., Ensari & Miller, 2002; Kunda & Oleson, 1997). A recent longitudinal 
study showed that liking or disliking of individuals from a particular ethnic group 
predicted adolescents‟ general attitudes towards that ethnic group. Such findings, 
taken together with evidence for a general cognitive bias in favour of automatic 
positive associations towards the self and self-related stimuli (Greenwald & Banaji, 
1995; Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004) suggest that through linking the 
skin colour of a racial out-group to the bodily representations of the self it may be 
possible to alter people‟s attitudes towards that racial group.       
 
 
There has been a considerable amount of research investigating what factors can 
reduce negative implicit attitudes towards racial out-groups. Researchers have 
identified that a wide range of factors can lead to a decrease in IAT score including;  
training on how to better individuate the faces of people from a different racial group 
(Lebrecht, Pierce, Tarr, & Tanaka, 2009); being placed in a situation in which one is 
subordinate to a member of that racial group (Richeson & Ambady, 2003), having 
close friends who are members of that racial group (Aberson, Shoemaker, & 
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Tomolillo, 2004), behaviourally mimicking a member of that racial group (Inzlicht, 
Gutsell, & Legault, 2012), and viewing positive exemplars from that racial group 
(Ashby Plant et al., 2009; Dasgupta, Greenwald, McGhee, Mellott, & Nosek, 2001). 
The sensitivity of the IAT scores to the various methods outlined suggests that it is 
best thought of as a measure of state rather than trait bias. 
     
In addition to the effects of race on cognitive attitudes and explicit behaviour a series 
of recent studies have demonstrated that racial bias can also exert an effect on more 
low level bodily aspects of social cognition. Along with the effect of race on VRT 
described in the previous chapter (Serino et al., 2009) modulations of shared bodily 
representations based on race have also been observed in studies investigating 
sensorimotor empathy for pain (Avenanti et al., 2010; Azevedo et al., 2013; Cheon et 
al., 2011; Mathur, Harada, Lipke, & Chiao, 2010; Xu, Zuo, Wang, & Han, 2009). For 
example Xu et al. (2009) found that the observation of members of a racial out-group 
receiving painful stimuli led to less BOLD activation in brain areas involved in pain 
processing than did the observation of a racial in-group. Avenanti et al. (2010) used 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to observe corticospinal excitability in 
black and white participants observing a hand of either their own skin colour or a 
different skin colour being stabbed with a syringe. They found that, while 
observation of an in-group hand being stabbed led to motor suppression, observation 
of an out-group hand being stabbed resulted in motor excitation. Interestingly this 
effect was greater for the known out-group than for a hand with a violet skin colour 
and was correlated with the participants‟ implicit racial bias as measured by the IAT. 
This suggests that, rather than merely being dependent on the physical difference 
between the in-group and out-group hands, this effect was related to social attitudes 
towards the racial out-group. A follow up fMRI study found greater activation to in-
group compared to out-group pain in the bilateral anterior insula and found that racial 
bias as measured by the IAT predicted the difference in the amount of activation in 
the left anterior insula between the two conditions (Azevedo et al., 2013). Taken 
together these studies suggest that, as well as affecting cognitive and behavioural 
level measures, the distinction between racial in-groups and out-groups can also 
exert an influence on shared body representations.     
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The two experiments in this chapter aimed at investigating whether using 
multisensory stimulation to induce the feeling of body ownership over a hand with 
the skin colour of a racial out-group could lead to a change in cognitive and bodily 
measures of racial bias. In both studies Caucasian participants experienced either 
synchronous or asynchronous stimulation over a white or black rubber hand and 
measures of racial bias taken before and after this experience were compared. Study 
3.1. focused on examining the effects of multisensory stimulation on participants‟ 
attitudes towards black people as measured using a single category IAT while study 
3.2 used TMS to examine the effect of multisensory stimulation on a bodily level 
measure of racial bias, namely sensorimotor resonance to the observation painful 
stimuli (Avenanti, Bueti, Galati, & Aglioti, 2005; Avenanti et al., 2010). 
 
3.2. Experiment 3.1 
 
3.2.1. Introduction 
 
The aim of the present experiment was to investigate whether manipulating the 
feeling of body ownership over a rubber hand of a different racial group could lead to 
an alteration in participants‟ implicit cognitive attitude towards that racial group.   
 
A recent study by Inzlicht, Gutsell and Legault (2012) provides indirect support for 
this possibility. The researchers found that that the behavioural mimicry of an 
individual from a racial out-group reduced implicit racial prejudice towards that out-
group.  As discussed in the introduction such behavioural mimicry may lead to a 
blurring of the boundary between self and other and has been shown to modulate the 
motor output of brain areas responsible for neural resonance with other‟s actions 
(Obhi & Hogeveen, 2010). Inzlicht et al. suggest that mimicry reduced implicit 
prejudice by increasing self-other overlap, thus enhancing neural resonance with the 
racial out-group.  The current experiment sought to show a similar effect of shared 
body representation on racial bias but aimed to elicit it using purely perceptual visuo-
tactile matching rather than the visuo-motor matching employed by Inzlicht et al.   
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Another study which sought to test the effects of directly embodying a different 
racial group on racial attitudes was carried out by Groom, Bailenson and Nass 
(2009).  In this study white participants were placed in a virtual reality environment 
and either asked to simply imagine that their avatar was white or black, or else 
shown either a white or black face as the face of their avatar in a virtual mirror.  The 
study found that while merely imagining the avatar as being white or black had no 
effect on racial bias, those participants who saw their avatar as black subsequently 
had higher racial bias than those who saw their avatar as white. The authors 
attributed this increase to increased stereotype activation in those who saw the black 
face directly. However, this finding is somewhat surprising as given the positive 
associations people generally have with the self (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995), the 
link between one‟s own body and the other race would have been expected to lead to 
lower rather than greater racial bias. A possible explanation for the failure of the 
embodiment to reduce racial bias is related to the specific way that participants 
embodied the avatar. While the head and body of the avatar moved in synchrony 
with the participant the only cues to the race of the avatar were in the face as the 
body of the avatar was presented as full clothed with no skin exposed.  Given that the 
facial movement of the participants was not synchronous with those of the avatar, it 
is possible that this created a feeling of mismatch between the participant and the 
most relevant part of the avatar in terms of racial identity creating an uncanny feeling 
in participants that was then reflected in participants‟ performance on the IAT. 
Offering support for the view that embodying a black avatar should reduce racial bias 
a second study that used virtual reality avatars (Peck, Seinfeld, Aglioti, & Slater, 
2013) did find a reduction in implicit racial bias for those who embodied a dark skin 
avatar compared to those who embodied either a white or purple skinned avatar or 
those who saw the same movements of the dark skinned avatar but without 
embodiment. 
      
The results of Experiment 2.1 revealed limited evidence in favour of the power of 
multisensory stimulation to alter attitudes at the cognitive level. While there was no 
significant change in participants‟ scores on the race IAT between pre- and post-RHI 
sessions there was a significant relationship between the levels of ownership the 
participants reported over both the black and white rubber hands, and post-RHI racial 
bias. Those who felt ownership over the rubber hands more strongly also showed 
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lower bias in the post-RHI IAT. However, due to the within group design of 
experiment 2.1 the effect of ownership over the black hand could not be disentangled 
from the effect of ownership over the white hand. The result of experiment 2.1 is 
therefore consistent with the possibility that simply experiencing ownership over a 
rubber hand of any skin colour may lead to a change in racial bias. The study also 
suffered from a number of other limitations. The within subjects design meant that it 
was not possible to separate out the effects of synchronous and asynchronous 
stimulation from those of experienced body ownership because all participants had 
experienced both synchronous and asynchronous VT-stimulation prior to carrying 
out the post-stimulation IAT.  While these two factors are highly correlated it is 
possible, given the findings of Inzlicht et al. (2012), that synchronous stimulation 
alone as opposed to the feeling of body ownership specifically is sufficient to change 
racial bias.  A final limitation of the study relates to the IAT itself. The standard IAT 
assesses attitudes toward white and black people simultaneously. This makes it 
difficult to determine whether the effect of implicit race bias effects observed in 
experiment 2.1 are the result of embodiment leading to a stronger liking for black 
people, a stronger disliking of white people, or both.     
 
Following on the published findings of experiment 2.1 a recent study by Maister, 
Sebanz, Knoblich and Tsakiris (2013) investigated whether the effect of changes in 
body ownership over a hand that has a darker skin colour would lead to a change in 
implicit biases against people with dark-skin colour. The study used a between 
subjects design in which participants experienced either synchronous or 
asynchronous VT stimulation applied to either a light or dark skinned rubber hand 
(equivalent to the black and white rubber hands employed in the current study).  As 
synchronous, but not asynchronous, VT stimulation has been found to reliably lead 
to feelings of body ownership over a foreign limb (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; 
Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005b) varying the synchrony of VT stimulation allowed for the 
control of whether or not participants felt ownership over the rubber hand or not, and 
thus controlled for the effects of visual exposure to a hand of a different skin colour 
independently of the type of stimulation used.  Maister et al. found a significant 
relationship between experiencing ownership over the dark rubber hand and change 
in IAT scores with those who experienced greater ownership over the dark rubber 
hand showing a reduction in skin-tone bias which was not seen with participants who 
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experienced ownership over the light rubber hand.  One notable difference between 
experiment 2.1 of this thesis and Maister et al. was that rather than using actual 
photographs of black and white faces in the IAT, Maister et al. used a set of images 
of faces which were identical in the light and dark conditions apart from their skin 
colour and so did not account for the distinctive differences in facial features 
between white and black people in real life.  
 
Several studies have investigated contributions of skin colour and facial features to 
racial categorization and have found evidence that both play an important role (Balas 
& Nelson, 2010; Balas, Westerlund, Hung, & Nelson, 2011; Eberhardt, Davies, 
Purdie-Vaughns, & Johnson, 2006; Hagiwara, Kashy, & Cesario, 2012; Livingston & 
Brewer, 2002; Ma & Correll, 2011; Ratner, Kaul, & Van Bavel, 2013; Ronquillo et 
al., 2007; Stepanova & Strube, 2009; Strom, Zebrowitz, Zhang, Bronstad, & Lee, 
2012).   Livingston and Brewer showed that highly prototypic Black targets (e.g., 
broad nose, large lips, coarse hair texture, dark skin tone) elicited more prejudice 
than less prototypic targets. Stepanova & Strube demonstrated that both skin colour 
and facial features affect judgements of racial typicality and racial categorization 
independently and in an additive manner, while Hagiwara et al. showed a similar 
independent effect of skin colour and features on white people‟s affective 
judgements towards black people. Strom et al. found that white participants were 
more responsive to facial metrics than to skin tone when making racial 
prototypicality ratings. Underlining the potentially lethal consequences of these 
findings is evidence that people with both darker skin and more prototypically black 
facial features are more likely to receive the death sentence (Eberhardt et al., 2006) 
and that participants and police officers playing a first person shooter computer game 
are more likely to shoot black avatars with prototypical as opposed to unprototypical 
features (Ma & Correll, 2011). In addition to these behavioural studies neuroimaging 
studies have found that skin colour and facial features selectively modulate neural 
responses to faces. Balas & Nelson showed participants faces of different races while 
using EEG to record brain activity and demonstrated that, while the N170 component 
was modulated only by skin colour, the N250 component was sensitive to both skin 
colour and facial features. In a follow up study the same authors showed that the 
neural signature of the „other-race effect‟, in which other-race faces tend to look 
more alike to observers than faces of their own race (Malpass & Kravitz, 1969; 
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Meissner & Brigham, 2001) only occurs in infants when both skin tone and facial 
features are combined (Balas et al., 2011). Given the large amount of evidence for 
the importance of facial features as well as skin colour for perceptions of race, it is 
important to show that the effects of experiencing ownership over a hand with a dark 
skin colour found by Maister et al. (2013) generalise to faces with distinctive black 
facial features as well as merely a dark skin tone.   
  
To expand on the findings of Maister et al. (2013) and address the limitations in 
study 2.1 the current experiment used a similar between subjects design as that used 
by Maister et al. However in this study, as in experiment 2.1, the race IAT with 
photographs of real people was used which allowed for the IAT to directly probe 
attitudes towards black people as a social group rather than merely about faces with 
light or dark skin.  Finally in order to ascertain whether or not any effects found on 
implicit attitudes was due to a greater liking of black people, a single category race 
IAT was used in which participants only had to associate either good or bad words 
with black faces (Karpinski & Steinman, 2006). This enabled the study to focus on 
the effect of multisensory stimulation on participants‟ attitudes towards black people 
rather than their relative bias between black and white people. 
 
On the basis of the findings from experiment 2.1 it was predicted that participants 
who experienced synchronous stimulation with the black rubber hand would become 
more positive in their implicit attitude towards black people compared to those in the 
other conditions.  Based on the finding of experiment 2.1 and of Maister et al. (2013) 
it was also predicted that those who felt greater embodiment over the black hand 
would show a greater increase in their implicit attitude. 
 
3.2.2. Methods  
 
3.2.2.1. Design 
The study used a between participants design with two factors (see Table 3-1). The 
first factor was the synchrony of visual-tactile stimulation (synchronous, 
asynchronous) and the second was the skin colour of the rubber hand (black, white). 
The dependent variables were participants‟ scores in the single category IAT for 
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black faces post-VT stimulation and participants‟ responses to four statements on a 7 
point Likert scale taken from Longo, Schüür, et al. (2008). In this study, in contrast 
to the studies in chapter 2, a larger sample of the questions from Longo, Schüür, et 
al. were used. Because the relationship between body ownership and racial bias was 
the key hypothesis in this study questions 1, 3 and 4 all loaded onto the ownership 
subfactor of the embodiment factor while question 2 loaded onto the location 
subfactor. In order to have a baseline measure of participants‟ attitudes towards black 
people participants also completed a single category black-faces IAT prior to 
experiencing V-T stimulation. 
 
Table 3-1. Design of Experiment 3.1. 
Condition Synchrony of V-T stimulation Skin colour of the rubber hand 
 
1 
Synchronous Black 
2 Synchronous White 
3 Asynchronous Black 
4 Asynchronous White 
 
3.2.2.2. Procedure 
Participants attended one experimental session. They first completed a demographic 
questionnaire. Following this, participants carried out a computer administered 
single-category „black-faces‟ IAT (SC-IAT), where they categorized words as „good‟ 
or „bad‟ and categorized pictures of black people‟s faces as „black‟ in order to give 
an initial baseline measure of their implicit attitude towards black people. The 
associations between stimuli and response key and the order of associations (i.e. 
positive words and black faces or negative words and black faces) were 
counterbalanced across participants (Karpinski & Steinman, 2006). The SC-IAT was 
performed using Presentation® software (Version 16.03, www.neurobs.com). 
Accuracy and response times were analysed according to the method used in 
Karpinski and Steinman and the resultant scores were adjusted for counterbalancing 
so that those with a more positive view of black people had positive scores (i.e. >0) 
and those with a more negative view of black people had negative scores (<0).  
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After completing the single category IAT participants received stimulation from a 
paintbrush on their unseen left hand at a frequency of approximately 1 Hz whilst 
viewing either a black or white rubber hand being stimulated either synchronously or 
asynchronously with their felt touch. VT stimulation was delivered manually over 
two minutes with the use of two identical paintbrushes. Both the participant‟s left 
hand and the rubber hand were alternately stimulated on the index, middle and ring 
fingers from the knuckle to the tip.  
 
Following the two minutes of VT stimulation participants then carried out the first 
half of the black faces SC-IAT (e.g. the blocks with the associations black faces and 
negative words), they then received a further two minutes of VT stimulation before 
completing the remaining block of the SC-IAT (e.g. black faces and positive words; 
see Figure 3-1). Finally participants completed the four item Ownership 
questionnaire which indicated the extent to which they experienced illusory 
ownership over the rubber hand.  They completed these questions twice, once for 
their experience during the first period of VT stimulation, and then again for their 
experience during the second period of VT stimulation.  The questions were 
presented using Presentation® software (Version 16.03, www.neurobs.com). 
 
3.2.2.3. Participants  
148 participants (mean age ± SD: 21 ± 6, 43 male) gave their informed consent to 
participate and were paid for their participation. All participants self-identified as 
white. The study was approved by the Departmental Ethics Committee, Royal 
Holloway, University of London. 
 
3.2.3. Results 
 
3.2.3.1. Introspective Rating of the RHI 
Participants‟ ratings on the four RHI questions were averaged together across the two 
periods of stroking to produce a mean rating for each question. One participant in the 
white asynchronous group‟s data was lost due to technical error resulting in a total 
sample of 147 participants.  A multivariate ANOVA was then run using all of the 
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questions as dependent variables and including synchrony and colour as independent 
variables to establish whether the manipulation of VT stimulation succeeded in 
generating greater ownership over the rubber hand in the synchronous compared to 
the asynchronous conditions and to investigate whether the skin colour of the rubber 
hand had any effect on ratings of ownership (see Figure 3-2).   
 
The MANOVA revealed that there was a significant difference between the 
synchronous and asynchronous groups on question one, “It seemed like I was 
looking directly at my own hand, rather than at a rubber hand”, F(1, 143) = 64.32, p 
< .001,  because synchronous stimulation (M = 1.12, SD = 1.7) led to higher 
responses than asynchronous stimulation  (M = -0.76, SD = 1.67), question two, “It 
seemed like the touch I felt was caused by the paintbrush touching the rubber hand”, 
F(1, 143) = 88.21, p < .001,  because synchronous stimulation (M = 1.46, SD = 1.54) 
led to higher responses than asynchronous stimulation (M = -0.73, SD = 1.64), 
question 3 “It seemed like the rubber hand was my hand”, F(1, 143) = 18.16, p < 
.001, because synchronous stimulation (M = 1.34, SD = 1.46) led to higher responses 
than asynchronous stimulation (M = -1.08, SD = 1.64),and question four “It seemed 
like the rubber hand began to resemble my real hand”,  F(1, 143) = 47.07, p < 
.001,because synchronous stimulation (M = 0.77, SD = 1.61) led to higher responses 
than asynchronous stimulation (M = -0.35, SD = 1.58),. There was no significant 
effect of skin colour of the rubber hand or significant interaction between synchrony 
or skin colour for any of the four questions. These results demonstrate that the 
manipulation of synchronous stimulation was successful in eliciting an illusory sense 
of body ownership over a black rubber hand. 
 
3.2.3.2. Pre-existing Implicit Racial Bias and Experienced Ownership  
First, to ensure that there were no significant differences in pre-existing attitudes 
towards black people between the four groups of participants, a between-subjects 
ANOVA was carried out on participants‟ scores with the pre-stimulation SC-IAT as 
the dependent variable and synchrony of VT-stimulation (synchronous, 
asynchronous) and skin colour of the rubber hand (black, white) as independent 
variables.  
  
 
 
1
1
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Figure 3-1. Structure of experiment 3.1(E = experimenter, P = participant.) 
  
 
1
1
2
 
 
Figure 3-2. Mean Likert scores for each RHI question across each of the four conditions. Error bars represent SEM. 
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It was found that there were no significant effects of either synchrony of stimulation 
and nor was there a significant interaction between synchrony and skin colour 
(Black: Synch: M = 0.01, SD = 0.38; Asynch: M = 0.01, SD = 0.44; White: Synch: M 
= -0.05, SD = 0.35; Asynch: M = 0.05, SD = 0.35), indicating that participants across 
the four groups had comparable scores in the pre-stimulation SC-IAT. 
 
We next investigated whether pre-existing implicit attitudes could predict the extent 
to which participants experienced ownership for the black rubber hand. To do this, 
participants‟ scores in the four introspective questions were averaged together to 
create an embodiment index. The averaging of all four questions as opposed to just 
using a single ownership question as in chapter 2 was carried out due to the fact that 
three of the questions in this study all loaded onto the ownership subfactor meaning 
that the scale created from averaging all four questions could be reliably interpreted 
as focused on ownership. Data from participants exposed to the black rubber hand (N 
= 37 for synchronous stimulation, and N = 37 for asynchronous stimulation) was 
then entered in a two-step hierarchical linear regression with the embodiment index 
as the dependant variable. Pre-stimulation SC-IAT score and synchrony of VT-
stimulation (synchronous or asynchronous) were entered as potential predictor 
variables at the first step, and the interaction between them was entered as a potential 
predictor variable at the second step. The overall model fit was significant at the first 
step, F(2, 71) = 15.31, p < .001. Adding the interaction term to the model in Step 2 of 
the regression did not significantly improve the model fit (see Table 3-2).  
 
3.2.3.3. Effect of Synchronous Multisensory Stimulation on Implicit Attitudes to 
Black People 
In order to assess the effect of synchronous multisensory stimulation on implicit 
attitudes to black people, an analysis of covariance was carried out with participant‟s 
score on the post-stimulation SC-IAT as the dependent variable and two between 
subjects factors; type of VT-stimulation (synchronous/asynchronous) and skin colour 
of the rubber hand (black/white).  Participants‟ pre-stimulation SC-IAT scores were 
included as a covariate in order to control for participants‟ pre-existing attitudes 
towards black people (as per Huck & Mclean, 1975; Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). 
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Table 3-2. Summary of two-step hierarchical regression analysis for variables 
ownership of the black hand. 
Variable β p 
Step 1   
Pre-VT SC-IAT -0.56 .139 
Synchrony 1.64 < .001 
Step 2   
Pre-VT SC-IAT -0.17 .195 
Synchrony 0.53 < .001 
Pre-VT SC-IAT* Synchrony 0.21 .789 
Note. r2adjusted = .28 for Step 1; Δr2=0.001 for Step 2 (p > .05),  
 
The ANCOVA found no significant main effects of either type of VT stimulation or 
skin colour.  Importantly, a significant interaction between them was found, F(1, 
143) =6.14, p < .05, (see Figure 3-3).  However, significant  interactions were also 
found between pre VT-stimulation SC-IAT score and synchrony, F(1,140) =7.87, p < 
.01, and between pre VT-stimulation SC-IAT score, skin colour and synchrony, 
F(1,140) =7.08, p < .01.  These interactions between the independent variables and 
the covariate indicated that the homogeneity of regression slopes assumption for 
ANCOVA had been violated. Therefore, in order to ensure that the results found in 
the ANCOVA were reliable, the Johnson-Neyman technique recommended by 
Tabachnick & Fidell (1996) was used to find the regions of significance for the 
observed effects.  It was found that for those participants with a pre-VT stimulation 
SC-IAT score of above 0.077 (N = 52), indicating more positive attitudes towards 
black people, there was no significant effect of VT-stimulation on attitudes towards 
black people while the observed effects reported above were significant for those 
with a pre-VT stimulation SC-IAT score below 0.077 (N = 96). This indicated that 
the manipulation was successful in altering attitudes towards black people only if 
participants originally held relatively negative attitudes towards black people.    
 
In order to further investigate this interaction four separate ANCOVAs were run.  
The first ANCOVA investigated the effect of VT stimulation on post-stimulation 
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IAT, with pre-stimulation IAT score as the covariate, only on participants in the 
black rubber hand conditions and revealed a significant effect of synchrony, F(1, 71) 
=5.54, p < .05, with those who received synchronous stimulation showing more 
positive adjusted post stimulation IAT scores (M = 0.05, SD = 0.3) compared to 
those who received asynchronous stimulation (M = -0.11, SD = 0.28).  The second 
ANCOVA included only those participants in the white rubber hand conditions and 
found no significant effect of synchrony, F(1, 71) =1.74, p > .05, indicating no 
significant difference in SC-IAT score between those who received synchronous 
stimulation (M = -0.01, SD = 0.37) compared to those who received asynchronous 
stimulation (M = 0.1, SD = 0.37). 
 
The third and fourth ANCOVAs used skin colour as the independent variable, post-
stimulation IAT score as the dependent variable and pre-stimulation IAT score as the 
covariate.  The first of these was run for those participants who received synchronous 
VT stimulation and found no significant difference, F(1, 71) =0.35, p > .05, between 
those who saw the white rubber hand (M = -0.01, SD = 0.3) compared to those who 
saw the black rubber hand (M = 0.05, SD = 0.37). The second was run for those 
participants who received asynchronous VT and revealed a significant effect of skin 
colour, F(1, 71) =8.5, p < .01, with those who had viewed the white hand showing a 
more positive adjusted post stimulation IAT score (M = 0.1, SD = 0.37) than those 
who had viewed the black hand (M = -0.11, SD = 0.28). 
 
3.2.3.3 Effect of Feeling of Body Ownership on Implicit Attitudes to Black 
People  
In order to investigate the effect of experiencing body ownership over the rubber 
hand on participants‟ implicit attitudes to black people a three-step hierarchical linear 
regression was carried out with post-stimulation SC-IAT score as the dependant 
variable. Synchrony of VT-stimulation, embodiment index, and pre-stimulation SC-
IAT score were entered as predictor variables in the first step, all two-way interaction 
terms entered in the second step and the three-way interaction entered as a third step. 
Due to the finding in the previous analysis that a significant difference in post-
stimulation SC-IAT between synchronous and asynchronous groups existed only for 
participants in the black rubber hand group only those who saw the black rubber 
hand were included in the regression The overall model fit was significant at the first 
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step , F(1, 72)=15.31, p<0.001. Synchrony of VT-stimulation was the only 
significant predictor and adding the interaction terms to the model in Steps 2 and 3 of 
the regression did not significantly improve the model fit (see Table 3-3).   
 
 
Figure 3-3. Pre- and Post-Stimulation SC-IAT scores grouped by synchrony of VT-
stimulation and skin colour of rubber hand. Error bars represent SEM. 
 
3.2.4. Discussion 
 
The present study examined whether using multisensory stimulation to induce 
feelings of body ownership over the hand of a racial out-group would lead to an 
increase in positive attitude towards that racial out-group. The study had a number of 
interesting finding.  First, it was found that synchronous multisensory stimulation 
was successful in eliciting an induced sense of body ownership over a black rubber 
hand. Second, the strength of the experienced ownership was not predicted by pre-
existing levels of implicit attitudes against the out-group, but only by the pattern of 
stimulation. Third, a significant interaction was found between the synchrony of VT 
stimulation and the skin colour of the rubber hand. Those participants who received 
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synchronous VT stimulation with the black rubber hand were found to have more 
positive implicit attitudes towards black people post-stimulation than those who 
received asynchronous stimulation of the black rubber hand. Fourth, when the effect 
of pre-VT stimulation attitudes towards black people was taken into account, the 
effect of VT stimulation was only significant for those participants who had a 
negative initial attitude towards black people. No significant effects were found for 
those who had positive initial attitudes towards black people. Finally there was an 
interesting interaction effect where participants who received asynchronous 
stimulation over a black hand subsequently showed increased negative attitudes 
towards black people post-stimulation. I discuss these findings in turn. 
 
The finding that synchronous VT stimulation is capable of inducing ownership over 
a hand of a different skin colour replicates the previous finding of experiment 2.1 of 
this thesis and Maister et al. (Maister, Sebanz, et al., 2013). Of note is the fact that 
the study differed from that of Farmer et al. in finding a main effect of synchrony but 
not of skin colour on body ownership , whereas experiment 2.1. found a significant 
difference between ownership scores for the black and white rubber hands.  This 
difference is probably due to the fact that the current study used a between-subject 
design, while experiment 2.1 employed a within-subject design.  Thus, in experiment 
2.1 participants were able to directly compare their experience of ownership over the 
white and black rubber hands, which is likely to have led them to more closely 
indicate any perceived difference in feeling of ownership between the two 
conditions.  In support of this hypothesis is the fact that Maister et al, who used a 
similar between-subjects design to that employed in the current study, also failed to 
find any significant effect of skin colour on introspective judgements of body 
ownership.   
 
Table 3-3. Summary of three-step hierarchical regression analysis for variables 
predicting SC-IAT score for participants who experienced ownership of the black 
hand. 
Variable β P 
Step 1   
Pre-VT SC-IAT 0 .969 
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Synchrony 0.41 .003 
Embodiment Index -0.27 .051 
Step 2   
Pre-VT SC-IAT -0.01 .961 
Synchrony 0.42 .004 
Embodiment Index -0.24 .187 
Pre-VT SC-IAT* Synchrony 0.01 .957 
Pre-VT SC-IAT* Embodiment Index 0.01 .937 
Embodiment Index * Synchrony -0.05 .795 
Step 3   
Pre-VT SC-IAT 0.08 .681 
Synchrony 0.34 .031 
Embodiment Index -0.25 .173 
Pre-VT SC-IAT* Synchrony 0.06 .773 
Pre-VT SC-IAT* Embodiment Index 0.15 .446 
Embodiment Index * Synchrony 0.07 .757 
Pre-VT SC-IAT* Embodiment Index * 
Synchrony 
-0.26 .231 
Note. r2adjusted = .09 for Step 1; Δr2 = .001 for Step 2 (p > .05), Δr2 = .019 for Step 3 (p > .05).  * = 
p < .05.  
 
Second, in common with the previous findings of both Farmer et al. and Maister et 
al., the study found that pre-stimulation attitudes towards the out-group did not 
significantly predict feeling of ownership.  This result further emphasises that in the 
case of multisensory-induced changes in body ownership, unlike the cases of 
empathy for pain (Avenanti et al., 2010)and action observation (Désy & Théoret, 
2007; Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2010; Molnar-Szakacs et al., 2007), participant‟s pre-
existing racial bias does not play a significant role in determining the amount of 
association between self and other. This is an intriguing finding because it suggests 
that while processes driven by simulation such as empathy and action understanding, 
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are affected by factors such as physical and social similarity between self and other, 
in the case of shared multisensory stimulation these factors are less relevant, possibly 
because the direct matching of sensory signals between self and other overrides 
them. 
 
The third and most important finding of this study was that of a significant 
interaction effect between the synchrony of VT stimulation and the skin colour of the 
rubber hand on the post-stimulation implicit racial bias scores.  Further analyses 
demonstrated that this interaction was driven by a significant difference between the 
synchronous and asynchronous conditions in those who had received VT-stimulation 
with the black hand but not those who had received it with the white hand.  This 
finding suggests that synchronous VT-stimulation caused an increase in overlap 
between the black hand and the participant‟s own hand. This increased overlap was 
then generalised to the out-group as a whole, leading to a modulation of high-level 
social attitudes, as evidenced by the change in the post SC-IAT. As such this study 
presents further evidence in line with that of other recent studies (Banakou et al., 
2013; Maister, Sebanz, et al., 2013; Peck et al., 2013) that the plasticity of body-
representation constitutes a previously unexplored dimension in social cognition 
processes.       
 
In contrast to Maister et al.'s (Maister, Sebanz, et al., 2013) study where the change 
in implicit attitudes was driven by the strength of experienced ownership, the present 
experiment did not find a significant effect of the experience of body ownership over 
the rubber hand on attitudes towards black people over and above the effect of 
synchronous stimulation.  It is important to note however that in both Maister et al.'s 
study and the results reported here there was a strong association between 
synchronous VT-stimulation and body ownership as measured by participants‟ 
responses to RHI questions. This association can be seen by the fact that, defining a 
mean response to the four RHI questions of greater than zero as constituting an 
experience of body ownership, in the current study the vast majority of participants 
(84% in total, 84% for the black hand condition) in the synchronous conditions 
reported experiencing ownership over the rubber hand. This robust association 
suggests that, despite the difference in the factor that was found to be most closely 
linked to changes in attitudes, the results of the current study and that of Maister et 
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al. are largely in agreement as to the power of multisensory stimulation to change 
participants‟ attitudes towards an out-group.  
 
Extending the results of Maister et al. (Maister, Sebanz, et al., 2013), we here used 
the race IAT that presents photographs of black people‟s faces while in Maister et 
al.‟s study the stimuli used were drawings of faces that had been coloured to give 
them either light or dark skin. As argued in the introduction, several studies have 
shown that processing of skin colour and facial features play an important role in 
judgements of racial typicality and racial categorization independently and in an 
additive manner. We here show that the induced ownership of a body-part of 
different skin colour affected the participants‟ implicit attitudes when processing 
facial features, in addition to the processing of skin colour as shown in previous 
studies. Thus, the effects of multisensory-induced changes in body ownership 
generalise to faces with distinctive black facial features as well as merely a dark skin 
colour.  As highlighted above, a key difference between the current study and that of 
Maister is the importance of the strength of body ownership as shown in Maister et 
al. versus the mere fact of a change in body ownership as shown here. It is possible 
that in the case of the skin colour SC-IAT the strength of the experience of 
ownership, rather than the fact of whether participants experienced ownership or not, 
was the key factor in changing implicit attitudes. In the skin-colour variant of the 
IAT, the stimuli used do not contain prototypical features of black faces. Instead, the 
focus is on the skin colour, independently of facial characteristics. Skin colour can be 
thought of as a continuous variable that can also account for physical differences 
within groups or races (Strom et al., 2012). To the extent that participants 
experienced the dark-skin rubber hand as their own, and the consequent change that 
this may have had on their body-image (Longo et al., 2009), it is plausible that the 
actual strength of the illusion would have a greater impact in processing the skin 
colour IAT stimuli as more similar to the self.   In the current study, by contrast, 
where photographs of black people‟s faces were used in the IAT, the more salient 
nature of the stimuli for race categorization may have meant that the synchrony of 
stimulation and the consequent change in ownership, but not the strength of this 
change was the critical factor in determining changes in attitudes. 
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A novel finding of the present study is that our experimental manipulation seemed to 
have an effect on those participants whose prior attitude towards black people was 
negative, while those participants whose attitude towards black people was initially 
positive were less affected by the manipulation. This finding is important for 
contextualizing the effects that multisensory-induced changes in self-representations 
can have on social cognition. While pre-existing levels of implicit biases do not seem 
to influence whether such multisensory-induced changes can occur for out-groups, 
we here show that the consequences that such changes have on social cognition are 
accentuated for people with pre-existing negative biases. Given that IAT seems to be 
resistant to cognitive strategies or general task demands (Fiedler & Bluemke, 2005; 
Kim, 2003; Steffens, 2004), the observed changes reinforce the hypothesis that the 
representation of the self and its relation to others as given to us  by multisensory 
processing is important in maintaining or changing social attitudes.   
 
The final interesting finding of the study was the fact that not only did synchronous 
VT-stimulation of the black hand lead to increased positive attitudes towards black 
people, but asynchronous VT-stimulation of the black hand led to increased negative 
attitudes towards the same out-group, while the reverse pattern was found for the 
white hand. This finding can be explained by considering recent studies which 
indicate that asynchronous stimulation is not merely a neutral control condition, but 
actually seems to lead to an increase in differentiation between one‟s self and the 
other.  For example, Dolk et al. (Dolk et al., 2011) used the RHI to investigate the 
role of body ownership in the “Social Simon task” in which participants appear to 
show an interference effect in their own actions due to co-representing the actions of 
an interaction partner (Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003). They found that 
asynchronous VT-stimulation of the hand of an interaction partner led to a stronger 
interference effect than did synchronous stimulation. It was suggested that the 
distinct lack of sensory contingency between the participant‟s hand and the hand of 
the interaction partner in the asynchronous stimulation emphasized the interaction 
partner‟s independent existence, thus making the partner a more salient influence on 
the representation of the participant‟s own response. In a similar vein, Rohde, Di 
Luca and Ernst (2011) found that proprioceptive drift, which is commonly used as a 
behavioural measure of body ownership, occurred after both synchronous VT-
stimulation and pure visual observation of a rubber hand but did not occur after 
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asynchronous VT-stimulation. They therefore concluded that the asynchronous VT-
stimulation condition plays a key role in preventing proprioceptive drift by 
enhancing the feeling of differentiation between the rubber hand and the hand of the 
participant.  
 
In the present study the power of asynchronous VT-stimulation to  increase the 
amount of differentiation felt between the black rubber hand and the participant‟s 
own hand seems likely to be the cause of the higher negative attitude towards black 
people found in the asynchronous compared to synchronous black hand condition.  
The present findings suggest that investigating the effects on social attitudes and 
identifications of one‟s own sensory and motor experiences being out of synchrony 
with those of other people could be a fertile area of further research. The fact that 
asynchronous stimulation of the white hand also led to more positive attitudes 
towards black people seems at first a more difficult finding to explain. However the 
fact that participants had completed the SC-IAT shortly before experiencing VT-
stimulation may have led to an increased salience for their own racial identity 
(white).  Subsequent vision of the white rubber hand being stroked asynchronously 
may have led to a feeling of differentiation between the self and the white hand 
which subsequently manifested itself as a greater positive attitude towards black 
people when taking the post stimulation SC-IAT.   
 
Recent studies have utilised virtual reality to investigate the effects of embodiment 
on implicit social attitudes (Banakou et al., 2013; Peck et al., 2013). Peck et al. 
(2013) demonstrated that experiencing control of a dark skinned avatar led to a 
decrease in implicit racial bias as measured by the race-IAT. These results are 
convergent with those reported here, despite several methodological differences. 
First, Peck et al.‟s study involved creating the feeling of body ownership over a 
whole body rather than just a hand, indicating that the anatomical location of the 
body part embodied does not make a difference to the influence of embodiment on 
implicit attitudes. Second, whilst the current study used passive multisensory 
stimulation to induce the feeling of ownership over a black hand, Peck et al. induced 
the feeling of ownership over the avatar by creating a sensorimotor experience in 
which moving one‟s own body caused the body of the avatar to move in synchrony. 
The hypothesis that bias towards an out-group can be reduced by synchronisation 
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between one‟s own movements and those of a member of the out-group has also 
been supported by the findings of Inzlicht et al. (2012), who have shown that 
mimicking a member of a racial outgroup can reduce negative attitudes towards that 
outgroup.           
 
Furthermore, another recent study (Banakou et al., 2013) expanded the investigation 
of the relationship between embodiment and implicit attitudes by showing that 
feeling body ownership over an avatar of a child resulted in a change in implicit 
attitudes towards children as measured by an IAT.  Importantly, the IAT used in 
Banakou et al. (2013) showed an increase in the association between the self-concept 
and childlike facial features, indicating that the change in implicit associations seen 
in that study was due to changes in self-representation. This finding suggests the 
changes in implicit attitudes towards a racial out-group found in the current study 
may also be mediated by changes in self-representation, whereby the self is seen as 
more similar to members of a racial out-group.   
    
In conclusion, the present study demonstrates that multisensory stimulation over a 
hand with the skin colour of a racial out-group can have an effect on high level 
cognitive attitudes towards that group.  Synchronous stimulation of a black rubber 
hand led to a significantly more positive attitude towards black people compared to 
asynchronous stimulation.  This finding adds to previous research by demonstrating 
that by manipulating, through multisensory stimulation, the perceived overlap 
between one‟s own body and a hand of a different racial group it is possible to 
change social attitudes towards that racial group.  Moreover, the current experiment 
also expands on previous results showing links between multisensory stimulation and 
higher level cognition (Banakou et al., 2013; Maister, Sebanz, et al., 2013; Peck et 
al., 2013) by suggesting that asynchronous stimulation can influence the perceived 
closeness between self and other by emphasising, contrary to the effects of 
synchronous stimulation, the dissimilarity between one‟s own body and that of 
another. 
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3.3. Experiment 3.2 
 
3.3.1. Introduction 
 
The second experiment in this chapter sought to explore the effect of multisensory 
induced changes in body ownership on a more sensorimotor based measure of racial 
bias, sensorimotor empathy to pain. 
 
This measure of sensorimotor empathy to pain was first identified by Avenanti et al. 
(2005) who demonstrated, using TMS, that observing a painful stimuli, e.g. a needle, 
being applied to the hand of a model, consistently led to a reduction in corticospinal 
(CS) excitability in the hand muscle relative to the response to non-painful stimuli 
touching the hand. They further demonstrated that this effect was specific to the body 
part being observed, as they found no reduction in the CS excitability of hand 
muscles when participants observed either a foot or a non-body object receiving 
painful stimuli. Further studies by Avenanti and colleagues have expanded on these 
findings by demonstrating that this sensrorimotor empathy is specific to the 
lateralization of the observed hand (Avenanti, Minio-Paluello, Sforza, & Aglioti, 
2009) and is correlated with participants‟ perceptions of the intensity of pain 
(Avenanti, Paluello, Bufalari, & Aglioti, 2006). Sensorimotor empathy for pain 
appears to be stimuli driven, as it is independent of the instructions given to 
participants (Avenanti et al., 2006) and may be the result of modulation of motor 
responses by activity in the somatosensory cortices (Bufalari, Aprile, Avenanti, Di 
Russo, & Aglioti, 2007). 
 
There is also evidence that this sensorimotor measure of empathy is related to more 
cognitive measures of empathy. Avenanti and colleagues (Avenanti, Minio-Paluello, 
Bufalari, & Aglioti, 2009) found that MEP suppression was greater in subjects with 
high trait-cognitive empathy and lower in subjects with high trait-personal distress 
and in those with high aversion for the stimuli being observed. They further 
demonstrated that no decrease in MEP size is found in autistic participants (Minio-
Paluello, Baron-Cohen, Avenanti, Walsh, & Aglioti, 2009), further suggesting a link 
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between this low level form of empathy and more congitive forms of social empathy 
that are known to be impaired in autistic people (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 
2004; Schulte-Rüther et al., 2011).  
 
The experiment reported here is motivated by the finding of a relationship between 
racial bias and sensorimotor empathy for pain by Avenanti et al. (Avenanti et al., 
2010). As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter this finding is one of a 
number of studies demonstrating that shared representations of pain are modulated 
by whether the person observed is a member of a racial in-group or out-group. Of 
specific interest for the current experiment was the finding by Avenanti et al. that 
participants‟ implicit racial bias was related to their bias in sensorimotor empathy, 
with those participants with the highest implicit bias showing the greatest difference 
between in-group and out-group. 
 
Based on the findings reported in Maister et al. (Maister, Sebanz, et al., 2013) and in 
experiments 2.1 and 3.1 of the current thesis, which demonstrated the power of 
multisensory stimulation induced feelings of ownership over the hand of a racial out-
group to reduced implicit bias towards that out-group the study reported here 
investigated whether inducing ownership of an out-group hand would lead to a 
significant change in sensorimotor empathy for the out-group hand. It was predicted 
that prior to VT-stimulation participants would show sensorimotor bias with a lower 
CS activation to the observation of pain stimuli compared to touch stimuli for the 
white hand than for the black hand. It was also predicted that this difference would 
significantly correlate with participants‟ implicit racial bias as measured prior to 
multisensory stimulation. It was then predicted that subsequent to synchronous, but 
not asynchronous, multisensory stimulation this effect of racial bias would be 
reduced or absent. 
 
3.3.2. Methods  
 
3.3.2.1. Design 
The study used a within participants design with three factors (see Table 3-4). The 
first factor was the synchrony of visual-tactile stimulation (synchronous, 
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asynchronous); the second was the skin colour of the observed hand (black, white) 
and the third was the type of stimuli that was applied to the observed hand. The 
dependent variables were MEP size   post-VT stimulation and participants‟ responses 
to the same fur statements used in experiment 3.1.  In order to have a baseline 
measure of participants‟ autonomic reactivity towards painful stimuli being applied 
to black and white hands, sensorimotor empathy was measured prior to VT-
stimulation for both the synchronous and the asynchronous conditions. In order to 
investigate the role of implicit racial bias on participants‟ pre and post VT-
stimulation sensorimotor empathy participants also completed the race IAT prior to 
any TMS being applied.    
 
Table 3-4 Design of Experiment 3.2. 
Condition 
Synchrony of V-
T stimulation 
Skin colour of the 
observed hand 
Type of stimuli applied 
to hand 
1 Synchronous Black Pain 
2 Synchronous Black Touch 
3 Synchronous White Pain 
4 Synchronous White Touch 
5 Asynchronous Black Pain 
6 Asynchronous Black Touch 
7 Asynchronous White Pain 
8 Asynchronous White Touch 
 
3.3.2.2. Procedure 
Participants attended 2 experimental sessions. In the first session they first completed 
a computer administered version of the race-IAT. The associations between stimuli 
and response key and the order of associations (i.e. positive words and white faces or 
positive words and black faces) were counterbalanced across participants (Greenwald 
et al., 1998, 2003). The IAT was performed using Presentation® software (Version 
16.03, www.neurobs.com). The data from the IATs were analysed using the 
improved IAT scoring algorithm recommended by Greenwald et al. (2003) and the 
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resultant scores were adjusted for counterbalancing so that those with greater racial 
bias had higher scores and those with less racial bias had lower scores.  
 
After completing the race IAT participants then began the first TMS session. 
Participants were placed in the experimental setup (see Figure 3-4). Ag/AgCl 
electrodes were placed over the left FDI (in the region of the index finger) muscles in 
a belly-tendon montage and the participant‟s left hand hand was then placed inside a 
box and hidden from view. EMG signals were sampled at 2kHz and band-pass 
filtered (10Hz-50Hz, AD instruments). Monophasic single pulses of TMS were 
generated by a Magstim rapid2 stimulator and delivered through a 70-mm figure-of-
eight coil. The position of the coil was adjusted to find the optimal scalp position 
(OSP) for the left hand FDI muscle. The stimulation intensity was set (separately for 
each of the four blocks in each session) at 110% of the resting motor threshold, 
which was defined as defined as the minimal intensity eliciting MEPs with a peak-to-
peak amplitude of greater than 1mV in over 50% of 10 test trials. Mean stimulation 
intensity was 67% (51–87%) of maximum stimulator output. The absence of 
voluntary contraction before the TMS pulse was continuously verified visually.  
 
Following the identification of the optimal scalp position and the stimulation 
intensity participants were instructed to watch video-clips of painful (syringe) and 
non-painful (cotton-bud) stimuli being applied to black and white hands (see figure 
3-5). Nine of each of the four types of video were presented to participants as part of 
a 36-trial block. The videos were presented on a 31cm x 18cm screen at a distance of 
80 cm from the participant using Presentation (Version 16.03, www.neurobs.com). 
The videos were presented in a randomised order and the experimenter applying the 
TMS was blind to the nature of the video being displayed in each trial. The duration 
of each video was 1,800 msec and in each trial, a magnetic pulse was randomly 
delivered between 200 and 600 msec before the end of the video to avoid any 
priming effects that could affect MEP size. A black screen was shown for 8.2 sec in 
the intertrial intervals. The choice of a long intertrial interval was based on a study 
demonstrating that TMS delivered for 1 h at 0.1 Hz frequency did not induce any 
change in excitability (R. Chen et al., 1997). Following completion of the first pre-
stimulation block there was a resting period of two minutes, during which a blank 
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screen was presented to the participant. After this resting period the OSP was again 
located and participants received a second 36-trials block of TMS.    
 
 
Figure 3-4: Experimental setup for experiment 3.2. Note that, although for the sake 
of convenience, this image displays both VT-stimulation and TMS being 
administered. During the experiment participants either received VT-stimulation in 
time with the hand in the video or received TMS while observing hands receiving 
painful or tactile stimuli. 
   
At the end of the second block of TMS participants had their left arm covered with a 
sheet in order to obscure their view of their arm extending into the box. They then 
received two minutes of tactile stimulation from a paintbrush on the middle finger of 
their unseen left hand at a frequency of 1 Hz whilst viewing a video of a black hand 
being stroked with an identical paintbrush either synchronously or asynchronously 
with their felt touch.  
 
Following the two minutes of VT stimulation the participants hand was uncovered 
and the OSP was again located. Participants then received a third block of 36-trials of 
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TMS. They subsequently received another 2 minutes of TMS using the same pattern 
of synchrony as used in the previous 2 minutes. Following this second period of VT-
stimulation, the OSP was located for a final time and participants received a fourth 
and final block of TMS. Finally participants completed the four item Ownership 
questionnaire which indicated the extent to which they experienced illusory 
ownership over the rubber hand (see Figure 3-5). Participants then returned for a 
second session of TMS stimulation no more than 12 days after their first session. In 
this second session participants did not complete an IAT but received four blocks of 
TMS with the same basic structure as in the first session.  The only difference 
between sessions was that participants received the opposite pattern of VT-
stimulation from that which had been delivered in the previous session. The order of 
VT-stimulation across the two sessions was counterbalanced between participants.         
 
3.3.2.3. Analysis of TMS data 
Neurophysiological data were processed off-line. Trials with EMG activity prior to 
TMS pulse or where MEP amplitudes could not be clearly distinguished from 
background EMG (< 0.05 mV) were discarded from the analysis (2.4% of trials) (see 
Figure 3-6 for an example). Mean MEP amplitude values for each of the eight blocks 
were measured peak-to-peak (in mV). The data was then normalised separately for 
each of the four blocks in both the synchronous and asynchronous conditions 
(Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1995; Papeo, Vallesi, Isaja, & Rumiati, 2009).  
The z-scored means of the two pre-VT stimulation blocks for each condition were 
averaged together as were the z-scored means of the two post-VT block for each 
condition resulting in sixteen values for each participant (time (pre VT, post VT) X 
skin colour (black, white) X type of stimuli (pain, touch) X synchrony (synchronous, 
asynchronous) 
 
3.3.2.3. Participants  
14 participants (mean age ± SD: 22 ± 3.45, 6 male) gave their informed consent to 
participate and were paid for their participation. All participants self-identified as 
white. The study was approved by the Departmental Ethics Committee, Royal 
Holloway, University of London. 
.
  
 
1
3
0 
 
Figure 3-5. Structure of experiment 3.2. 
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Figure 3-6. Example of MEP. 
 
3.3.2. Results 
 
3.3.3.1. Pre VT-stimulation Corticospinal Activation to Observation of Ingroup 
and Outgroup Pain 
In order to investigate whether the current study replicated Avenanti et al.‟s (2010) 
finding of an effect of racial group on sensorimotor empathy for pain a 2x2x2 
ANCOVA was carried out, with pre VT-stimulation z-scored MEP size as the 
dependent variable and synchrony (synchronous, asynchronous), type of stimuli 
(pain, touch) and skin colour (white, black) as the independent variables (see figure 
3-6). A finding of an interaction between colour and stimuli type would have 
indicated a replication of Avenanti et al. (2010). A significant main effect of type of 
stimuli was found F(1, 36.5) = 9.99, p < .05, because overall touch stimuli (M = -
0.17, SD = 0.63) elicited smaller MEPs than did pain stimuli (M = 0.17 SD = 0.63). 
No other significant main effects were found and there were no significant 
interactions.     
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Figure 3-7: Pre VT-stimulation z-scored MEP size in response to the different 
experimental videos. Error bars represent SEM. 
  
3.3.3.2. Introspective Rating of the RHI 
In order to investigate whether synchronous VT-stimulation had indeed led to a 
greater experience of body ownership paired sample t-tests were carried out between 
participants‟ ratings for each the 4 RHI questions in the synchronous and 
asynchronous conditions (see Figure 3-7).   
 
The t-tests revealed a significant difference between the synchronous and 
asynchronous conditions at the two tailed level for question two, “It seemed like the 
touch I felt was caused by the paintbrush touching the rubber hand”, t(13) = 5.08, p 
< .001, because synchronous stimulation (M = 1.57, SD = 1.28) led to higher 
responses than asynchronous stimulation (M = -1.07, SD = 1.86). There was also a 
significant effect of synchrony at the one tailed level for question one, “It seemed 
like I was looking directly at my own hand, rather than at a rubber hand”, t(13) = 
1.79, p < .05, because synchronous stimulation (M = -0.36, SD = 2.02) led to higher 
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responses than asynchronous stimulation (M = -1.29, SD = 1.73) and question four, 
“It seemed like the rubber hand began to resemble my real hand”, t(13) = 1.81, p < 
.05, because synchronous stimulation (M = -0.5, SD = 2.28) led to higher responses 
than asynchronous stimulation (M = -1.29, SD = 1.77). No significant difference was 
found for between the synchronous (M = -0.5, SD = 2.24) and asynchronous 
conditions (M = -1.5, SD = 1.83) for question three, “It seemed like the rubber hand 
was my hand”, t(13) = 1.81, p < .05. Given these generally low scores for synchrony, 
the responses for the four questions in were averaged together to form an 
embodiment index and a further t-test was run comparing overall embodiment for the 
synchronous (M = 0.54, SD = 0.46) compared to asynchronous (M = 0.54, SD = 0.46)  
conditions. A significant difference was found at the two tailed level, t(13) = 2.92, p 
< .05, indicating that the manipulation of synchrony was successful in eliciting a 
greater sense of embodiment over the black hand in the synchronous compared to 
asynchronous condition.  
 
3.3.3.3. Relationship Between Pre VT-Stimulation Sensorimotor Racial Bias and 
Implicit Racial Bias 
In order to investigate whether the current study successfully replicated Avenanti‟s 
finding of a significant relationship between participants‟ IAT scores and their 
sensorimotor empathy for pain, the z-scored pre VT-stimulation MEPs from the 
observation of touch stimuli were subtracted from those for pain stimuli for the black 
and white hand conditions respectively and the resultant value for the black hand was 
subtracted from that for the white hand in order to give a measure of sensorimotor 
bias. This was done separately for the synchronous and asynchronous conditions. In 
order to ensure there was no significant difference between the synchronous and 
asynchronous conditions, a paired sample t-test was carried out with sensorimotor 
bias as the dependent variable and synchrony as the independent variable. No 
significant difference was found between the synchronous (M = 0.29, SD = 0.99) and 
asynchronous (M = 0.19, SD = 1.27) conditions, t(13) = 0.39, p > .05 and so the 
mean of these two values was calculated and used as a dependent variable in a linear 
regression with IAT score as the predictor variable (see Table 3-5). The overall 
model fit was not significant, F(1, 12)=2.14, p > .05, r2adjusted = .08, indicating that 
sensorimotor bias was not predicted by implicit racial bias.     
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3.3.3.4. Effect of VT-stimulation on Corticospinal Activation to Observation of 
In-group and Out-group Pain 
In order to investigate how synchronous and asynchronous VT-stimulation affected 
corticospinal activation during the observation of pain and touch stimuli to hands 
from a racial ingroup and a racial outgroup a 2x2x2 ANCOVA was carried out with 
participant‟s post VT-stimulation z-scored MEP size as the dependent variable, pre 
VT-stimulation z-scored MEP size as the covariate, synchrony (synchronous, 
asynchronous), type of stimuli (pain, touch) and skin colour (white, black) as the 
independent variables (see Figure 3-9). 
 
No significant main effects were found, but there was a significant interaction 
between colour and synchrony, F(1, 90.32) = 3.93, p = .05, because, accounting for 
pre-VT stimulation z-scored MEPs size synchronous stimulation led to lower z-
scored MEPs to pain and touch stimuli applied to the black hand (Estimated marginal 
mean (EMM) = -0.08, standard error (SE) = 0.11) compared to the white hand (EMM 
=  -0.02, SE = 0.11) while asynchronous stimulation led to higher z-scored MEPs to 
pain and touch stimuli applied to the black hand (EMM =  0.21, SE = 0.12) compared 
to the white hand (EMM = -0.19, SE = 0.13). There was also a significant interaction 
between type of stimulation and synchrony, F(1, 90.32) = 4.66, p > .05, because 
synchronous stimulation led to higher z-scored MEPs for the observation of painful 
stimuli (EMM = 1.18, SE = 0.1) compared to touch stimuli (EMM =  -0.28, SE = 
0.12) while asynchronous stimulation led to lower z-scored MEPs for the observation 
of painful stimuli (EMM = -0.02, SE = 0.12) compared to touch stimuli (EMM =  
0.35, SE = 0.14). No other interactions were found to be significant. These findings 
suggest that synchronous VT-stimulation over the hand of a racial outgroup led to 
increased inhibition in CS excitability when watching painful and tactile stimuli 
touching a hand from that racial group and also that synchronous VT-stimulation 
leads to increased CS excitability when watching painful stimuli compared to tactile 
stimuli.
  
 
1
3
5 
 
Figure 3-8: Responses to introspective questions following synchronous and asynchronous VT-stimulation. Error bars represent SEM 
 136 
 
 
Figure 3-9: Change between Pre and Post VT-stimulation z-scored MEP size in 
response to the different experimental videos. Error bars represent SEM 
 
3.3.4. Discussion  
   
The current experiment sought to examine whether multisensory induced body 
ownership over the hand of a racial out-group would lead to a reduction in 
sensorimotor bias for empathy towards that out-group. However, since the results of 
the study failed to find an effect of sensorimotor bias prior to the administration of 
VT-stimulation it is not possible to draw any conclusion about the effects of VT-
stimulation on sensorimotor bias. The study did, however find evidence that 
synchronous multisensory stimulation could have an effect on MEP response to the 
observation of somatic stimuli being delivered to the hand of a racial out-group 
regardless of whether such stimuli was nociceptive or tactile and also that 
synchronous VT-stimulation led to an increase in MEP response to painful stimuli 
compared to tactile stimuli. I will now briefly discuss possible reasons for the failure 
to replicate the findings of Avenanti and colleagues (Avenanti et al., 2010) before 
moving to discuss possible interpretations of the studies positive findings. 
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There are a number of possible reasons why the current study failed to replicate the 
findings of Avenanti et al. (2010). First it is notable that the IAT scores for the 
participants in the current study were generally low. In fact the mean score was 
negative (M = -0.22, SD = 1.03) showing that overall participants showed a slight 
bias in favour of black faces as opposed to white faces and only half of the 
participants showing a bias in favour of white faces. In contrast the IAT scores in 
Avenanti et al.‟s study showed that both white and black participants had an implicit 
bias towards their own racial group. Given the relationship between racial bias and 
sensorimotor empathy found by Avenanti and colleagues the lack of a strong implicit 
bias in the participants in the current study might explain the failure to find an effect 
of skin colour on sensorimotor empathy. 
 
However, the current study not only failed to find a significant suppression effect for 
pain stimuli on pre VT-stimulation z-scored MEP size, which would have indicated 
an effect of sensorimotor empathy for pain in general, but in fact found the opposite 
effect, greater suppression for touch stimuli than pain stimuli. Therefore it seems that 
the low implicit racial bias of the participants is unlikely to be the sole cause of the 
failure to replicate the findings of Avenanti and colleagues previous studies(Avenanti 
et al., 2005, 2006, 2010; Avenanti, Minio-Paluello, Bufalari, et al., 2009; Avenanti, 
Minio-Paluello, Sforza, et al., 2009; Minio-Paluello et al., 2009). One possible 
explanation for this reversal in effects is a difference in the way that the stimuli were 
presented. While in Avenanti et al.‟s studies the different conditions were presented 
in separate blocks, in the current study the order of presentation for the different 
stimuli was randomised so that in each of the four blocks participants saw nine 
videos from each condition. This randomising of conditions enabled a better control 
of expectancy effects and also made it possible to ensure that the experimenter 
administering the TMS was blind to the condition being presented. Ensuring that the 
experimenter is blind to the condition being presented is an important factor in TMS 
studies as the susceptibility of MEP size to even very slight movements of the coil 
position makes TMS studies particularly at risk of unconscious modulation by the 
experimenter. It is possible therefore that the failure to replicate the findings of 
Avenanti et al. (2010) were due to these greater controls on the experiment.  
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Regardless however of the failure to replicate the findings of Avenanti et al. (2010) 
the study did produce some positive findings relating to the effect of multisensory 
induced changes in body ownership. Of particular interest is the interaction between 
skin colour of the observed hand and synchrony of VT-stimulation. Relative to 
asynchronous VT-stimulation, synchronous VT-stimulation over the black hand led 
to both higher ratings of embodiment and decreased CS activation in response to the 
observation of objects touching the black hand, regardless of whether those objects 
produced nociceptive or tactile sensations. There has been little research 
investigating the effect of the observation of touch on MEP size which makes it 
difficult to draw any solid conclusions from this finding. It is however important to 
note that although in Avenanti et al. motor empathy was calculated by subtracting 
MEP size in response to touch from that of pain, previous studies investigating the 
effects of observing pain on MEP size have used the observation fixation crosses 
(Avenanti, Minio-Paluello, Bufalari, et al., 2009) or painful stimuli applied to other 
body parts as a baseline measure (Avenanti et al., 2005, 2006). In the current study it 
was possible to adjust MEPs in the post VT-stimulation sessions taking into account 
participants‟ MEPs in the pre stimulation sessions. It is arguable therefore that the 
current experiments finding of lower MEPs during the observation of painful stimuli 
being applied to the black hand after synchronous, but not asynchronous VT-
stimulation can still be considered evidence for an increase in sensorimotor empathy. 
despite the fact that a similar decrease was present during the observation of touch 
being delivered to the black hand.       
 
Another possible interpretation is suggested by a study by Schütz-Bosbach, Mancini, 
Aglioti and Haggard (2006) who demonstrated that experiencing synchronous VT-
stimulation over a hand and then observing that hand performing actions led to lower 
MEPs than did receiving asynchronous stimulation. This finding was seen as a sign 
that reduced MEPs at least to motor stimuli are a marker of self attribution. It is 
possible therefore that the findings in the current study may be explained by the 
existence of a general reduction in MEP size following the experience of body 
ownership over an observed hand.  
 
The study also found that overall synchronous VT-stimulation led to increased CS 
excitability in response to painful as opposed to tactile stimuli. Such a finding would 
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seem to suggest that VT-stimulation led to lower feelings of sensorimotor empathy 
than did asynchronous stimulation. However examination of the difference between 
pre and post VT-stimulation MEPs suggests that this interaction is largely due to 
reduced CS response to pain in the white hand and increased response in the black 
hand following asynchronous stimulation. This finding further supports the 
hypothesis put forward in the discussion of experiment 3.1, that asynchronous 
stimulation may act as a cue to the distinction between self and other. In this case 
experiencing a cue for dis-ownership over the black hand may have led to increased 
identification with the white hand as a member of the racial ingroup thus increasing 
CS inhibition when observing that hand in pain while increasing motor excitation 
during the observation of painful stimuli being applied to the black hand. 
 
One key limitation of the current experiment is the generally low ownership scores 
after synchronous VT-stimulation. This finding may be due to the fact that 
throughout the study participants would have been aware of the tactile stimulation 
coming from the electrodes attached to their own hand. Since the hand that they 
received VT-stimulation with visibly did not have any electrodes attached this may 
have led to a conflict between the tactile stimulation received during VT-stimulation 
and the tactile stimulation participants were experiencing on their own hand. A 
second possible cause of the low ownership scores in the current study may be that as 
in experiment 2.2 the hand that received VT-stimulation was presented on a video 
screen rather than being physically present. It is notable that only half of the 
participants in this study experienced embodiment over the hand which matches the 
findings for the black hand in experiment 2.2, and offers support for the possibility 
expressed in the discussion of chapter 2 that the combination of a hand of a different 
skin colour and the presentation of that hand on a video increases the feeling that the 
hand is less “real” and thus leads to lower introspective ratings of embodiment.      
 
A second key limitation of the current study is that participants only experienced VT-
stimulation over a black but not over a white hand. This makes it impossible to 
disentangle whether the effects of skin colour seen here are due to participants 
experiencing ownership specifically over a hand from a different racial group, or 
whether they are primarily caused by the increased association between self and 
other that experiencing ownership over a hand of any skin colour causes. In order to 
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address this issue a further study is needed which compares the effect of 
experiencing ownership over a white hand on CS activation during the observation of 
painful and tactile stimuli.  
 
In conclusion the current study while failing to replicate the findings of Avenanti et 
al. (2010) did find some evidence that experiencing ownership over the hand of a 
racial out-group can lead to alterations in how sensorimotor systems process the 
application of painful and tactile stimuli to that hand. In so far as these responses can 
be considered a form of empathic response the current study demonstrates that the 
experience of body ownership over the hand of a racial out-group can lead to a 
modulation in sensorimotor empathy towards that racial group.  
 
3.4. General Discussion 
 
Given the disparate findings of the two studies in this chapter I will not spend a large 
amount of time discussing them together. However I will recap here two key 
similarities between the experiments reported in this chapter, namely the power of 
synchronous VT-stimulation to alter cognitive and sensorimotor representations of 
the relationship between self and other and the effect of asynchronous VT-
stimulation in increasing the perceived distance between self and other.  
 
In both the experiments reported here synchronous VT-stimulation led to greater 
feelings of body ownership over the hand of a different skin colour to that of the 
participant and also resulted in changes in participants‟ responses to stimuli from a 
racial group with that skin colour (in this case black people). This finding suggests 
that experiencing ownership over a hand that is clearly from a different social group 
increases one‟s self identification with that social group which therefore leads to 
changes in how participants conceptualise that group in line with the strong links 
between bodily and social representations of the self predicted by the embodied 
cognition paradigm. The exact nature of this relationship is currently unclear but will 
be further considered in the general discussion of this thesis in chapter 7. 
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The second interesting finding shared by both studies is that, as well as synchronous 
VT-stimulation leading to an increase in association between self and other, 
asynchronous VT-stimulation also appears to have an effect on how people perceive 
the relationship between self and other. In experiment 3.1 asynchronous stimulation 
of a black rubber hand led to decreased implicit attitudes towards black people while 
asynchronous stimulation of a white rubber hand led to increased implicit attitudes 
towards black people. In experiment 3.2 synchronous stimulation of the black rubber 
hand led to an increase in CS activity when observing painful stimuli being applied 
to the black hand but a decrease in CS activation when observing painful stimuli 
being applied to the white. If reduced CS activation to painful stimuli is indeed a sign 
of increased sensorimotor empathy then the finding of increased CS activity to the 
black hand after asynchronous stimulation implies that asynchronous stimulation of 
the black hand reduced sensorimotor empathy for the observation of pain in the out-
group hand, while correspondingly increasing it for the in-group hand.    
 
These findings suggest that asynchronous VT-stimulation may play an important role 
in establishing the separation of self and other, a view also put forwards by Dolk et 
al. (2011) and Rohde et al. (2011). It is interesting to note, given the link discussed in 
the introduction between synchronous movement and social cognition, that cases of 
natural asynchronous movement also occur most notably in social control situations 
that involve dominance and submission (R. Cook, Dickinson, & Heyes, 2012). In 
such cases expansive gestures by one interaction partner are contrasted with 
contraction movements by the other, and vice versa (Tiedens & Fragale, 2003). If 
asynchronous stimulation does indeed increase the distinction between self and other 
then it is possible that part of the power of these displays of dominance/submission is 
that they reduce any sensorimotor overlap between self and other, establishing 
instead a sense of the other as occupying a distinctly different role in the social 
hierarchy.    
 
In conclusion, the experiments reported in this chapter demonstrate the power of 
multisensory stimulation over a hand with the skin colour of a racial outgroup to alter 
attitudes towards that group, whether measured by implicit attitudes or by 
sensorimotor empathy for pain. Interestingly while synchronous VT-stimulation led 
to increased positive responses towards the outgroup, presumably due to closer 
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association between self and other, asynchronous stimulation led to increased 
negative reactions suggesting that asynchronous multisensory stimulation may act to 
increase the difference between self and other. 
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Chapter 4. A Brush with The 
Imagination: Age, Body Ownership and 
Motor Imagery. 
 
"As in this body, there are for the embodied one childhood, youth, old age, 
even so is there the taking on of another body."  
                                              Bagavard Gītā, (Telang, 1882) 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The studies detailed in the previous two chapters have focused on the power of 
multisensory stimulation to induce feelings of body ownership over a hand belonging 
to a different racial group and the effects of such multisensory stimulation in altering 
both cognitive and sensorimotor measures of racial out-group. The two studies 
described in the current chapter aimed to investigate whether multisensory 
stimulation using stimuli that are related to other social categories can have effects 
on self-representations. To investigate this question the studies moved from using 
multisensory stimulation to induce the RHI over a hand with a different skin colour 
to that of the participant to inducing the RHI over a hand of a different age from that 
of the participant, in this case an elderly hand. 
 
Researchers in the field of impression formation have identified age, along with race, 
gender and social class, as one of the key primary or primitive categories which is 
initially activated on the first encounter with an individual. These categories are 
processed with speed and ease, and are difﬁcult to suppress attention towards even in 
situations where the information is irrelevant (Brewer, Dull, & Lui, 1981; Bruner, 
1957; Cosmides, Tooby, & Kurzban, 2003; Kinzler, Shutts, & Correll, 2010; 
Messick & Mackie, 1989; S. E. Taylor, 1981).  
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In general research into the attributes associated with age suggests that old age is 
largely associated with stereotypes which lead to negative treatment of the elderly 
including discrimination (Kite, Stockdale, Whitley, & Johnson, 2005; Kornadt & 
Rothermund, 2011; Rosen & Jerdee, 1976). Cuddy, Norton, and Fiske (2005) 
characterised the stereotype of the elderly as being evaluatively mixed with old 
people being seen as both warm (positive attribute) and incompetent (negative 
attribute). They also gathered information from seven different nations 
demonstrating that this stereotype is pan-cultural, appearing in both individualist and 
collectivist cultures. One particular negative attribute that is strongly associated with 
old age and linked to the perception of the elderly as incompetent is that the elderly 
are slower than younger people. 
 
The link between old age and slowness has been held up as an example of the way 
that social stereotypes can exert an effect on behaviour. The first, and most well-
known, study to find evidence for this relationship was conducted by Bargh, Chen, 
and Burrows (1996). They conducted two studies in which participants were given a 
scrambled sentence task in which the experimental group were primed with words 
that were related to the elderly stereotype, e.g. old, lonely, grey, selfishly, careful, 
while the control group were primed with neutral words. The researchers then 
recorded the amount of time that participants took to walk down a corridor and found 
that those who had been primed with the elderly stereotype took longer to walk down 
the corridor than those who had seen the neutral words. This effect was found in both 
the original study and in a second study that aimed to replicate the effect.  
 
Since this study a number of other researchers have also investigated the link 
between age and movement speed, and reported findings that support the original 
results (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2002; Branaghan & Grey, 2010; Cesario, Plaks, & 
Higgins, 2006; Chambon, Droit-Volet, & Niedenthal, 2008; Ginsberg, Rohmer, & 
Louvet, 2012; Kawakami, Young, & Dovidio, 2002; Wyer, Neilens, Perfect, & 
Mazzoni, 2011; although see Doyen, Klein, Pichon, & Cleeremans, 2012 for a failed 
replication).    
 
These further studies have served to further explore various aspects of the 
relationship between stereotype activation and behaviour. It has now been shown that 
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priming with an elderly stereotype can lead to a change not only in walking speed but 
also in reaction times during a lexical decision task (Kawakami et al., 2002), in 
driving speed in a driving simulator (Branaghan & Grey, 2010), in performance on a 
motor coordination task (Ginsberg et al., 2012), on ratings of the perceived speed of 
a stick figure (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2002) and perception of time (Chambon et al., 
2008). It has also been demonstrated that only elderly stereotypes, as opposed to 
stereotypes related to women or disability, selectively affect movement speed 
(Ginsberg et al., 2012; Kawakami et al., 2002). Another study by Mussweiler (2006) 
demonstrated that the relationship between the elderly stereotype and slower 
movement is bidirectional. In that study participants who were unobtrusively induced 
to move in the slow manner that is stereotypic of elderly people subsequently 
ascribed more elderly-stereotypic characteristics to a target than did control 
participants. 
 
The effect of stereotype activation on behaviour also seems to be mediated by social 
attitudes towards the stereotyped group. Cesario et al. (2006) showed that only those 
participants‟ who had a positive implicit attitude to the elderly slowing down after 
seeing being primed with the elderly while those who had a negative implicit attitude 
actually walked more quickly. Finally and of particular interest to the current work is 
a study by Wyer et al. (2011) which examined the effect of stereotype activation on 
the self-concept. Participants were primed with photographs of elderly people and 
then had their walking speed and memory for words measured. In both cases 
participants showed an effect of stereotype on behaviour. Participants who were 
primed with old faces both walked more slowly and performed worse in the memory 
task. Finally participants completed a self-characterisation task in which they were 
presented with a list of words and asked whether each described them.  Wyer et al. 
(2011) found that participants who had been primed with the elderly faces were more 
likely to describe words connected with the stereotype of elderly people as self-
descriptive. Further the amount of change in self-concept played a mediating role on 
the power of the elderly stereotype to affect walking speed suggesting that the 
observed changes in behaviour due to stereotype activation are caused, at least in 
part, by the influence of the activated stereotype on the self-concept (for further 
commentary on the role of the self-concept in behavioural priming see Wheeler, 
Demarree and Petty, 2007).     
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The two experiments reported in the current chapter sought to further explore this 
link between stereotype activation and self-concept by manipulating participants‟ 
perception of their bodily self through multisensory stimulation and examining the 
consequences of this induced ownership on slowing down motor imagery (MI). 
Using video stimuli similar to those used in experiment 2.2, participants received 
either synchronous or asynchronous VT-stimulation on their own hand and the hand 
of an elderly person. It was hypothesised that synchronous VT-stimulation would 
lead to a feeling of body ownership over the old hand, and that this would result in an 
association between the hand of the participant and the elderly stereotype attribute of 
slowness and would thus lead to slower movement speeds when the participant 
imagined moving their hand. One important difference between the previous studies 
on stereotype activation reported above and the present one is that in the present 
study both the experimental group and the control group were exposed to identical 
visual stimuli evoking the elderly stereotype. The only difference between the 
experimental and control conditions was whether VT-stimulation was synchronous 
or asynchronous and thus whether multisensory evidence would suggest that the seen 
elderly hand belonged to the participants or not.  
 
One practical limitation of the use of passive multisensory stimulation to induce 
feelings of ownership over an elderly hand is that any actual movement of the 
participants own hand will cause a divergence in the visual perception of the elderly 
hand and kinaesthetic and proprioceptive perception of the participants own hand 
which leads to the disruption of the experience of ownership over the elderly hand.  
In order to avoid the possibility of such a disruption destroying the effect of 
multisensory induced ownership on movement speed that was under investigation it 
was decided that, rather than measure participants actual movements, participants 
were given a MI task and the speed of their imagined movements was measured.    
 
The use of MI rather than actual movements in the current study can be justified due 
to the close links between imagined actions and actual action execution (for a review 
see Jeannerod, 2006). A large number of studies have shown that the time taken for 
subjects to perform imagined actions is highly correlated with the time taken to 
perform actual actions (Crammond, 1997; de Lange, Roelofs, & Toni, 2008; Decety 
& Michel, 1989; Jeannerod, 1994; Parsons, 1994; Sirigu & Duhamel, 2001; Sirigu et 
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al., 1996; Stevens, 2005). It has also been shown that the amount of imagined effort 
used during MI is correlated with physiological measures such as cardiac and 
respiratory rhythms (Decety, Jeannerod, Germain, & Pastene, 1991).  
 
The close relationship between MI and actual motor performance displayed in the 
experiments reviewed here has been explained by the fact that MI draws on many of 
the same neural systems that are involved in the execution of actions. In particular 
the evidence that the current state of one‟s body can influence MI appears to support 
the idea that MI involves the generation of a full action plan which is then inhibited 
from being transmitted to the body proper (Grush, 2004; Jeannerod, 2001). This 
interpretation of MI as involving action simulation has been supported by a number 
of neuroimaging studies that have found overlapping activation in brain areas 
involved in action execution and MI (Lorey et al., 2011; Lotze et al., 1999; 
Oosterhof, Tipper, & Downing, 2012).      
 
Of particular interest to the current study, given its aim of manipulating stereotype  
associations through a change in body representation, several studies have found that 
changes in the current state of the body can lead to changes in performance in MI 
tasks (de Lange, Helmich, & Toni, 2006; Parsons, 1994; Saimpont, Malouin, 
Tousignant, & Jackson, 2012; Shenton, Schwoebel, & Coslett, 2004; Sirigu & 
Duhamel, 2001). Parsons (1994) found that participants were slower to decide 
whether an image of a hand was a left or right hand, a task that had previously been 
shown to involve implicitly imagining rotating one‟s own hand (Parsons, 1987; 
Sekiyama, 1982), when their own hands were in an uncommonly adopted posture, 
e.g. hands held back to back the palms facing outwards, than when their hands were 
placed palms down on the table. In the same paper Parsons demonstrated that this 
increased time was correlated to the greater time taken when participants were 
required to actually rotate their hands starting from either posture. De Lange et al. 
(2006) found that the effect of posture was effector specific, when the participant‟s 
own left hand was in a less natural position they showed slower reaction times when 
judging the laterality of a left hand compared to a right hand and vice versa when it 
was their right hand that was in the unnatural posture.  Finally Saimpont et al., 
(2012) demonstrated that both young and elderly participants were more accurate in 
imagining their walking speed when standing up compared to when sitting down.   
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These findings, which suggest that current embodiment can have an effect of 
participant‟s MI, together with the findings on the effects of exposure to stimuli 
related to the elderly on movement detailed above, make it reasonable to hypothesise 
that changing participants‟ representation of their own hand, such as using 
multisensory stimulation to make participants feel that their own hand is older than it 
actually is, may have the effect on their performance in a MI task.   
 
The two experiments reported here sought to test whether a change in the apparent 
age of the participant‟s own hand, as induced by multisensory stimulation, would be 
reflected in decreased speed during a MI task. In these experiments a modified 
version of the visually guided pointing task (Danckert & Goodale, 2001; Decety & 
Michel, 1989; Fitts, 1954; Maruff et al., 1999; Proteau, Marteniuk, Girouard, & 
Dugas, 1987) was employed as the MI task. The only change from the regular 
version of this task made in the current study is that, due to the constraints of the RHI 
setup participants were not given any visual cue to the position of their own hand. 
 
Experiment 4.1 aimed to investigate whether  induced ownership of an elderly hand 
would lead to behavioural priming that as reflected in decreased speed of MI using a 
between subjects design. In addition to this main hypothesis, experiment 4.1 also 
sought to replicate the effect of synchronous multisensory stimulation on implicit 
attitudes towards an outgroup observed in experiments 2.1 and 3.1 by examining 
whether participants who experienced synchronous stimulation over the elderly hand 
showed a reduced bias against the elderly in the age IAT.  
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4.2. Experiment 4.1 
 
4.2.2. Methods 
 
4.2.2.1. Design 
The study used a between participants design, with one experimental factor namely 
the synchrony of visual-tactile stimulation (synchronous, asynchronous). The 
dependent variables were participants‟ reaction times in the post V-T stimulation MI 
task, participants‟ responses to four statements on a 7 point Likert scale taken from 
Longo, Schüür, et al. (2008) and participants scores on a post -stimulation “Age 
IAT”. In order to have a baseline measure of participants‟ baseline speed of MI 
participants also carried out a pre-VT stimulation MI task. 
 
4.2.2.2. Procedure 
Participants attended one experimental session. They first completed a demographic 
questionnaire and the Edinburgh Handedness questionnaire.  
 
Following this, participants took part in an adapted version of the visually guided 
pointing task (VGPT; Fitts, 1954; Proteau et al., 1987). Participants were told to sit at 
a table which had two screens embedded in it (see Figure 4.2). They were told to 
place their right hand flat on the table underneath the screen on the right and to place 
their left hand on a mouse on the left side of the table. Participants were then told 
that in the experiment they would see a white square appearing on the screen and that 
they should imagine that they were moving the index finger of their right hand from 
its current position to the position of the white square. It was emphasised that 
participants should actually keep their right hand still at all times during the task. 
Participants were told to use their left hand to press the right mouse button once 
when they imagined lifting their index finger and once again when they imagined 
their finger touching the target. After the right mouse button was pressed twice there 
was a 1 second delay before a white square appeared on the screen again. In order to 
prevent habituation the square appeared in one of three places on the screen, either 
59, 45.5, or 32 cm away from the location of the participant‟s index finger. Stimuli 
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for the study were presented using Presentation® software (Version 16.03, 
www.neurobs.com). 
 
Participants first carried out a practice session of six trials to familiarise themselves 
with the task. They then completed the pre V-T stimulation MI task which consisted 
of thirty trials, ten for each of the three different distances. Following this, 
participants were asked to direct their attention to the video screen that was placed 
above their own right hand. Participants then viewed a 2 minute video of a hand 
belonging to a 90 year old female being stroked with a paint brush at a rate of 1 Hz 
(see Figure 4-1). Given that previous research has found that the larger the observed 
hand the greater the strength of the RHI (Pavani & Zampini, 2007) the videoed hand 
was zoomed and expanded to fill the whole screen (size: 31cm x 18cm). In the 
synchronous condition the participant‟s hand was brushed at the same time as the 
hand in the video, while in the asynchronous condition it was brushed 180° out of 
phase. Following the two minutes of VT stimulation participants then carried out the 
MI task again. 
 
Following this, participants carried out a computer administered version of the age-
IAT. The associations between stimuli and response key and the order of associations 
(i.e. positive words and young faces or positive words and old faces) were 
counterbalanced across participants (Greenwald et al., 1998, 2003). The data from 
the IATs were analysed using the improved IAT scoring algorithm recommended by 
Greenwald et al. (2003) with positive values indicating a greater bias towards young 
people and negative values indicating a greater bias towards old people. 
 
Finally participants completed the four item Embodiment questionnaire, used in the 
studies in chapter 3, indicating the extent to which they experienced embodiment 
over the elderly hand. The questions were presented using Presentation® software 
(Version 16.03, www.neurobs.com). 
 
4.2.2.3. Participants  
21 participants (mean age ± SD: 21 ± 1.6, 4 male) gave their informed consent to 
participate and were paid for their participation. All participants were under 35 years 
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of age. The study was approved by the Departmental Ethics Committee, Royal 
Holloway, University of London. 
 
4.2.2.4. Analysis of Behavioural Data 
Participants times on each of the MI trials was calculated by subtracting the time of 
their first press of the mouse button from the time of their second press of the mouse 
button. Mean timings for the each of the three distances were calculated for pre and 
post VT-stimulation session for each participant. Trials that were greater than 3 
standard deviations from these means were excluded from the analysis.   
 
In order to ensure that participants had understood the task properly, MI times were 
checked to see whether they had the correct pattern of MI timing across the three 
distances in the pre VT stimulation condition. Those participants who did not have a 
greater mean time in the far trials compared to the middle trials and a greater mean 
time in the middle trials compared to the near trials were not considered to have 
correctly understood the task, as they reported taking more time to imagine moving 
to a shorter distance compared to a longer one. These participants were removed 
from the analysis of the MI task leaving a sample of 13 participants (mean age ± SD: 
20 ± 1.5, 2 male, 6 asynchronous condition) for the MI analysis.  
 
4.2.3. Results  
 
4.2.3.1. Introspective Rating of the RHI 
In order to ensure that our manipulation of the synchrony of VT stimulation had 
successfully led to differences in the perceived embodiment of the elderly hand, 
independent sample t-tests were carried out on each of the four RHI questions (See 
figure 4-3). 
 
For the first question, “It seemed like I was looking directly at my own hand.” 
responses were significantly higher in the synchronous group (M = 2.5, SD = 0.71) 
than in the asynchronous group (M = -1.73, SD = 1.85), t(13.1) = 7.04, p < .001, SED 
= 0.6. Levene‟s test indicated unequal variances (F = 7.3, p < .05), so degrees of 
freedom were adjusted from 19 to 13.1. For the second question, “It seemed like the 
 152 
 
touch I felt was caused by the paintbrush touching the hand in the video.” responses 
were significantly higher in the synchronous group (M = 2.5, SD = 0.85) than in the 
asynchronous group (M = -1.45, SD = 2.25), t(13.02) = 5.42, p < .001, SED = 0.73. 
Levene‟s test indicated unequal variances (F = 10.52, p < .01), so degrees of freedom 
were adjusted from 19 to 13.02. 
 
For the third question, “It seemed like the hand in the video was my hand.” responses 
were significantly higher in the synchronous group (M = 1.8, SD = 1.03) than in the 
asynchronous group (M = -1.55, SD = 2.34), t(14.03) = 4.3, p < .01, SED = 0.78. 
Levene‟s test indicated unequal variances (F = 7.38, p < .05), so degrees of freedom 
were adjusted from 19 to 14.03. For the fourth question, “It seemed like the hand in 
the video began to resemble my own hand” responses were significantly higher in the 
synchronous group (M = 1.9, SD = 0.74) than in the asynchronous group (M = -1.45, 
SD = 2.11), t(12.61) = 4.94, p < .05, SED = 0.68. Levene‟s test indicated unequal 
variances (F = 6.1, p < .05), so degrees of freedom were adjusted from 11 to 12.61. 
 
 
 
Figure 4-1. Trial structure of experiments 4.1 and 4.2. 
  
 
1
5
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Figure 4-2. Experimental setup for experiments 4.1 & 4.2 as seen from a horizontal (A) and vertical (B) viewpoint (E = experimenter, P = 
participant). 
  
 
1
5
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Figure 4-3. Mean Likert scores for each RHI question across synchronous and asynchronous groups. Error bars represent SEM. 
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4.2.3.2. Effect of VT Stimulation of An Elderly Hand on Speed in MI Task 
In order to ensure that there were no significant differences in baseline MI task 
performance between the two groups of participants, an independent sample t-test 
was carried out on the average score on the MI task of the 13 participants who 
followed the task instructions successfully with time in the pre VT-stimulation MI 
task as the dependent variable and synchrony (synchronous/asynchronous) as the 
independent variable. There was a significant effect of synchrony, t(11) = 2.43, p < 
.05, with faster times in the asynchronous condition (M = 1199, SD = 274) than in 
the synchronous condition (M = 1955, SD = 716). 
 
To investigate the effect of synchrony of multisensory stimulation between 
participant‟s hands‟ and an elderly hand on participants speed in a MI task, a 
between subject analysis of covariance was carried out with post VT- stimulation MI 
times as the dependent variable, synchrony (synchronous/asynchronous) as the 
independent variable and pre VT-stimulation MI times as the covariate. The 
ANCOVA found an almost significant effect of synchrony, F(1,10) = 4.38, p = .063, 
with faster post stimulation MI times in the asynchronous condition (M = 1280, SD = 
513) than in the synchronous condition (M = 1646, SD = 701) (see figure 4-4). 
 
4.2.3.3. Effect of embodiment over an elderly hand on speed in MI task 
To investigate the effect of experiencing embodiment over an elderly hand on 
participants subsequent speed in a MI task scores in the four introspective questions 
were averaged together to create an embodiment index. A three-step hierarchical 
linear regression was then carried out with post-stimulation MI time as the dependant 
variable. Synchrony of VT-stimulation, embodiment index, and pre-stimulation MI 
time were entered as predictor variables in the first step, all two-way interaction 
terms entered in the second step and the three-way interaction entered as a third step. 
The overall model fit was significant at the first step, F(1, 12) = 16.03, p < 0.01. Pre-
stimulation MI time was the only significant predictor and adding the interaction 
terms to the model in Steps 2 and 3 of the regression did not significantly improve 
the model fit (see Table 4-1).   
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Figure 4-4. Mean time taken for imagined movement before and after VT-stimulation 
across synchronous and asynchronous groups. Error bars represent SEM. 
 
4.2.3.4. Effect of VT Stimulation of an Elderly Hand on Implicit Attitudes 
Towards the Elderly 
To investigate the effect of multisensory stimulation on participants‟ implicit 
attitudes towards the elderly, an analysis of variance was carried out with 
participant‟s score on the post-stimulation “Age IAT” as the dependent variable, and 
synchrony of VT-stimulation (synchronous/asynchronous) as the independent 
variable.  No significant difference in implicit bias was found between the 
synchronous (M = 0.4, SD = 0.44) and asynchronous conditions (M = 0.54, SD = 
0.47), t(11) = 0.68, p > .05, SED = 0.33 (see Figure 4-5). 
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Table 4-1. Summary of three-step hierarchical regression analysis for variables  
predicting with post-stimulation MI times. 
Variable Β p 
Step 1   
Pre-VT MI Time 1.07 < .001 
Synchrony -0.25 .874 
Embodiment Index -0.01 .684 
Step 2   
Pre-VT MI Time 0.91 .176 
Synchrony -1.85 .186 
Embodiment Index 1.61 .11 
Pre-VT MI Time * Synchrony 1.65 .353 
Pre-VT MI Time  * Embodiment Index -2.47 .098 
Embodiment Index * Synchrony 0.94 .172 
Step 3   
Pre-VT MI Time 0.67 .301 
Synchrony 0.02 .993 
Embodiment Index 2.1 .06 
Pre-VT MI Time * Synchrony 0.06 .978 
Pre-VT MI Time  * Embodiment Index -3.29 .054 
Embodiment Index * Synchrony -1.48 .453 
Pre-VT MI Time    * Embodiment Index * 
Synchrony 
2.7 .22 
Note. r
2adjusted = .790 for Step 1; Δr2 = .077 for Step 2 (p > .05), Δr2 = .023 for Step 3 (p > .05).  * = 
p < .05.  
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Figure 4-5. Age IAT scores after VT-stimulation across synchronous and 
asynchronous groups. Error bars represent SEM. 
 
4.2.4. Discussion 
 
Experiment 4.1 sought to investigate whether synchronous multisensory stimulation 
over the participants hand and the hand of an elderly person would lead to slower 
performance in a MI task than asynchronous VT stimulation did. While introspective 
reports indicated that synchronous multisensory stimulation successfully induced a 
feeling of ownership over the elderly hand, the predicted effect was not observed. In 
fact an almost significant effect (p=0.063) was found in the opposite direction, that is 
participants in the synchronous condition actually imagined moving their hand 
towards the target faster after VT stimulation that they had before VT stimulation.   
 
There are several possible explanations for such a finding. One is that, rather than 
creating a stronger link between old age and the self, experiencing synchronous 
visual tactile stimulation over the old hand in fact led to a contrast effect in which the 
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participant attempted to distance themself from the negative feeling of being old by 
imagining their subsequent movements to be faster, thus reaffirming that they 
themselves were not actually old.   
 
Such contrast effects have been known for some time and are considered to be a 
common response to observing an exemplar of a particular stereotype. For example 
Herr (1986) demonstrated that priming the trait hostility caused a person seen by the 
participant afterwards to be judged as more hostile compared to a control condition, 
but priming an exemplar of hostility such as Adolf Hitler led to the person being 
judged as less hostile. Of direct relevance to the hypothesis of the current study 
Dijksterhuis et al. (1998) conducted a study in which participants were first primed 
with elderly stimuli or neutral stimuli as in Bargh et al. (1996) but then gave 
participants either a series of questions about the Princess Juliana, the Dutch Queen 
Mother and an elderly exemplar, or else a series of questions about Belgium. The 
researchers found that those participants who had answered questions about the 
elderly exemplar showed a reverse in the behavioural effect found in Bargh et al., 
walking faster on leaving the experiment than those who had not been primed with 
the elderly stereotype at all. This distinction between exemplars of a stereotype and 
the stereotype itself is of some relevance to the current experiment, in the current 
study participant‟s observed an actual elderly hand being stroked which might be 
considered more of an exemplar of an elderly person rather than the trait of being 
elderly itself.      
 
In addition to the possibility that the stimuli being used in the current task are an 
exemplar of the trait elderly rather than simply a reflection of being elderly in 
general the fact that in the current study participant‟s sense of bodily selfhood was 
directly manipulated may also be a relevant. Schubert and Häfner (2003) 
demonstrated that priming participants with self relevant words (e.g. me, I, myself) 
before asking them to think about either an intelligent (professor) or unintelligent 
(hussy) stereotype led to a contrast effect in participants subsequent rating of their 
own intelligence. In contrast participants who were primed with other relevant words 
(e.g. his, her, their) rated themselves as marginally more intelligent if asked to think 
about a professor than if asked to think about a hussy. It is possible that in the current 
study the feeling of a change in participant‟s own body states produced by 
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synchronous VT-stimulation acted in a similar way as the self-relevant words did in 
Schubert and Häfner‟s study in producing a focus on the self and thus prompted 
participant‟s in the synchronous condition to imagine moving faster in order to 
differentiate themselves from the elderly hand that they had experienced as their 
own.  
 
While it is possible that the almost significant speeding up of imagined movements 
in the synchronous condition was due to a contrast effect, such an interpretation is 
somewhat at odds with the interpretation given for the pattern of results in 
experiment 3.1. In that study synchronous VT stimulation over a black hand led to 
more positive implicit attitudes towards black people while asynchronous VT 
stimulation led to less positive implicit attitudes. This finding was interpreted as 
indicating that asynchronous stimulation had the effect of increasing the 
differentiation between self and other and thus to a greater perception of black people 
as an out-group. Following that line of reasoning it might have been expected that 
any contrast effect found would be in the asynchronous condition in which the touch 
experienced on one‟s own hand was distinct and contrasted from the touch observed 
on the elderly hand. 
 
However, an alternative explanation of the current findings is suggested by the fact 
that the almost significant difference between the two conditions was actually due to 
the significant difference found in the pre VT stimulation baseline speeds of MI. This 
raises the possibility that somehow participants in the synchronous condition were 
primed to perform more slowly during the baseline task before they ever observed 
the elderly hand. 
 
This possibility is suggested by the controversial recent study carried out by Doyen 
et al. (2012). The authors sought to replicate the original finding of Bargh et al.‟s 
study (1996) but correcting for two major weaknesses, the fact that the experimenter 
who administered the task was not blind to the condition participants were in and the 
fact that the time taken for walking were measured by a second experimenter with a 
stop watch and so vulnerable to human error. Their own study corrected these flaws 
by using a double blind method for both experimenters and by measuring walking 
time with two lasers.  In their initial study they failed to replicated the effect of old 
 161 
 
age priming on walking speed so in a second experiment they tested whether 
experimenter‟s knowledge of the condition could have had an effect on participants 
walking speed by giving the experimenter either correct or incorrect information 
about whether participants were primed with neurtral or elderly words. In this 
experiment they did find that the speed at which the participant walked changed 
depending on condition but, crucially, it was the primes that the experimenter 
thought the participant had received rather than the primes they had actually received 
that explained the pattern of results. Based on these finding Doyen,et al. (2012) 
hypothesised that the reported behavioural priming effects from Bargh et al.‟s study 
were actually due to participants unconsciously picking up on and mimicking cues 
unwittingly given by the experimenter.   
 
The setup of the current study allowed for a similar situation to occur. Due to the 
nature of the task it was necessary for the experimenter to know which condition a 
participant was assigned to before the task began (so that they could deliver the 
correct type of multisensory stimulation). Moreover before participants carried out 
the pre VT stimulation MI task the experimenter demonstrated the type of movement 
that they were supposed to imagine making during the task. It is possible therefore 
that the experimenter unwittingly moved slightly more slowly when demonstrating 
the action to participants in the synchronous condition and therefore biased them to 
move more slowly in the pre VT-stimulation MI task than participants in the 
asynchronous condition. By the time that participant‟s had received multisensory 
stimulation over the elderly hand and started the post VT-stimulation MI task the 
effect of this experimenter effect may have faded leading to similar performance 
between the synchronous and asynchronous groups. To differentiate between these 
two possible explanations of the finding of experiment 2.1 a second study was 
conducted which used the same basic paradigm, but employed a within participants 
design. The logic behind this change was that if the difference in pre-scores was due 
to cues from the experimenter, then a with-in subject design should remove the effect 
as each participant would be given the instructions on the task only once and would 
then perform the MI task before and after both synchronous and asynchronous 
stimulation. If however the faster movement after synchronous, but not 
asynchronous, VT stimulation was due to a contrast effect being produced by 
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synchronous stimulation then it should still be present even after the design of the 
study was altered.   
 
4.3. Experiment 4.2 
 
4.3.1. Methods 
 
4.3.1.1. Design 
The study used a within participants design with one experimental factor, namely the 
synchrony of visual-tactile stimulation (synchronous, asynchronous). The dependent 
variables were participants‟ reaction times in the post V-T stimulation MI task and 
participants‟ responses to four statements on a 7 point Likert scale taken from Longo, 
Schüür, et al. (2008). In order to have a baseline measure of participants‟ baseline 
speed of MI participants also carried out a MI task before receiving VT stimulation 
for each condition. 
 
4.3.1.2. Procedure 
Participants attended one experimental session. They first completed a demographic 
questionnaire and the Edinburgh Handedness questionnaire and the Age IAT, which 
was analysed in the same way as described in experiment 4.1.  
 
Next participants were sat at the same setup as used in experiment 4.1 and were 
instructed to carry out the same MI task as in the previous study. In order to allow 
the experimenter to better monitor the task and ensure that participants were 
following the instructions correctly a modification was made to the way that trials 
were cued. In this experiment after each trial, the experimenter cued the next trial by 
pressing a separate button, following this there was a 1 second delay before the start 
of the next trial.   
 
Following completion of the MI task participants were asked to direct their attention 
to the video screen that was placed above their own right hand.  Participants then 
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viewed the same VT stimulation video as in experiment 4.1. In the synchronous 
condition the participant‟s hand was brushed at the same time as the hand in the 
video, while in the asynchronous condition it was brushed 180° out of phase. 
Following the two minutes of VT stimulation participants then carried out the MI 
task again. Participants then left the MI setup and completed the same embodiment 
questionnaire that was used in experiment 4.1.  
 
Participants then returned to the MI setup and again completed the 30 trial pre VT-
stimulation MI task. Following this they received VT-stimulation in the stimulation 
condition that they had not previously experienced and then completed the MI task 
again. They then completed the embodiment questionnaire again but this time for the 
second session of stroking. The order in which the two VT-stimulation conditions 
were experienced was counterbalanced across participants. 
 
4.3.1.3. Participants  
14 participants (mean age ± SD: 21 ± 1.5, 5 male) gave their informed consent to 
participate and were paid for their participation. All participants were under 35 years 
of age. The study was approved by the Departmental Ethics Committee, Royal 
Holloway, University of London. 
 
4.3.1.4. Analysis of Behavioural Data 
Participants‟ average times on each of the MI trials was calculated as in experiment 
4.1. In order to ensure that participants had understood the task properly it was 
checked whether participants had the correct pattern of MI timing across the three 
distances in the pre VT stimulation task. Those participants who did not have a 
greater mean time in the far trials compared to the middle trials, and a greater mean 
time in the middle trials compared to the near trials in the first condition that they 
completed were considered to not have correctly understood the task, as they 
reported taking more time to imagine moving to a shorter distance compared to a 
longer one. These participants were removed from the analysis of the MI task leaving 
a sample of 12 participants (mean age ± SD: 21.2 ± 1.5, 5 male) for the MI analysis. 
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4.3.2. Results 
 
4.3.2.1. Introspective Rating of the RHI 
In order to ensure that our manipulation of the synchrony of VT stimulation had 
successfully led to differences in the perceived embodiment of the elderly hand, 
paired sample t-tests were carried out on each of the four RHI questions (See Figure 
4-6).  
 
For the first question, “It seemed like I was looking directly at my own hand.” 
responses were higher in the synchronous condition (M = 0.86, SD = 1.56) than in 
the asynchronous condition (M = -0.79, SD = 2.46), t(13) = 3.74, p < .01. For the 
second question, “It seemed like the touch I felt was caused by the paintbrush 
touching the hand in the video.” responses were higher in the synchronous condition 
(M = 0.93, SD = 1.86) than in the asynchronous condition (M = -1.36, SD = 1.65), 
t(13) = 3.77, p < .01.  
 
For the third question, “It seemed like the hand in the video was my hand.” responses 
were higher in the synchronous condition (M = 0.43, SD = 1.91) than in the 
asynchronous condition (M = -1.07, SD = 1.98), t(13) = 4.17, p < .01, SEM = 0.36. 
For the fourth question, “It seemed like the hand in the video began to resemble my 
own hand” no significant differences were found responses in the synchronous 
condition (M = 0.29, SD = 1.98) and the asynchronous condition (M = -0.5, SD = 
2.03), t(13) = 1.44, p > .05. 
 
In order to investigate whether pre-existing implicit attitudes could predict the extent 
to which participants experienced ownership for the elderly hand, participants‟ scores 
in the four introspective questions for the synchronous condition were averaged 
together to create an embodiment index. This embodiment index as the dependant 
variable was then entered in a linear regression with pre-stimulation Age IAT score 
as the predictor. The overall model fit was not significant, F(1, 13) = 1.34, p > .05, 
r
2
adjusted = .01.  
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4.3.2.3. Effect of VT stimulation of an elderly hand on speed in MI task 
In order to ensure that there were no significant differences in baseline MI task 
performance between the two groups of participants, a paired sample t-test was 
carried out on the average score on the MI task of the 12 participants who followed 
the task instructions successfully with time in the pre VT-stimulation MI task as the 
dependent variable and synchrony (synchronous/asynchronous) as the independent 
variable.  No significant differences were found between the synchronous (M = 1291, 
SD = 533) and asynchronous conditions (M = 1282, SD = 524), t(11) = 0.16, p > .05. 
 
To investigate the effect of synchrony of multisensory stimulation between 
participant‟s hands‟ and an elderly hand on participants speed in a MI task, a 
repeated measure analysis of covariance was carried out with post VT- stimulation 
MI times as the dependent variable, synchrony (synchronous/asynchronous) as the 
independent variable and pre VT-stimulation MI times as the covariate.  The 
ANCOVA found no significant differences between the synchronous (M = 1271, SD 
= 489) and asynchronous conditions (M = 1302, SD = 427), F(1,21) = 2.9, p > .05, 
(see Figure 4-7). 
 
 
 
  
 
1
6
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Figure 4-6. Mean Likert scores for each RHI question across synchronous and asynchronous conditions. Error bars represent SEM. 
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Figure 4-7. Mean time taken for imagined movement before and after VT-stimulation 
across synchronous and asynchronous conditions. Error bars represent SEM. 
 
Table 4-2. Summary of two-step hierarchical regression analysis for variables 
predicting with post-stimulation MI times in the synchronous condition.  
Variable β p 
Step 1   
Pre-VT MI  Time 0.97 < .001 
Embodiment Index 0.07 .016 
Step 2   
Pre-VT MI  Time 0.96 < .001 
Embodiment Index 0.08 .041 
Pre-VT MI  Time * Embodiment Index  -0.02 .651 
Note. r
2adjusted = .99 for Step 1; Δr2 = 0 for Step 2 (p > .05). 
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Table 4-3. Summary of two-step hierarchical regression analysis for variables 
predicting with post-stimulation MI times in the asynchronous condition.  
Variable β p 
Step 1   
Pre-VT MI  Time 0.9 < .001 
Embodiment Index 0.06 .673 
Step 2   
Pre-VT MI  Time 0.8 .011 
Embodiment Index 0.33 .58 
Pre-VT MI  Time * Embodiment Index  -0.26 .64 
Note. r
2adjusted = .81 for Step 1; Δr2 = 0 for Step 2 (p > .05). 
 
 
Figure 4-8. Introspective reports of ownership against post VT-stimulation imagined 
movement time after synchronous stimulation. 
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4.3.3. Discussion 
 
Experiment 4.2 found no significant differences between the time taken in a MI task 
after synchronous and asynchronous VT-stimulation over an elderly rubber hand.  
This finding suggested that the almost significant effect found in experiment 4.1 was 
probably caused by experimenter cues biasing scores in the pre VT-stimulation trial 
rather than being due to a contrast effect being induced. However the experiment did 
find that, along with participant‟s speed of MI prior to VT-stimulation, the amount of 
ownership experienced over the elderly hand in the synchronous condition 
significantly predicted the speed of imagined movement in the subsequent MI task, 
with greater ownership predicting slower imagined movements.  
 
4.4. General Discussion 
 
The experiments reported in this chapter sought to investigate first whether 
synchronous VT-stimulation over an elderly hand would lead to a change in 
perceived ownership of the elderly hand and second whether this multisensory 
induced ownership of an elderly hand would have the effect of slowing down 
participants‟ imagined movement speed during a MI task. The results of both 
experiments suggested that synchronous VT stimulation could induce the feeling of 
body ownership over the elderly hand, as in both experiments participants gave 
significantly higher responses to the ownership questions in the synchronous 
condition as opposed to the asynchronous condition.    
 
Regarding the second question of whether multisensory induced ownership of an 
elderly hand would affect participants imagined movement speed, the results of the 
current study offered partial evidence in support of the hypothesis that it does. In 
experiment 4.1 it was found that, adjusting for baseline there was an almost 
significant decrease in the time taken to perform the reaching task in the 
synchronous condition compared to the asynchronous condition, meaning that 
experiencing synchronous multisensory stimulation had actually led participants to 
imagine moving more quickly than had experiencing asynchronous stimulation. In 
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addition no relationship was found between participants‟ rating of body ownership 
and their speed of imagined movement in the MI task. Experiment 4.2 was conducted 
using a within subject design to ensure that this increase in speed of imagined 
movement was not due to any unconscious cues given by the experimenter during the 
pre-VT stimulation MI task. The results of experiment 4.2 showed no significant 
differences in speed in the MI task between the synchronous and asynchronous 
conditions suggesting that the almost significant increase in imagined movement 
speed found in experiment 4.1 was due to an experimenter effect. However, when 
data from the synchronous condition was examined it was found that, taking into 
account participants speed in the pre-stimulation condition, the amount of ownership 
experienced over the elderly hand significantly predicted the time taken to complete 
the imagined movements in the post-stimulation condition.  This finding suggests 
that, in line with the original hypothesis, experiencing body ownership over an 
elderly hand can slow down the imagined speed of one‟s own hand movements. The 
implications of these findings will now be discussed. 
 
The experiments reported in this chapter make a novel contribution to the literature 
by showing, for the first time, that synchronous multisensory stimulation is capable 
of inducing the feeling of body ownership over a hand with the appearance of a 
different age than that of the participant.  Taken together with the results of 
experiments 2.1 and 2.2, which demonstrated that it was possible to induce body 
ownership over a hand of a different skin colour to that of the participant, the current 
study further demonstrates the relatively low importance of the surface visual 
features of the foreign hand for the induction of a sense of body ownership over it.  
In terms of the comparator model of body ownership but forward by Tsakiris (2010) 
the results of this study suggest that the age of the foreign hand, like other surface 
level features, is involved as a comparator only at a very late stage in processing, if at 
all.   
 
It is important to note however that in neither experiment in the current chapter was 
the amount of ownership felt over the old hand directly compared to the amount of 
ownership felt over a hand of a more similar age to that of our participants. At this 
point therefore it is unclear whether the pattern of effect found in chapter 2 for hands 
of a different skin colour, i.e. an effect of the age of the hand on introspective ratings 
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of body ownership but not on proprioceptive drift or SCR results, would hold in this 
case. Future research using a within subjects design and employing behavioural and 
physiological measures of embodiment would help to further address this question. 
 
The second important finding to come out of these studies is the significant 
relationship between the experience of ownership over the elderly hand and the 
speed of imagined movements found in the synchronous condition in experiment 4.2. 
This finding suggests, in line with the findings of previous studies (Bargh et al., 
1996; Branaghan & Grey, 2010; Cesario et al., 2006; Chambon et al., 2008; Ginsberg 
et al., 2012; Kawakami et al., 2002; Wyer et al., 2011) that increased association 
between one‟s self and exemplars of the elderly stereotype can lead to a change in 
movement speed as a consequence of the stereotypical association between slowness 
and old-age. A novel results of the current study is that while in previous studies the 
effect of  elderly primes were compared to that of  neutral primes(Bargh et al., 1996; 
Branaghan & Grey, 2010; Cesario et al., 2006; Chambon et al., 2008; Kawakami et 
al., 2002; Wyer et al., 2011) or primes of a different  stereotype (Ginsberg et al., 
2012; Kawakami et al., 2002) in the current study the stimuli used in the 
experimental and control conditions were identical and only the shared sensory 
stimulation between that stimuli and the participant‟s differed. Moreover it was the 
amount of embodiment of the elderly hand in the synchronous condition, rather than 
a pure difference between conditions, that predicted a slower movement speed in the 
subsequent MI task.  
 
In addition the current finding builds on the finding by Wryer et al. (2011) in 
showing that the effect of stereotype priming on behaviour is mediated by the 
association between the primed stereotype and the self. However, an important 
distinction between the current study and that of Wryer et al.‟s is that in their case 
this association was between the primed stereotype and participant‟s self-concept, 
while in experiment 4.2 the association was between the participant‟s own body and 
the elderly hand. Thus the current finding again underlines the strong links between 
changes in bodily selfhood and changes in more cognitively complex forms of self-
identification that has previously been shown in study 3.1.  
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The current study also demonstrates a link between stereotype activation and MI, 
adding MI to the already reported effects of stereotype activation on a wide range of 
different tasks including driving speed in a driving simulator (Branaghan & Grey, 
2010), ratings of the perceived speed of a stick figure (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2002) 
and perception of time (Chambon et al., 2008). In addition by showing that 
stereotype activation can influence imagined as well as actual motor behaviour the 
current study‟s findings further emphasise the close links between MI and actual 
motor performance (Decety & Michel, 1989; Jeannerod, 1994; Lorey et al., 2011; 
Maruff et al., 1999; Oosterhof et al., 2012). 
 
One apparent weakness of the results of the current study is the failure to find any 
effect of embodiment scores on post-VT stimulation MI in study 4.1. However, this 
failure to find an effect is not surprising given the significant difference in pre-
stimulation MI between those in the synchronous and asynchronous groups in 
experiment 4.1, which led to an almost significant difference between the adjusted 
post-stimulation MI times, with synchronous stimulation leading to faster reaction 
times than asynchronous stimulation..  It seems likely, given the failure to replicate 
this effect in experiment 4.2,that the difference in pre-stimulation MI times in 
experiment 4.1 was due to subtle cues from the experimenter, which may have 
inadvertently disrupted any potential link between experienced ownership over the 
elderly hand and post-stimulation MI times.  
 
Finally I will briefly discuss two potential ways that the findings in this study can be 
expanded upon in the future. One potentially fruitful direction for future research 
would be to investigate whether the current result showing an effect of body 
ownership on MI times also holds for actual motor actions.  This could be examined 
by using a visuomotor version of the rubber hand illusion (Riemer et al., 2013; 
Sanchez-Vives et al., 2010; Slater, Perez-Marcos, Ehrsson, & Sanchez-Vives, 2008). 
In this study one could manipulate the congruency of the visually perceived 
movements of an old hand and the voluntary movements of a participant would be 
able to modulate MI or motor performance in the expected direction. The most 
obvious way to achieve this is using a virtual reality setup of the kind employed by 
Slater and colleagues (Banakou et al., 2013; Kilteni, Normand, Sanchez-Vives, & 
Slater, 2012; Peck et al., 2013; Slater, Perez-Marcos, Ehrsson, & Sanchez-Vives, 
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2009). In such a setup the appearance of an elderly arm, or even a full elderly avatar, 
would be able to be linked to the movements of the participant, the counterpart of the 
synchronous condition used in the current experiments, or else the movements of the 
avatar would be autonomous from those of the participant, the counterpart of the 
asynchronous condition in the current experiments. Indeed this virtual reality 
technique has already been used to manipulate adults into feeling that they are in a 
child‟s body and been shown to lead to more positive implicit attitudes towards 
children (Banakou et al., 2013). 
 
The second potential avenue of research is to investigate whether giving elderly 
people the feeling of body ownership over a younger hand would lead to an increase 
in their MI. Saimpont, Malouin, Tousignant and Jackson (2013)reviewed studies on 
MI in the elderly and highlighted the potential benefits of MI training in maintaining 
and enhancing motor abilities. If it is indeed the case that body ownership of a young 
hand could speed up elderly participants imagined movements then such an 
intervention could also prove beneficial in improving the speed of actual body 
movements in the elderly. 
 
To conclude the two experiments reported in this chapter demonstrated first that it is 
possible for participants to experience the feeling of body ownership over a hand that 
is considerably older than their own.  In addition experiment 4.2 demonstrated that 
those participants who showed greater embodiment of the elderly hand subsequently 
showed slower imagined movements, suggesting that experiencing body ownership 
over an elderly hand can have similar effects on behaviour as being primed with 
stimuli related to elderly stereotypes.        
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Chapter 5. Trust in Me: Investigating 
the Relationship between Trust and 
Body Representation
4
 
  
“Trust thyself: every heart vibrates to that iron string” 
                                                    Ralph Waldo Emerson, (1841, p. 52) 
 
5.1. Introduction 
  
The studies detailed so far in this thesis have been concerned with the power of 
multisensory-induced changes in body representation to create an association 
between the self and a different social group, be that a racial out-group or the elderly. 
In the final two experimental chapters of the thesis I will shift my focus away from 
social groups and instead examine the relationship between representations of one‟s 
own body and interpersonal interactions. In the current chapter I present two studies 
that focused on examining the relationship between the representation of one‟s own 
face and judgements on the trustworthiness of others.   
  
The move from investigating the importance of body representations in the 
experience of social groups to investigating the importance of body representations 
when interacting with a specific individual necessitates a move away from hand 
centred body representations and towards representations of the face. The face is by 
far the most distinguishing and recognisable part of both one‟s own body and the 
bodies of other people and is also the most important part of the body for social 
interaction (Zebrowitz & Montepare, 2008). Indeed the ability to recognise one‟s 
own face in the mirror is considered to be a key milestone in the development of a 
                                                 
4
 Experiment 5.3 is published as:  
Farmer, H., McKay, R. & Tsakiris, M. (2014) Trust in me: trustworthy others are seen as more 
physically similar to the self. Psychological Science, 25(1), pp. 290-292.  
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self-concept as it requires the ability to match the image of one‟s face seen from an 
external perspective with an internal representation of the self (Verosky & Todorov, 
2010), thus demonstrating the bridging of a gap between the way that we perceive 
ourselves and the way that others see us which is vital for later social cognitive 
processes such as perspective taking.    
  
There is considerable evidence for the rapid and unconscious processing of both the 
identity of a face (X. Zheng, Mondloch, & Segalowitz, 2012) and of facial 
expression (Batty & Taylor, 2003; Eger, Jedynak, Iwaki, & Skrandies, 2003; Fox et 
al., 2000; Hansen & Hansen, 1988; Smith, 2012). In addition there is evidence for 
strong links between the visual observation of emotional expressions on another 
person‟s face and motor systems involved in the display of the same expression on 
one‟s own face. People automatically mimic the facial expressions of others 
(Dimberg & Thunberg, 1998; Hess & Blairy, 2001; Sato & Yoshikawa, 2007) and 
this mimicry occurs even in situations where the other‟s facial expression is only 
unconsciously perceived (Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000). 
  
Another source of evidence for the importance of faces in social interaction comes 
from findings that social deficits are often liked to problems in forming or processing 
facial features and expressions. For example, it has been suggested that part of the 
explanation for the social deficits found in people with autism is due to their 
abnormal processing of social and emotional information from faces (Adolphs, 
Sears, & Piven, 2001). A similar account has been put forward to explain some of the 
difficulties with social interaction observed in people with schizophrenia (Marwick 
& Hall, 2008). Further evidence for the intrinsically social nature of faces are the 
facts that people with social phobia avert their attention away from faces (Y.-P. 
Chen, Ehlers, Clark, & Mansell, 2002) and show neural differences from healthy 
controls across a range of brain areas involved in face processing (Amir et al., 2005; 
Gentili et al., 2008; Phan, Fitzgerald, Nathan, & Tancer, 2006; Stein, Goldin, Sareen, 
Zorrilla, & Brown, 2002). Of course this relationship between facial expressions and 
social interaction can also be disrupted in the other direction. This appears to be the 
situation of people with Moebius syndrome, a congenital condition which causes an 
inability to form facial expression, who often report feelings of decreased social 
 176 
 
competence due to their inability to facially express their thoughts and emotions 
expressions during social interaction (Bogart & Matsumoto, 2010; Cole, 2009). 
  
The large amount of evidence for the social nature of face stimuli makes it 
unsurprising that facial appearance is often and automatically used as a guide to a 
person‟s character and personality (Berry & McArthur, 1986; Todorov, 2008). 
Hassin and Trope (2000) point out that, at least until very recently the face of an 
interaction partner has almost always been visible during social interaction and that 
facial features, unlike facial expressions, are difficult to wilfully alter through 
behaviour. People generally feel that the facial features of others are a reliable guide 
to their character. Liggett (1974) reported that 90% of undergraduate students 
believed that the face is a valid guide to character while Hassin and Trope (2000) 
found that 75% of students held this belief. A number of studies have shown that 
these views do have an effect on real world decisions. Facial features can predict a 
number of important social outcomes including election results (Little, Burriss, 
Jones, & Roberts, 2007; Spezio et al., 2008; Todorov, Mandisodza, Goren, & Hall, 
2005), promotion in the military (Mazur, Mazur, & Keating, 1984), the amount of 
money offered to people during economic games (Krumhuber et al., 2007; Stirrat & 
Perrett, 2010; R. K. Wilson & Eckel, 2006) and criminal sentencing decisions (Blair, 
Judd, & Chapleau, 2004).  
   
Todorov and colleagues suggested that judgements of personality rely on two key 
dimensions of facial features; dominance, which is related to cues for physical 
strength such as maturity and masculinity; and valence/trustworthiness, which is 
related to the subtle resemblance of neutral faces to positive or negative expressions 
(Todorov, Said, Engell, & Oosterhof, 2008). Other studies have however pointed 
towards an additional factor that affects judgements of personality from faces, the 
similarity between one‟s own face and the observed face. Using computer generated 
images that merge a certain percentage of the participants face into the face of the 
person whose traits they have to judge, DeBruine and colleagues have shown that 
facial similarity leads to increased cooperation in both trust games (DeBruine, 2002) 
and common goods games (Krupp, DeBruine, & Barclay, 2008) and increased 
attributions of trustworthiness (DeBruine, 2005). 
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Hassin and Trope (2000) considered two different ways in which judgements of 
personality and faces could interact. The first way, reading from faces, involves 
using facial characteristics to make an inference about the character of the observed 
person while the second, reading to faces, takes place when verbal or behavioural 
information about the character of another person changes judgments about that 
person‟s facial features. In a series of experiments Hassin and Trope demonstrated 
that a person‟s facial characteristics could affect the interpretation of ambiguous 
verbal information about their character and their decision about a candidate‟s 
suitability for a job. They also found evidence for reading to faces showing that 
people described as being kind were perceived as more attractive and as  being more 
“baby faced”  than those who had been described as mean. Finally Hassin and Trope 
also found that two people described as having similar personalities were also rated 
as having more similar faces. A similar study by Paunonen (2006) found that people 
judge the face of a person described as honest as being more attractive and looking 
more physically fit than the same face when it was attributed to a person described as 
being dishonest. 
  
Given the importance of faces for social cognition a number of recent studies have 
sought to investigate how multisensory stimulation can alter both the physical 
representation of the self-face and the sense of social closeness between self and 
other. These studies have used the paradigm of interpersonal multisensory 
stimulation (IMS) or “enfacement” developed by Tsakiris (2008) to examine these 
questions. In this paradigm participants watched another person receiving tactile 
stimulation while their own face was touched either synchronously or 
asynchronously with what they saw on the screen. 
  
Tsakiris (2008) presented videos of the participant‟s face morphing into that of the 
person whose face they saw being stroked, i.e. going from 100% self to 100% other, 
or vice versa and instructed participants to stop the movie when they felt that the face 
was starting to look more like self than other, or vice versa, depending on the 
morphing direction displayed in the movie. It was found that after synchronous, but 
not asynchronous, stimulation participants showed a bias in recognizing their own 
face, judging a greater number of the frames as containing more self than other than 
they had in pre-stimulation trials. This indicates that IMS changes the mental 
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representations of the self‟s physical appearance and leads to the face of the other 
being perceived as more similar to one‟s own. Several other studies have since 
replicated this finding of increased facial similarity using similar morphed images 
(Sforza, Bufalari, Haggard, & Aglioti, 2010; Tajadura-Jiménez, Grehl, & Tsakiris, 
2012) and also using questionnaire measures (Mazzurega, Pavani, Paladino, & 
Schubert, 2011; Paladino et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jiménez, Longo, Coleman, & 
Tsakiris, 2012; Tajadura-Jiménez & Tsakiris, In Press).  In addition Cardini, 
Tajadura-Jiménez, Serino, & Tsakiris (2013) showed that synchronous IMS led to an 
increase in the strength of the visual remapping of touch effect when applied to 
another person.  
  
Direct evidence of a distinctly social effect of IMS was first reported by Paladino et 
al. (2010). The authors found that, compared to asynchronous visual tactile 
stimulation, synchronous stimulation caused participants to feel socially closer and 
more affiliated to the other person as well as viewing them as more physically 
similar to themselves. They also projected their own attributes onto the other more 
and showed greater conformity to the other‟s judgement about the number of letters 
on a screen.  Several other studies have also highlighted the social aspects of IMS, 
Tajadura-Jiménez, Longo, et al. (2012) used questionnaire items to run a principal 
component analysis on the conscious experience of the changes in self-identification 
produced by IMS and identified changes to affective feelings towards the other as 
one of the three key components of the illusion with participants viewing the other as 
both more trustworthy and more attractive after synchronous stimulation. Maister, 
Tsiakkas and Tsakiris, (2013) demonstrated that the enfacement illusion also 
facilitates emotion recognition, specifically fearful facial expressions, while Beck, 
Bertini and Ladavas (2012) found that the effect of synchrony was abolished if the 
other person displayed a fearful facial expression. In addition Sforza et al. (2010) 
showed that individual differences in social cognition could affect how strongly self-
other merging was perceived, with more empathic individuals showing a greater 
effect of self-other merging on the self-face recognition task. This link between 
empathy and self-other merging has also been found in studies using the RHI (Asai 
et al., 2011).  
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The ample evidence for the importance of face representation in social cognition and 
of the power of IMS to affect perceived physical and social closeness suggests that 
one potentially fruitful area of research would be to investigate the relationship 
between representations of one‟s own face and the faces of others and the amount of 
trust between self and others. Investigating this relationship is of value due to the 
importance of trust in social interaction. Trust is one of the most important 
components for the development and maintenance of happy, well-functioning 
relationships (Fehr, 1988; Regan, Kocan, & Whitlock, 1998; Simpson, 2007) and 
also plays a key role in promoting cooperation between group members and allowing 
the development of long term reciprocal exchanges that are a key part of larger 
societies (K. S. Cook & Cooper, 2003; Walker & Ostrom, 2009) 
 
A number of models have been proposed to examine trust but one of the most 
influential is that developed by Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) which defines 
trust as the willingness of a trustor to be vulnerable to the actions of a trustee based 
on the expectation that the trustee will perform a particular action. A second model 
developed by Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt and Camerer (1998) defines trust as a 
psychological state comprising the intentions to accept vulnerability based on 
positive expectations of the actions of the trustee. Both of these models have two key 
components of trust the first being willingness to accept vulnerability and the second 
the expectation that the trustee will act so as to give the trustor a positive outcome. In 
addition Mayer et al. distinguished trust from trustworthiness which was based on 
three distinct characteristics of the trustee (ability, benevolence, and integrity) and 
also trust from trust propensity. Trust propensity is considered as the stable trait 
likelihood of trusting another person while trust itself is considered as a situational 
state of deciding to trust another person and is determined by a combination of trust 
propensity and the three aspects of trustworthiness applied to the other person.   
  
In the studies reported here trust was measured (experiments 5.1 and 5.2) or 
manipulated (experiment 5.3) by means of a trust (or investment) game. Developed 
by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) based on an earlier more complex version 
developed by Camerer and Weigelt (1988) the trust game involves a sequential 
exchange in which there is no contract to enforce agreements. Subjects are endowed 
with a starting amount of money, anonymously paired and assigned to either the role 
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of trustor or trustee. At stage one of the game, the trustor may either pass nothing, or 
any portion of the endowment to the trustee. The trustor then keeps the remainder of 
the endowment and the experimenter triples the money that is passed onto the 
trustee. In stage two, the trustee may either pass nothing, or pass any portion of the 
money received back to the trustor. The amount passed by the trustor is said to 
capture trust, “a willingness to bet that another person will reciprocate a risky move 
(at a cost to themselves)”, and the amount returned to the trustor by the trustee to 
capture trustworthiness (Camerer, 2003, p. 85).  
  
Several studies have investigated the relationship between responses in the trust 
game and other more explicit measures of trust such as responses to trust 
questionnaires. Ashraf, Bohnet and Piankov (2006) investigated the factors 
associated with the amount returned in the trust game and found that the amount of 
money sent by the trustor to the trustee was best predicted by a model that included 
both the amount of money expected to be returned and unconditional kindness. 
Ashraf, Bohnet and Piankov also found that unconditional kindness, not reciprocity, 
was the most significant predictor of the amount of money returned in the game. In 
addition Chaudhuri and Gangadharan (2007) found a strong influence in the expected 
amount of money returned on the initial amount of money sent by the trustor. These 
findings suggest that the expectation of the trustee reciprocating trust and returning a 
reasonable amount of money is a key factor in the amount of money that trustors 
chose to send, a result which is in line with Mayer et al.'s (1995) emphasis on 
expectations of a positive outcome when defining trust.  
  
Other studies by Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman and Soutter (2000) and Gächter, 
Herrmann and Thöni (2004) found that the amount sent by trustors during the first 
round of a trust game are correlated with survey questions on past trusting behaviour 
and a question on trust in strangers but not when examining trust towards institutions 
or familiar others. Naef and Schupp (2009) found a similar result using a different 
questionnaire as did Johansson-Stenman, Mahmud and Martinsson (2013) in a study 
examining offers in trust games between Bangladeshi villagers. These findings 
suggest that, at least in trust games involving strangers, in terms of the components 
of trustworthiness defined by Mayer et al. (1995) the amount of money returned in 
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the trust game is best seen as measuring the benevolence, as opposed to ability or 
integrity, of the trustee.   
   
The above review of the literature demonstrates both the importance of face 
representation and the power of trust games to measure changes in trust towards 
others and to impact on the perception of other‟s trustworthiness. The two studies 
reported here aimed to examine the existence of reciprocal relationship between face 
representation of self and other and trust as measured by the amounts given and 
received in the trust game.  
  
In the terminology used by Hassin and Trope (2000) experiment 5.1 attempted to 
examine the effect of reading from faces by using IMS to increase the perceived 
similarity between participants‟ own faces and the faces of a partner in the trust 
game.  It was hypothesised that participants acting as the trustor would send larger 
amounts of money to the trustee after experiencing synchronous IMS with them than 
when they had experienced asynchronous multisensory stimulation. Experiment 5.3 
in contrast sought to investigate reading into faces by discovering whether learning, 
through a trust game interaction, that a person was trustworthy or untrustworthy 
affected the perceived similarity between the participants‟ own face and the face of 
the trustee.  It was hypothesised that after learning that the trustee was trustworthy 
participants would perceive their own face to be more similar to that of the trustee 
than they would after learning that the trustee was untrustworthy. 
  
5.2. Experiment 5.1 
  
5.2.1. Introduction 
  
Experiment 5.1 is, to the best of my knowledge, the first to test whether the 
experience of IMS would affect the amount of money sent while in the trustor role in 
a trust game. It was hypothesised that participants who received synchronous 
stimulation would offer larger amounts of money in the trust game than those who 
received asynchronous stimulation. This hypothesis was based on three 
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considerations. The first is the finding that synchronous IMS leads to increased 
ratings of trust in the stimulation partner (Tajadura-Jiménez, Longo, et al., 2012). 
Based on this it seems reasonable to assume that behavioural measures of trust will 
also be affected by IMS. The second consideration is the known effect of 
synchronous movement to increase prosocial offers in the trust game and other 
economic games (Launay et al., 2013; Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009), based on this it is 
assumed that exposure to synchronous multisensory events in this study will result in 
similar effect. The third consideration is based on the finding that facial similarity 
leads to increased cooperation in trust games (DeBruine, 2002) and the finding that 
IMS leads to an increase in perceived facial similarity (Mazzurega et al., 2011; 
Paladino et al., 2010; Sforza et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jiménez, Grehl, et al., 2012; 
Tajadura-Jiménez, Longo, et al., 2012; Tajadura-Jiménez & Tsakiris, In Press; 
Tsakiris, 2008). Combining these findings suggests that the increase in facial 
similarity produced by IMS might increase the amount of money sent in the trust 
game. 
  
5.2.2. Methods 
  
5.2.2.1. Design 
The study used a between subjects design with one factor: synchrony of VT 
stimulation (synchronous, asynchronous). The dependent variables were: the amount 
of money that participants sent to the trustee in the trust game; the amount of money 
they expected the trustee to return; their responses to nine statements on a 7 point 
Likert scale taken from Tajadura-Jiménez, Longo, et al. (2012), their ratings of how 
close they felt to the trustee using the Inclusion of Other in the Self (IOS) scale 
(Schubert & Otten, 2002) and their rating of how dominant they felt using the 
pictorial dominance scale (Bradley & Lang, 1994). The measure of dominance was 
to examine whether the greater feeling of interpersonal closeness to the other that 
was expected to be experienced in the synchronous condition would also lead to a 
feeling of greater efficacy due to being the member of a larger group. 
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5.2.2.2. Procedure 
Participants attended one experimental session. They first completed a demographic 
questionnaire which asked their age, gender and ethnic background. Following this 
the rules of the trust game (presented as a social interaction in order to prevent any 
framing effects) were explained to the participant.  In this game the participant took 
the role of the trustor and had to decide how much of a £5 endowment (in £1 
increments) to transfer to the trustee, a photograph of whose face was presented on 
the screen during the trust decision. The interaction in the study used the „strategy‟ 
method (Brandts & Charness, 2011). Participants were informed that the trustees had 
previously made a series of hypothetical back-transfer decisions, one for each of the 
possible transfers that the trustor could make and that they would be paid for the 
study based on these previously made decisions. Participants were also informed that 
the trustee would be paid for their part in the study based on the amount sent to them 
by a randomly selected participant meaning that their decision in the trust game 
could potentially affect the amount of money that the trustee was paid.   
  
Following the explanation of the game participants were presented with six questions 
about how the trust game worked to ensure that they had understood all the key 
aspects of the trust game (see Table 5-1). Participants then viewed a video of the 
trustee, who was always a stranger of the same sex as the participant, being stroked 
on their left cheek by a cotton bud. Participants were stroked with a cotton bud on 
their own cheek either synchronously or asynchronously with respect to the strokes 
the participant could observe in the video. 
  
The stimulation period lasted for two minutes after which the participants were 
requested to make their decision about how much money they wished to transfer to 
the trustee.  Participants were then asked to state how much money they expected the 
trustee to return to them. Participants then completed a nine item enfacement 
questionnaire, three of these questions loaded on to the self-identification factor, 
three loaded on to the similarity factor, two loaded onto the affect factor and the final 
question being on feelings of affiliation (Tajadura-Jiménez, Longo, et al., 2012).  
Participants then rated: their relationship with the actor they played the trust game 
with using the Inclusion of Other in the Self scale (Schubert & Otten, 2002); how 
dominant they felt using a pictorial dominance scale (Bradley & Lang, 1994); their 
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general trust for strangers using a scale developed by Naef and Schupp (Naef & 
Schupp, 2009) and their propensity towards risk taking using 10 point Likert scale.  
Finally participants viewed pre-recorded videos of the trustees stating how much 
money they had decided to return to the trustor and were paid for the study based on 
the amount of the pot the trustee had returned and whatever was left from their 
original endowment (see Figure 5-1).  
 
Table 5-1. List of the 6 instruction questions and their correct answer. 
Question Correct Answer 
 "How many one pound coins will you be given at the 
start of the interaction?"; 
5 
"How many one pound coins does the other person start 
the interaction with?" 
5 
"What is the maximum number of one pound coins you 
can transfer to the other person?" 
5 
"True or false: You must transfer some of the money to 
the other person? (Please enter “T” for true or “F” for 
false.)" 
False 
"If you transfer £3 to the other person, how much will 
they receive?” 
£9 
"If you transfer £3 to the other person and they return £5, 
how much will you leave the interaction with?” 
£7 
  
5.2.2.3. Participants 
33 participants (mean age ± SD: 22.6 ± 3.7, 5 male, 16 asynchronous) took part in 
the study. The study was approved by the Departmental Ethics Committee, Royal 
Holloway, University of London. 
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Figure 5-1. Procedure of Experiment 5.1. 
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5.2.3. Results 
  
5.2.3.1. Participants Ratings of General Trust towards Strangers and Risk 
Taking 
To test that there were no significant differences between the synchronous and 
asynchronous groups in their general trait trust towards strangers and willingness to 
take risk, independent sample t-tests were carried out on the mean response to the 
four questions in the trust questionnaire and the Likert scale rating of risk taking.    
 
No significant difference between the two groups was found in either their general 
trust towards strangers, t(31) = -0.91, p>.05, (synchronous: M = 2.29, SD = 0.38; 
asynchronous: M = 2.42, SD = 0.43) or their rating of risk taking, t(31) = -1.39, 
p>.05, (synchronous: M = 5.71, SD = 1.93; asynchronous: M = 6.56, SD = 1.59).  
 
5.2.3.2. Introspective Rating of the Enfacement Illusion 
In order to investigate the effect of synchrony of IMS on participants‟ ratings of the 
enfacement illusion, independent sample t-tests were carried out for each of the 9 
questions taken from Tajadura-Jiménez, Longo, et al.'s (2012) enfacement 
questionnaire with synchrony of IMS as the independent variable. Significant results 
at the two tailed level were found for two of the questions regarding their experience 
of enfacement and two other questions were significant at the one tailed level, (see 
Table 5-2).  
 
To further investigate these effects the scores for the three questions that loaded onto 
the self-identification factor and the similarity factor of Tajadura-Jiménez, Longo, et 
al.'s (2012) principle component analysis and the two questions that loaded on the 
affect factor plus the affiliation question were separately averaged together and 
independent samples t-tests were run on  the resultant 3 variables. In the affect and 
affiliation factor significantly higher ratings were found for the synchronous 
condition (M = 1.08, SD = 1.01) compared to the asynchronous condition (M = -0.06, 
SD = 1.26) at the two tailed level, t(31) = 2.88, p < .01. In the self-identification 
factor significantly higher ratings were found for the synchronous condition (M = 
0.31, SD = 1.88) compared to the asynchronous condition (M = -0.48, SD = 1.76) at    
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Table 5-2. Summary of the results of t-tests conducted on the 9 Questions taken from Tajadura-Jiménez, Longo et al. (2012). (* = significant at 
the 1-tailed level, ** = significant at the 2-tailed level).   
Question Factor 
Synchronous 
Mean (SD) 
Asynchronous 
Mean (SD) 
t 
p (2- 
tailed) 
"The touch I saw on the other's face was caused by the cotton bud 
touching my own face" 
Self-
Identification 
-0.76 (2.22) -1.56 (1.59) 1.19 .234 
"It seemed like the other's face began to resemble my own face" Similarity -0.35 (2.18) -0.63 (1.75) 0.39 .696 
"It seemed like I was in control of the other's face" 
Self-
Identification 
-0.88 (1.93) -1.68 (1.3) 1.41 .169 
"It seemed like the face of the person in the video was similar to mine" Similarity 0.41 (2) -0.44 (1.93) 1.24 .225 
"It seemed like my face was similar to the face of the person in the video" Similarity 0.88 (1.8) -0.38 (1.96) 1.92 .064* 
"It seemed like the person in the video was attractive" Affect 0.88 (1.05) 0.06 (1.69) 1.68 .103 
“It seemed like the person in the video was trustworthy" Affect 1.35 (1.32) -0.13 (1.26) 3.29 .003** 
"I felt that the other person was imitating me" 
Self-
Identification 
-0.24 (1.68) -1.31 (1.49) 1.94 .061* 
"I felt affiliated with the person in the video" None 1 (1.54) -0.13 (1.59) 2.07 .047** 
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the one tailed level, t(31) = 1.8, p < .05. No significant difference was found between 
the synchronous condition (M = -0.63, SD = 1.65) and the asynchronous condition 
(M = -1.52, SD = 1.12) for the self-identification factor (see Figure 5-2).    
 
 
Figure 5-2. Mean Likert scores for each of the three factors across synchronous and 
asynchronous conditions. Error bars represent SEM. 
 
5.2.3.3. Effect of Synchrony of IMS on Trust Game Decisions 
To investigate the effect of synchrony of IMS on participant‟s trust decisions an 
independent sample t-test was carried out with the amount of money sent to the 
trustee in the trust game as the dependent variable and synchrony of IMS as the 
independent variable.  No significant difference was found between the synchronous 
(M = 2.41, SD = 1.28) and asynchronous (M = 2.38, SD = 1.26) conditions t(31) = 
0.08, p > .05,. In addition an independent sample t-test with synchrony of IMS as the 
independent variable and the amount of money that participants expected the trustee 
to return as the dependent variable was carried out to examine whether synchronous 
stimulation would lead to the expectation of a greater return than asynchronous 
stimulation. No significant difference was found between the synchronous (M = 3.59, 
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SD = 3.39) and asynchronous (M = 3.36, SD = 1.75) conditions t(31) = 0.23, p>.05, 
(see figure 5-3). 
   
 
Figure 5-3. Mean amounts of money sent and expected to be returned across 
synchronous and asynchronous conditions. Error bars represent SEM. 
 
 5.2.3.4. Effect of Enfacement Scores on Trust Game Decisions 
To investigate the effect of experiencing enfacement on participants‟ trust game 
decisions a two-step hierarchical linear regression was carried out with the amount 
sent to the trustee as the dependent variable. Synchrony of IMS, score on the trust 
questionnaire (Naef & Schupp, 2009) and scores in the three factors from the 
enfacement questionnaire were entered as predictor variables in the first step and the 
interaction terms between synchrony and each of the three factors were entered as 
predictor variables in the second step.  The overall model fit was not significant at 
the first step, F(5,  27) = 0.25, p > .05, r
2
adjusted = -.13  and adding the interaction 
terms to the model in Step 2 of the regression did not significantly improve the 
model fit. Δr2 = .12.  
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5.2.3.5. Effect of Synchrony of IMS on IOS and Dominance Ratings 
In order to investigate the effect of synchrony of IMS on participants‟ ratings of 
social closeness to the trustee and their feelings of dominance following IMS, 
independent sample t-tests were carried out on the IOS score and dominance ratings 
with synchrony of IMS as the independent variable in each. No significant 
differences were found in IOS score between the synchronous (M = 3.47, SD = 1.77) 
and asynchronous (M = 2.56, SD = 1.36) groups, t(31) = 0.11, p > .05. There was 
also no significant difference in dominance ratings between the synchronous (M = 5, 
SD = 1.7) and asynchronous (M = 4.25, SD = 1.53) groups, t(31) = 0.19, p > .05.  
  
5.2.4. Discussion  
  
It was hypothesized  that observing touch being delivered to the face of another in 
synchrony with feeling touch on one‟s own face would lead people to see that person 
as more trustworthy than asynchronous touch would. The current study found limited 
evidence of this in so far as synchronous IMS led to higher ratings of trustworthiness 
and of affiliation with the VT stimulation partner, at least using the Likert scale 
measure, although no effect was found for the IOS ratings of social closeness.  
However, on the behavioural measure of trust, the amount of money sent to the other 
person in a trust game, there was no effect of the synchrony of IMS. This 
discrepancy between participants‟ ratings of trustworthiness and their willingness to 
trust the other in a behavioural task occurred despite the fact that participants took 
part in the trust game before they gave their ratings of trustworthiness about the other 
person, although not before discovering the amount of money that person had 
returned to them.  
  
There are a number of possible reasons for this failure to find an effect of synchrony 
on our behavioural measure of trust.  The first important point to note is that, in 
contrast to other studies that have investigated IMS (e.g. Paladino et al., 2010; 
Tajadura-Jiménez, Longo, et al., 2012)the scores on the enfacement questionnaire in 
the current study were relatively low with no significant difference between 
synchronous and asynchronous groups in their ratings of self-identification between 
themselves and the trustee. If the strength of the enfacement illusion plays a key role 
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in the ability of IMS to affect trust game decisions then the failure of the current 
study to find an effect may be due to these weak enfacement scores.  
  
Another possibility is that synchronous IMS has only a mild effect on social 
behaviour and that despite its effect on rating of trustworthiness the difference 
between synchronous and asynchronous IMS is not great enough to override other 
factors that come into play when making real decisions about how much to trust a 
person, such as judgements about trustworthiness based on the other persons facial 
characteristics. However this seems unlikely given that other studies have shown that 
synchronous action can lead to: increased cooperation in public goods games 
(Reddish et al., 2014; Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009); a positive change in attitudes 
towards a racial outgroup (Inzlicht et al., 2012) and increased performance in 
cooperative tasks (Valdesolo et al., 2010) and that synchronous VT stimulation can 
lead to increased conformity behaviour (Paladino et al., 2010), affect perceptual 
judgements of physical similarity (Sforza et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jiménez, Grehl, et 
al., 2012; Tsakiris, 2008) and lead to a positive change in attitudes towards a racial 
outgroup (see Chapter 3, study 3.1; Maister, Sebanz, Knoblich, & Tsakiris, 2013). 
Taking these findings into account it seems plausible that passive VT stimulation 
should be able to exert enough influence over behaviour for its effect on trustors‟ 
decisions to be significant. 
  
A third possibility is that the remote nature of the trust game in the current study 
meant that participants did not conceptualise the trust game as necessarily involving 
any trust on their part.  Participants were aware that  the game used the strategy 
method and therefore that the other person‟s decision of how much to return had 
already been made and was not specifically directed towards them and this 
knowledge may have made them less likely to see the decision they made as 
involving any trust or real interpersonal interaction. Supporting this view is the fact 
that, ignoring any effects of synchrony, participants‟  score of the four item trust 
scale failed to predict either the offer they sent to the other person or the amount of 
money they expected the other person to return, The trust scale has been found to 
reliably track participants‟ offers in more conventional trust games (Naef & Schupp, 
2009) which suggests that in the current study participants may not have based their 
decision about how much money to send the trustee on the same factors that drive 
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decision making in a conventional trust game. Moreover participants were 
presumably also aware of an asymmetry between their own experience and that of 
the trustee in that, while they had experienced IMS with the trustee before making 
their decision, the trustee had had no such experience of IMS before making their 
decision of how much money to return. Given these considerations it is possible that 
making the trust interaction a real time and more obviously interpersonal situation 
might give a greater possibility of finding a significant effect of synchrony of VT 
stimulation.  
  
A final possible explanation for the current study‟s failure to manipulate behavioural 
trust is that the one-shot nature of the task and the low number of increments that the 
money participants could offer in the trust game led to the study having insufficient 
power to find any behavioural effect of the manipulation of synchrony. This 
possibility is supported by data from Wiltermuth & Heath (2009)who found that 
synchronous action only led to significantly more cooperation than asynchronous 
action in the later rounds of a public goods game suggesting that part of the power of 
synchrony in improving cooperative behaviour is that it buffers participants against 
defection as the interaction continues. In addition Wiltermuth and Heath split the 
total allowance that participants were able to invest into the group into a greater 
number of increments than did the current study. It is therefore possible that, 
although no effect of synchronous VT stimulation on trust behaviour was found in 
the one shot game with only five increments used in the current study, if the trust 
game were to be played over several rounds or with smaller increments of money it 
would reveal a difference between the synchronous and asynchronous conditions. 
  
These considerations lead to the development of a second experimental design to 
investigate the influence of synchronous multisensory stimulation on trust. This 
second study, which focussed on increasing the power of the key dependent variables 
of amount sent and amount expected in the current study is presented below as 
experiment 5.2   
  
In conclusion the current study offered limited support for the idea that synchronous 
IMS could lead to an increase in trust towards one‟s stimulation partner by 
replicating the higher trustworthiness ratings after synchronous stimulation observed 
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in Tajadura-Jimenez et al. (2012). The study also partially replicated the finding from 
Paladino et al. (2010) that synchronous interpersonal stimulation led to greater 
ratings of overall affiliation, although the current study failed to find an effect of 
synchrony on ratings of closeness using the IOS scale.   However on the more 
important measure of actual behaviour in a trust game no effect of synchrony was 
observed. To examine whether this failure to find an effect was due to a lack of 
power in the design a second experiment was conducted in which participants played 
a series of trust games with ten different partners, with half of whom they received 
synchronous IMS with prior to the game and with the other half of whom they 
received asynchronous IMS with. In addition although the amount of money that 
participants had to send to each trustee was the same as in experiment 5.1 (£5) the 
number of increments they could offer it in was doubled from 5 to 10. 
   
5.3. Experiment 5.2 
  
5.3.1. Methods 
  
5.3.1.1. Design 
The study used a within-subjects design with one independent variable, the pattern of 
IMS (synchronous, asynchronous). The dependent variables were the amount of 
money participants sent to the trustees and the amount of money they expected 
trustees to return. 
 
5.3.1.2. Apparatus and materials. 
Fourteen videos of different female models receiving tactile stimulation to their left 
cheek were recorded.  The faces of these models were then rated for attractiveness 
and trustworthiness by ten females who did not participate in the study.  On the basis 
of these ratings ten of the videos were selected and split into two groups each with 
approximately equal overall attractiveness (group 1: M = 1.39, SD = 2.01; group 2: 
M = 1.51, SD = 2.43, t(8) = -0.09, p > .05) and trustworthiness (group 1: M = 4.79, 
SD = 0.68; group 2: M = 4.66, SD = 1.3, t(8) = 0.2, p > .05). For each participant one 
of these groups was presented in the synchronous condition and the other in the 
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asynchronous condition. The pattern of stimulation applied to each group was 
counterbalanced across participants. 
  
 
 
5.3.1.3. Procedure 
Participants attended one experimental session. They first completed a demographic 
questionnaire which asked their age, gender and ethnic background. Following this 
the rules of the trust game (presented as a social interaction in order to prevent any 
framing effects) were explained to the participant. Participants were told they would 
play a series of trust games in the role of the trustor. As in experiment 5.1 the 
interaction used the „strategy‟  method (Brandts & Charness, 2011). The current 
experiment did however have a number of changes to the trust game. Participants 
were given an endowment of £5 for each game but this time they could send this 
money in £0.50p increments, doubling the number of possible amounts that could be 
sent. In addition participants were informed that only one of the ten trustees had 
made a series of hypothetical back-transfer decisions and that they would be paid for 
the study based on these previously made decisions and their decision of how much 
to offer that trustee. Participants were not however told which of the ten trustees had 
actually made their decisions. This method ensured that participants had to treat each 
of the interactions as potentially involving a real decision. Participants were also 
informed that the trustee who had made the back transfers would be paid for their 
part in the study based on the amount sent to them by a randomly selected participant 
meaning that their decision in the trust game could potentially affect the amount of 
money that the trustee was paid.   
  
Following the explanation of the game participants were presented with five of the 
six  questions (question 3 was omitted) about how the trust game worked from 
experiment 5.1, to ensure that they had understood all the key aspects of the trust 
game (see Table 5-1). Participants then began their ten trust game interactions. In 
each interaction participants saw a video of one of the models, being stroked on their 
left cheek by a cotton bud. Participants were stroked with a cotton bud on their own 
cheek either synchronously or asynchronously with respect to the strokes the 
participant could observe in the video. The experimenter administering the VT-
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stimulation was cued as to the pattern of stimulation in each video by the appearance 
of a vertical (synchronous) or horizontal (asynchronous) line that appeared for two 
seconds prior to the presentation of each video and was naïve of the purpose of the 
study. 
  
The stimulation period lasted for ninety seconds after which the participants were 
requested to make their decision about how much money they wished to transfer to 
the trustee.  Participants were then asked to state how much money they expected the 
trustee to return to them (See Figure 5-3).They then moved on to the next video. At 
the completion of all 10 interactions participants were informed of how much money 
they had earned in the interactions, based on the amount of money that the trustee 
had returned and whatever was left from their original endowment, and were paid for 
the study based on this amount and an additional £5 for taking part in the study. They 
were also asked to complete a debriefing sheet consisting of five questions (see Table 
5-3). 
 
5.3.1.4. Participants 
15 female participants (mean age ± SD: 23.9 ± 2.9) gave their informed consent to 
participate and were paid for their participation. The study was approved by the 
Departmental Ethics Committee, Royal Holloway, University of London.  
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Table 5-3. List of the 5 debriefing questions with examples of answers indicating an awareness of the hypothesis. 
Question Example Answer 
"What do you think the purpose of this experiment (the whole thing) 
was?" 
“I think I was supposed to give more money to the people who had their 
faces touched in synchrony with the touching of my face.” 
"Did anything about the experiment seem strange to you?" 
“That synchronous stroking makes the other persons face to feel like 
mine.” 
"How did you decide how much money to send?" 
No answers indicating awareness given by participants but an example 
would be “I gave more when there was synchronous stroking.” 
"Did you think that any of the different parts of the study were related in 
any way? If yes how?" 
“Yes simultaneous strokes can probably help empathise with strangers 
and we may be more likely to give more money as a resut.” 
"Did anything in one part of the study affect your decisions in another 
part?" 
“I tried to remember what I had given people before to make it fair. If I 
was being stroked at the same time as the person in the video I was 
more likely to give more money.” 
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5.3.2. Results 
  
5.3.2.1. Effect of Synchrony of IMS on Trust Game Decisions 
To investigate the effect of synchrony of IMS on participant‟s trust decisions, the 
mean value of the amount of money sent to the trustee and the amount of money 
expected to be returned by the trustee was calculated for both the synchronous and 
asynchronous conditions. A paired sample t-test was carried out with the mean 
amount of money sent to the trustee in the trust game as the dependent variable and 
synchrony of IMS as the independent variable.  It was found that the amounts sent in 
the synchronous condition (M = 2.77, SD = 0.85) were significantly higher than those 
sent in the asynchronous condition (M = 2.06, SD = 0.84) conditions t(14) = 4.13, p 
< .01.  A second paired sample t-test was carried out with the mean amount of money 
expected to be returned by the trustee as the dependent variable and synchrony of 
IMS as the independent variable.  It was found that the amounts sent in the 
synchronous condition (M = 3.43, SD = 1.67) were significantly higher than those 
sent in the asynchronous condition (M = 2.47, SD = 1.29) conditions t(14) = 3.83, p 
< .01. These results indicated that the manipulation of synchrony of IMS in this study 
lead to a significant change in the amounts of money offered by participants (see 
Figure 5-4).  
  
5.3.2.2. Checks of Participant Awareness of the Purpose of the Experiment 
Due to the large difference between the results of experiment 5.2 and the possibility 
of a within-subject design increasing demand characteristics (Orne, 1962; Rubin & 
Badea, 2010) participants‟ responses to the five debriefing questions were coded for 
signs that participants had been aware of the purpose of the study. For questions 1, 2 
and 4 participants were coded as having been aware of the purpose of the study if 
they had mentioned any link between the synchrony of the IMS and their decisions in 
the trust game. For questions 3 and 5 participants were marked as having been 
affected by the purpose of the experiment if they said that the synchrony of IMS had 
affected their decisions of how much to send each person. One sample t-tests were 
carried out on each of the five questions to determine whether the number of 
participants who showed knowledge of the purpose of the study was significantly 
different from 0. A significant difference from 0 was found for responses to question 
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1 (M = 0.6, SD = 0.51), t(14) = 4.58, p < .01, and question 4 (M = 0.6, SD = 0.51), 
t(14) = 4.58, p  < .01, indicating that a majority of participants correctly identified 
the purpose of the study. No significant results were found for question 2 (M = 0.13, 
SD = 0.35), t(14) = 1.47, p  > .05, question 3 (M = 0.13, SD = 0.35), t(14) = 1.47, p > 
.05, and question 5 (M = 0, SD = 0), t(14) = 0, p > .05 indicating that participants did 
not feel that the pattern of multisensory stimulation played a significant role in their 
trust game decisions.       
 
 
 Figure 5-4. Mean amounts of money sent and expected to be returned across 
synchronous and asynchronous conditions. Error bars represent SEM. 
  
5.3.3. Discussion  
  
The results of experiment 5.2, in contrast to those of experiment 5.1, found that 
receiving synchronous IMS with a trustee lead participants to give them significantly 
more than did receiving asynchronous stimulation. Here I will briefly discuss the 
possible reasons for the discrepancy in results between the two studies and suggest 
potential explanations for it. 
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The finding of experiment 5.2 indicates that shared multisensory experience is 
capable of increasing levels of behavioural trust between self and other in addition to 
leading to higher rating of perceived trust as seen in Tajadura-Jiménez, Longo, et al. 
(2012) and experiment 5.1 of this chapter. The results of experiment 5.2 are also in 
line with similar results relating to the power of shared sensorimotor experiences to 
increase cooperation in group economic games (R. Fischer et al., 2013; Launay et al., 
2013; Reddish et al., 2014; Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009). Given the power of 
multisensory stimulation to blur the physical boundaries between self and other 
(Paladino et al., 2010; Sforza et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jiménez, Grehl, et al., 2012; 
Tsakiris, 2008) the findings of the current study further demonstrate the close links 
between perceptions of bodily similarity and social similarity as reflected in 
behavioural judgements of trustworthiness. 
   
The positive findings of experiment 5.2 have to be qualified however by the failure 
of experiment 5.1 to find a significant effect of synchrony in a between subject 
design. There are several differences in the design of the two studies that may have 
been the cause of this discrepancy in findings. For one thing, participants in 
experiment 5.2 played a much larger number of individual trust games each than did 
participants in experiment 5.1.  More importantly, participants in experiment 5.2 had 
the money they were about to send split into twice as many increments than did 
participants in experiment 5.1.  
  
This difference in increments may be the key to the discrepancy in findings between 
the two experiments reported above. Notably, despite the high significance of the 
difference between synchronous and asynchronous conditions between the two 
groups in experiment 5.2, the actual difference in the amount offered between the 
two conditions was less than £1. Since £1 was the minimal increment that 
participants could offer in experiment 5.1 it is possible that any effect of synchrony 
on trust game decisions in that study was not found due the decreased range of 
distinctions that participants could make in the amount of money they offered the 
trustee. 
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However, the results of the analysis of participants‟ debriefing questionnaire 
responses for experiment 5.2 do raise another possibility, that the difference between 
the two studies may be due to the increased risk of demand effects when using a 
within participants design (Orne, 1962; Rubin & Badea, 2010). The results of the 
debriefing questionnaire in experiment 5.2 showed that, despite the fact that the 
study used a double blind design, the majority of participants did guess the purpose 
of the study even though none of the participants reported that the synchrony of IMS 
played a part in their decision of how much money to send. No similar debriefing 
questionnaire was used in experiment 5.1, meaning that it is not possible to know 
how many of the participants in that experiment surmised its purpose. However, the 
fact that that experiment used a between participants design and that participants 
only played one trust game rather than a series of games means that it was 
significantly more difficult for participants in experiment 5.1 to guess what the 
study‟s purpose was. In order to determine whether the findings from the current 
study are genuine or due to demand effects a new study which has the same basic 
procedure as experiment 5.2 but with a between rather than within subject design is 
currently being conducted. This study should make it possible to determine which of 
the two possible explanations for the difference in findings between experiments 5.1 
and 5.2.      
  
5.4. Experiment 5.3 
  
5.4.1 Introduction  
  
The aim of experiment 5.3 was to investigate whether learning about whether an 
interaction partner was trustworthy or untrustworthy, as measured by the amount of 
money returned by them in the trustee role in a trust game, would affect 
participants‟ perceptual judgements of similarity between their own face and the face 
of the interaction partner. 
  
In the introduction to this chapter I reviewed the considerable literature indicating 
that facial appearance is used as a guide to a person‟s personality traits such as 
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trustworthiness (Todorov, 2008).  Of particular note to the current experiment are the 
findings that facial similarity leads to increased cooperation in both trust games 
(DeBruine, 2002) and common goods games (Krupp et al., 2008)and increased 
attributions of trustworthiness (DeBruine, 2005). These findings strongly suggest that 
we show a social bias towards favouring those who appear to be physically similar to 
ourselves with interesting behavioural effects. For example, people are more likely to 
vote for a politician that looks similar to them (Bailenson, Garland, Iyengar, & Yee, 
2006; Bailenson, Iyengar, Yee, & Collins, 2009). 
  
The cognitive mechanism which underlies this preference for people with similar 
faces is unclear. In the literature so far two interpretations of these findings have 
been made.  The first is based on the kin selection literature and suggests that since 
facial similarity is a cue to relatedness, peoples‟ preference to similar others is due to 
the fact that those who look more similar to one‟s self are more likely to be close 
relatives.  Support for this interpretation comes from the fact that self-resemblance 
increased attributions of trustworthiness to both self and opposite sex faces 
(DeBruine, 2002, 2005) but only increased attributions of attractiveness to same-sex 
faces (DeBruine, 2004a). Another study supporting the kin selection interpretation 
found that men, but not women, show a preference towards infants‟ faces that are 
more similar to their own (DeBruine, 2004b).  This is predicted by evolutionary 
biology because while a woman can be confident that a child is theirs, for a man 
physical similarity is one of the key ways to determine paternity.   
  
The second interpretation of these findings proposes a more general cognitive bias in 
favour of automatic positive associations towards the self and self-related stimuli 
(Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Mezulis et al., 2004).  This positive self-bias has been 
shown to extend to the letters in one‟s name (Koole, Dijksterhuis, & van 
Knippenberg, 2001); a brand of soft drink (Prestwich, Perugini, Hurling, & Richetin, 
2010); the personality traits of politicians (Vecchione, González Castro, & Caprara, 
2011); the avatars of other players in the computer game World of Warcraft (Lortie 
& Guitton, 2011) and to other members of a novel ingroup (Otten, 2003).  Verosky 
and Todorov (2010) suggest that the attribution of positive traits to faces that look 
similar to our own is another example of this positive bias towards the self.   
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In favour of the self-bias account Bressan & Zucchi (2009) showed that when pairs 
of twins saw pictures of faces that had been subtly morphed either with their own 
face or that of their twin and asked them which face they would prefer in prosocial 
contexts they significantly favoured the faces that had been morphed with their own 
over those morphed with their twin even in the case of monozygotic twins who were 
genetically identical. Therefore, it is the closeness of the other person‟s face to one‟s 
own rather that the faces of one‟s kin that is important in driving the effect. It is 
however important to be note that the kin selection and positive self-bias accounts of 
the facial similarity effect are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Indeed given that 
our self-concept often expands to embrace our family members (Polkinghorne, 1991) 
it could be argued that positive self-bias is the proximal mechanism through which 
kin selection acts. 
  
While the effects of existing similarity between self and others are well-documented, 
little is known about whether the perceived similarity between self and others can 
change as a result of self-other interactions. Thus, while we perceive a face that is 
similar to ours as more trustworthy, the reverse direction of causation has not been 
investigated. Would a person who treats us in a trustworthy way be perceived as 
being more physically similar to us? Given the evidence for the mutability of 
perceived facial similarity and for the close relationship between judgements of 
physical similarity and judgments of social similarity (Paladino et al., 2010; Tsakiris, 
2008) the present experiment sought to investigate whether a simple social 
interaction during an economic game that does not directly alter physical self-other 
boundaries can also change the perceived similarity between self and others.  
  
Both the positive self bias and kin selection interpretations of the link between trust 
and facial similarity give some reason to suggest that it should. People have a general 
bias towards positive information about themselves (Kruger & Dunning, 1999; S. E. 
Taylor & Brown, 1988). Of particular relevance to the current study are the findings 
that people view themselves as more trustworthy than the average person (Flynn & 
Lake, 2008) and view their face as more attractive than it actually is (Epley & 
Whitchurch, 2008).  Given this bias one would expect people to view a trustworthy 
person as more similar in personality to themselves and this feeling of social 
similarity might then extend to the feeling of greater physical similarity. On the kin 
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selection interpretation it might be argued that the experience of another‟s face being 
similar to one‟s own can be thought of as the felt output of a computational system 
that utilizes direct, phenotypic cues (e.g., objective facial features) and indirect, 
contextual cues (e.g., co-residence early in life; Debruine et al., 2011; Penn & 
Frommen, 2010) to gauge genetic kinship (cf. Kurzban, Duckworth, Kable, & Myers, 
2013). If evidence of cooperative intent in others serves as a contextual cue to 
kinship, then a person who behaves in a trustworthy way towards us may be 
perceived as more physically similar to us. This process would have adaptive value 
as it would in turn lead to the activation of kin selection based adaptations for greater 
cooperation with those who seem similar to us and thus encourage further 
cooperation with people who had previously proved themselves trustworthy.         
  
A number of studies previous have touched on the question of how social 
information about others might affect perceived facial similarity. Hassin and Trope 
(2000) and Paunonen (2006) both found that verbal information about a person‟s 
personality traits can affect judgements about that person‟s facial features. Notably, 
Hassin and Trope found that people who were described as having similar 
personalities were also perceived as having more similar faces.   
  
There are however, several limitations in these studies. First neither examined the 
effect of social information on perceptions of self-similarity. People have much more 
exposure to and therefore greater familiarity with their own facial appearance than 
they do with novel faces and any effects reported might not be applicable when 
considering a highly familiar face Second both studies asked participants to give 
rating responses which leaves open the possibility that the effects observed are due to 
changes in explicit judgements rather than in perception.  The conscious and explicit 
nature of the measures used in these studies also increases the possibility that the 
findings of these studies are due to demand characteristics (Orne, 1962). Finally both 
studies used verbal descriptions of the personality of the people whose faces were 
rated rather than direct interaction between the person and the participant. Thus it 
remains unclear whether behavioural evidence of a person‟s personality would have 
the same effect as verbal information.  
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Another study that touched on this question was carried out by Verosky and Todorov 
(2010) who morphed together a computer generated version of participants‟ faces 
with computer generated faces that had been set to appear either trustworthy or 
untrustworthy.  They then presented participants with these while in an MRI scanner 
and asked them to decide whether the morph looked like them or the other face while 
monitoring BOLD response. Verosky and Todorov found that participants were more 
likely to identify the trustworthy than the untrustworthy morphs as looking like the 
self and also showed that a number of brain areas seemed to differentiate more 
between the self-face and the untrustworthy face than they did between the self-face 
and the trustworthy face.   
  
Verosky and Todorov‟s (2010) study also suffered from a number of methodological 
issues. First the faces used in the study were all computer generated meaning that 
their ecological validity is somewhat dubious.  A second and more important issue 
with the study is that the trustworthiness of the computer generated faces was not 
based on any actual information about trustworthy behaviour but rather was based on 
physical properties of the faces that have been found to correlate with judgements of 
trustworthiness. This makes it impossible to generalise from these finding to claims 
about the effect of past experience of a persons‟ trustworthiness on judgements of 
facial similarity.     
  
A recent study by Teneggi, Canzoneri, di Pellegrino, and Serino (2013) also touched 
on the hypothesis being tested in the current experiment. The authors found that after 
playing an economic game with another person, the boundaries of peripersonal space 
between self and other merge, but only if the other behaved cooperatively. This 
finding shows that an economic game manipulation can affect bodily perceptions of 
self and other and thus offers support for the current experiments hypothesis that 
economic games could affect judgments of physical similarity.    
  
The current study attempted to improve on the limitations of the previous studies 
discussed above by examining how judgements of facial similarity were affected by 
taking part in a social interaction (trust game) in which the other person either 
rewarded or betrayed the participant‟s trust by returning to them either a large or 
small amount of the total pot of money. In order to increase ecological validity 
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morphs using photographs of the faces of the participants and their interaction 
partners were used. To minimise the possibility that the results found were due to 
demand characteristics, rather than genuine changes in participants‟ perception of 
facial similarity, physical similarity was measured by using the self-face recognition 
task developed by Tajadura-Jiménez, Grehl, et al. (2012).  This task uses a hybrid 
staircase procedure to estimate the point at which participants were unable to 
determine whether the morphed face contained more of their own face or more of 
their interaction partner‟s face. 
  
5.4.2. Methods 
  
5.4.2.1. Design 
The study used a within-subjects design with one independent variable. The 
independent variable was the trustworthiness of the other player (trustworthy, 
untrustworthy). The dependent variable was participants‟ scores in a post-interaction 
self-recognition task and participants‟ responses to the Inclusion of the Other in the 
Self (IOS) scale (Schubert & Otten, 2002). 
  
5.4.2.2. Apparatus and Materials 
Participants were required to come to an initial session approximately one week prior 
to the experimental session.  During the initial session a digital photograph of the 
participant‟s face with a neutral facial expression was taken, and then converted to 
gray scale and mirror transposed (Keenan et al., 1999). A black template was used to 
remove non-facial attributes (e.g., background, hair, ears). Subsequently, a 
computerized morphing procedure was implemented (Abrasoft Fantamorph) to 
produce a sequence of photos in which the participant‟s face was merged with 
another person‟s face in 1% morphing transitions. This sequence of photos had as 
end points the original photos of the participant‟s face and the other person‟s face. 
The one hundred photos were saved as individual images.   
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5.4.2.3. Procedure 
Participants were attended two sessions no more than fourteen days apart.  In the 
first, participants had a photo of their face taken in order for the morphed photos to 
be created. They then had to rate 5 gender-matched faces on attractiveness, 
trustworthiness and similarity to the participant‟s own face using a seven point Likert 
scale. Two of the faces were those of the two trustees while the other three were 
faces taken from the Karolinska database (Lundqvist, Flykt, & Öhman, 1998; 
Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008). Finally participants completed the interpersonal 
reactivity questionnaire (Davis, 1980, 1983) and a four item questionnaire to 
investigate their feelings of trust towards strangers (Naef and Schupp, 2009).      
  
In the second session (see Figure 5-5), participants played two trust games in the role 
of trustor, each with a separate gender matched trustee. In each game a photograph of 
the trustee was presented on the screen, and participants decided how much of a 
£2.50 endowment (in £0.50 increments) to transfer to the trustee. Transfers were 
tripled by the experimenters. After making both transfer decisions, participants 
viewed pre-recorded videos of the trustees stating how much money they had 
decided to return to the trustor. As in the previous experiments in this chapter the 
„strategy‟ method was used (Brandts & Charness, 2009): participants were informed 
that trustees had previously made a series of hypothetical back-transfer decisions, 
one for each of the possible transfers trustors could make. In reality trustee decisions 
were manipulated such that trust was either reciprocated (70% of tripled transfer 
returned) or betrayed (10% returned).  
  
Immediately prior and subsequent to these games, participants performed a self-
recognition task (Tajadura et al., 2012) with each of the trustees‟ faces, in order to 
measure participants‟ point of subjective equality (PSE) with each face. During the 
self-recognition task participants were presented with a series of images. For each 
image they indicated whether the depicted face looked more like their own face or 
more like the other person‟s face using a two-alternative forced choice (2AFC) 
method. Each image depicted a face with a varying degree of morphing between 
“self” and “other”. 
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 PSE was calculated to reflect the degree of morphing for which participants were 
equally likely to judge the morph as “self” or as “other”. PSE values obtained for 
both interleaved staircases (“self to other”  and “other to self” directions) were 
averaged for each experimental condition(Watson & Clifford, 2003; Webster, 
Kaping, Mizokami, & Duhamel, 2004). This value is presented as the percentage of 
the “other” face contained in the PSE. For example, a PSE of 43% suggests that 
participants could not distinguish between self and other in the picture that contained 
43% of the other-face and 57% of the self-face. Any increase in this value as a result 
of the social interaction would suggest an increase in the maximum percentage of the 
“other” face contained in the pictures judged as self. 
  
The order of conditions and the identities of the models used as the trustworthy and 
untrustworthy trustees were fully counterbalanced across participants. Following the 
completion of the self-recognition task, participants completed the Inclusion of the 
Other in the Self scale (Schubert & Otten, 2002) with each trustee and were 
subsequently debriefed and dismissed with their earnings. 
 
5.4.2.4. Participants 
66 participants gave their informed consent to participate and were paid for their 
participation. The study was approved by the Departmental Ethics Committee, Royal 
Holloway, University of London. 59 participants (mean age ± SD: 23.6 ± 5.2, 15 
male) were included in the analysis (3 participants‟ data was lost due to technical 
failure, 2 participants did not send any money to one of the trustees and so did not 
receive any information regarding that trustee‟s trustworthiness and 2 had a PSE of 
either below 10 or above 90 indicating that they hadfailed to perform the self-face 
recognition task correctly). 
 
  
  
 
2
0
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Figure 5-5. Experimental procedure for experiment 5.3. 
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5.4.3. Results 
  
5.4.3.1. Perception of Facial Similarity Prior to Social Interaction  
In order to ensure that there were no significant differences in participant‟s ratings of 
the two trustees prior to the trust game. Paired sample t-tests were carried out on the 
ratings given to the trustees faces in session one.  These t-tests confirmed that there 
were no significant differences in ratings of attractiveness, t(58) = .98, p > .05, 
(trustworthy: M = 3.91, SD = 1.21, untrustworthy: M = 3.76, SD = 1.37), 
trustworthiness t(58) = -.76, p > .05, (trustworthy: M = 4.1, SD = 1.27, 
untrustworthy: M = 4.25, SD = 1.12) or similarity to own face t(58) = 1.2, p > .05, 
(trustworthy: M = 3, SD = 1.54, untrustworthy: M = 2.71, SD = 1.45). In addition a 
paired sample t-test was carried out on participants‟ PSEs from the pre-interaction 
self-face recognition task, which showed no significant difference between the two 
faces, t(58) = -.71, p > .05, (trustworthy: M = 45.86, SD =9.44, untrustworthy: M = 
44.93, SD = 9.55).  There were also no significant differences in either the amount of 
money sent to the two faces in the trust game, t(58) = -.33, I > .05 (trustworthy: M = 
2.95, SD = 1.22, untrustworthy: M = 2.9, SD = 1.14) or in the amount of money 
participants expected to receive back from the player t(58) = -1.42, p > .05, 
(trustworthy: M = 2.03, SD = 1.22, untrustworthy: M = 2.25, SD = 1.13).   
  
5.4.3.2. Perception of Facial Similarity Following Social Interaction  
In order to test whether, after accounting for perceived similarity before the 
interaction, participants would judge the face of the model who displayed 
trustworthy behaviour towards them as more similar to their own face than that of the 
one who displayed untrustworthy behaviour towards them a repeated measures 
analysis of covariance (as per Huck & Mclean, 1975; Tabachnick & Fidell, 1999), 
with post-game PSE as dependent variable, pre-game PSE as a covariate, and trustee 
trustworthiness as independent variable, revealed a significant difference between 
conditions, F(2,57) = 6.31, p < .05. This finding means that once the pre-interaction 
PSE was taken into account the post-interaction PSE was significantly higher in the 
trustworthy condition (M = 48.42, SD = 11.41) than in the untrustworthy condition 
(M = 45.76, SD = 9.06) (See Figure 5-6).  
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Figure 5-6. Percentage of other’s face in the PSE image of pre- and post-trust game 
self-face recognition task for trustworthy and untrustworthy players. Higher values 
indicate greater perceived similarity between self and other. Errors bars represent 
SEM. 
 
5.4.3.3. IOS scores Following Social Interaction  
In order to show that the manipulation of the trust game had an effect on how 
participants viewed the two trustees a paired sample t-test was carried out on the 
responses to the IOS scale.  A significant difference was found between the rating of 
closeness for the trustworthy and untrustworthy players, t(58) = 6.8, p < .001, with 
participants feeling closer to the trustworthy player (M = 3.34, SD = 1.17) than to the 
untrustworthy player (M = 2.07, SD = 0.98) (see Figure 5-7). 
 
5.4.4. Discussion 
  
The current experiment investigated whether participants‟ judgements of facial 
similarity between themselves and another person was affected by that person‟s prior 
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behaviour towards them in a trust game.  It was found that, accounting for pre-trust 
game performance, participants judged someone who had given them a generous 
amount of money as being more physically similar to them than someone who had 
returned only a very miserly amount of the money.  This finding is consistent with 
those of Epley and Whitchurch (2008) and Verosky & Todorov (2010) in indicating 
that the tendency to see the self as positive can also be applied to judgements of 
physical appearance and is also consistent with the findings of Hassin and Trope 
(2000) and Paunonen (2006) that information about a person‟s personality can affect 
judgement about their facial appearance.  
 
 
Figure 5-7. IOS scores for trustworthy and untrustworthy players. Errors bars 
represent SEM. 
   
The current experiment is the first to show that behavioural interactions with another 
person can affect judgements about one‟s physical similarity to another. Several 
other studies (Bailenson et al., 2006, 2009; DeBruine, 2002, 2005; Krupp et al., 
2008) have demonstrated that faces which are more physically similar to the self are 
attributed more positive personality traits than dissimilar faces.  The current 
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experiment indicates that the reverse is also true, that knowledge about someone‟s 
personality gained through social interaction can feed back to create a perception of 
greater physical similarity between their face and one‟s own. 
  
By examining the relationship between the pre- and post-interaction scores on the 
self-face recognition task it can be seen that this effect was primarily driven by 
participants having a greater perception of similarity between themselves and the 
generous trustee after the interaction rather than by their perception of a greater sense 
of dissimilarity with the ungenerous trustee. In fact the PSE for both the generous 
and ungenerous trustee both increased slightly compared to the pre scores. Some of 
this change may be due to the fact that in the pre-interaction self-face recognition 
task our participants tended to underestimate the amount of their own face compared 
to the other‟s in each morphed photo. Given that participants had received more 
exposure to both faces in the post-interaction task some of the increase in the PSE 
may simply be due to the greater familiarity they had with both faces.  None the less 
the significant difference found between trustworthy and untrustworthy faces still 
demonstrates that participants judged trustworthy individuals as being more similar 
to themselves than untrustworthy individuals over and above any effect of 
familiarity. 
  
The fact that this change in self recognition was only found in the direction of the 
generous trustee also rules out one possible alternative explanation for our results 
which is that participants were consciously trying to disassociate themselves from the 
miserly trustee and associate themselves with the generous one.  If this were the case 
then one would expect that, for the untrustworthy trustee, the PSE in the post-
interaction test would be lower than in the pre-interaction. Indeed given that the 
untrustworthy trustee actually took money from the participants one might expect a 
stronger negative reaction against them rather than a positive change towards the 
trustworthy trustee. The fact that PSE actually rose (indicating greater similarity 
between self and other) for both trustees suggests that participants were not 
consciously trying to dissociate themselves from the miserly trustee and therefore 
also makes it likely that their PSE for the trustworthy trustee was not greatly affected 
by a conscious bias.             
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The result of the current experiment suggests that positive self-bias is transferable 
between different types of self-information. That is just as physical similarity 
between one‟s own face and that of another leads to the belief that the other has more 
positive personality traits so too the discovery that another person has more positive 
personality traits leads to the judgement that a morphed face containing more of the 
other person is actually more similar to one‟s own.  This finding suggests an effect 
similar to the “perceptual accuracy hypothesis” (Silvia & Gendolla, 2001) which 
claims that any type of self-focussed attention will improve an individual‟s accuracy 
in judging both somatic and cognitive aspects of the self. Both the perceptual 
accuracy hypothesis and the results of experiment 5.3 suggest, in line with the 
prediction of embodied congition, that self-relevant information, whether based on 
the physical body or in more abstract cognitive representations of the self, are linked 
together such that changes in one source of self-relevant information can lead to 
similar changes in other forms of self-representation.      
  
Similarity to the self can be viewed in evolutionary terms as providing an important 
cue to genetic relatedness (DeBruine, Jones, Little, & Perrett, 2008). It has been 
argued that the positive social effects of similarity are an indicator of our tendency to 
favour our close genetic relatives over strangers and, as previously mentioned, 
several studies (DeBruine, 2002; Krupp et al., 2008) have shown that people 
cooperate more with those who look similar to them. Based on these considerations it 
is arguable that the experience of facial similarity is the phenomenological 
component of a neurocomputational variable („kinship index‟) that calibrates 
altruistic behaviours and regulates group cooperation (Krupp et al., 2008; D. 
Lieberman, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2007). On this interpretation, the results of the 
current experiment, which suggest that evidence of cooperative intent in others 
serves to structure the phenomenology of facial perception, indicate that evidence of 
cooperative intent in others serves as a contextual cue to genetic relatedness.  
  
This reciprocal relationship between trustworthy behaviour and perceived facial 
similarity may have an adaptive value as a way to encourage long term cooperation 
between unrelated individuals. If cooperative behaviour can lead to greater perceived 
similarity and perceived similarity can likewise predispose us towards cooperative 
behaviour then it is conceivable these two processes could reinforce each other.  This 
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would lead to a virtuous circle in which initial cooperation leads to a sense of greater 
physical resemblance which in turn leads to the activation of cognitive processes 
adapted towards assisting one‟s kinship group creating a predisposition towards 
further cooperation. In such a way this phenomena of increased perceived similarity 
towards trustworthy others would act as a buffer against possible temptations to 
defect against or betray the other person and thus help to maintain mutually 
beneficial relationships.  
  
The findings of the current experiment also corroborate the fluidity of perceived 
facial similarity. IMS experiments have demonstrated that synchronous VT 
stimulation of one‟s own and another person‟s face causes participants to perceive 
the other person as both more physically and psychologically similar to themselves 
(Paladino et al., 2010; Tsakiris, 2008). Notably the change in the percentage of other 
face included in the PSE image between pre and post manipulation self-face 
recognition tasks is of similar magnitudes in the current experiment as they were in 
previous studies that have used similar measures (Tajadura-Jiménez, Grehl, et al., 
2012; Tsakiris, 2008). Thus the findings of the current experiment extend the results 
of previous IMS studies by demonstrating that a purely social, as opposed to bodily, 
intervention can lead to equivalent changes in perceived facial similarity.   
  
While the current experiment is a purely behavioural one, the similarity between its 
results and those found in the fMRI study conducted by Verosky and Todorov (2010) 
does allow for some speculation on the possible neural mechanisms that underlie the 
observed findings.  Verosky and Todorov found a number of brain areas that showed 
increasing activation as the untrustworthy faces became less similar to the self but far 
less activation as the trustworthy faces became less similar to the self, suggesting that 
they distinguished between untrustworthy faces and the self far more than they did 
trustworthy faces. Based on findings from other imaging studies (Morita et al., 2008; 
Uddin, Kaplan, Molnar-Szakacs, Zaidel, & Iacoboni, 2005) Verosky and Todorov 
suggested that these areas, in particular the right inferior frontal gyrus, may become 
more active when associating positive stimuli with the self and less active when 
distancing negative stimuli from the self. In the current experiment it is possible that 
the effect of the social interaction was to decrease the amount that these areas 
activated when observing morphs of the self-face with the untrustworthy face and to 
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increase to amount they activated for morphs of the self-face with the trustworthy 
face. Further research is needed however to investigate exactly how the distinct 
neural areas involved in the judgement of facial similarity and in judgements of 
trustworthiness interact to produce the behavioural effects observed here.  
   
Facial similarity has been established to have an effect on judgements of 
trustworthiness and on cooperative behaviour.  Experiment 5.3 demonstrates that a 
reciprocal relationship also holds, participants viewed another person who had 
cooperated with them in a social interaction as being significantly more similar to 
them. This finding demonstrates that information about the social behaviour of 
another person towards the self can affect judgements of physical similarity between 
self-face and other person‟s face suggesting a two way link between representations 
of physical appearance and representation of personality traits.   
  
5.5. General Discussion 
  
Experiments 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 all examined the relationship between the 
representation of one‟s own face and the face of another person and the perceived 
trustworthiness of that other person.  Experiments 5.1 and 5.2 investigated the 
question of whether the application of tactile stimulation to one‟s own face while 
observing the synchronous tactile stimulation being applied to the face of another, a 
procedure that has previously been shown to lead to greater perceived similarity 
between one‟s own face and that of the other person, would lead to greater offers in 
the trust game than asynchronous VT stimulation did.  Experiment 5.3 investigated 
whether the relationship between trust and perceived facial similarity held in the 
other direction, that is whether information about whether another person was 
trustworthy or untrustworthy would affect how similar that person‟s face was 
perceived to be to one‟s own face. 
  
The results of the three experiments offer support for the idea that facial similarity 
and trust have a reciprocal relationship.  Experiment 5.1 found a significant 
difference between the synchronous and asynchronous conditions in the ratings of 
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the trustworthiness of the trustee.  Synchronous IMS led to higher ratings of 
trustworthiness and attractiveness and also led to higher ratings of similarity between 
the participant‟s face and the face of the trustee. Experiment 5.2 found a significant 
effect of synchrony on the amount given in the trust game with synchronous IMS 
leading to larger amounts of money being sent to the trustee than did asynchronous 
stimulation. Experiment 5.3 found that learning through a social interaction that 
another person was trustworthy, as opposed to untrustworthy, led to an increase in 
their perceived facial similarity to one‟s own face. 
  
As covered in the introduction to this chapter many studies have shown that facial 
features are automatically used in judgements of personality (Berry & McArthur, 
1986; Hassin & Trope, 2000; Todorov et al., 2008) Several recent studies have also 
shown that IMS can change perceptions of social closeness and similarity in 
personality (Paladino et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jiménez, Longo, et al., 2012) as well as 
in physical appearance (Sforza et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jiménez, Grehl, et al., 2012; 
Tsakiris, 2008).  Taken together the findings of these experiments add to the 
considerable amount of research showing strong bidirectional links between the 
perception of physical characteristics, in this case perceived facial similarity, and the 
attribution of personality traits.  At present however it is still unclear what the precise 
mechanism behind this link and further research is necessary in order to identify the 
neural basis of these findings.  
  
Another important issue in interpreting the results of the current chapter is the 
question of how far the offers and responses in the trust game can be considered to 
be truly indicative of trust.  In the introduction to this chapter I reviewed a number of 
studies suggesting strong links between subjective judgements of trustworthiness and 
the trust game (Ashraf et al., 2006; Chaudhuri & Gangadharan, 2007; Gächter et al., 
2004; Glaeser et al., 2000; Johansson-Stenman et al., 2013; Naef & Schupp, 2009). 
However, several researchers (Ashraf, Bohnet, & Piankov, 2003; Ermisch, Gambetta, 
Laurie, Siedler, & Noah Uhrig, 2007; Haile, Sadrieh, & Verbon, 2008; Holm & 
Nystedt, 2008) have failed to find any association between offers in the trust game 
and the response to commonly used survey measures of trust such as the General 
Social Survey (GSS) or the World Values Survey (WVS). This has led some authors 
(e.g. Hardin, 2003, 2006; Levi, 2003; Levitt & List, 2007; Nannestad, 2008) to argue 
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that the trust game fails to be a good measure of trust.  In particular Levi (2003) and 
Hardin (2003, 2006) have pointed to a speciﬁc problem of interpretation in 
connection with the trust game and have argued that the amount of money sent by the 
trustor is a measure not of trust but cooperation. Taking cooperation as a proxy for 
trust, as is routinely done in many trust experiments, is valid only if trust is from the 
outset deﬁned as cooperation, or if it is assumed that trust is a necessary condition for 
the cooperation observed. This question raises the issue of whether any results of the 
experiments reported here can be interpreted as strictly being due to an increase in 
trust or whether they might instead reflect a more general effect of increased 
cooperation.  It is important to note that while in the rest of this chapter the measures 
and manipulations used are referred to as being based around trust this does not 
necessarily mean that they are trust specific, it is also possible that they reflect a 
more generalised modulation of pro-sociality or cooperation. 
  
A related question is whether the effects found in these studies are specific to trust or 
whether they are due to a more general sense of affiliation between self and other.  In 
experiment 5.1 as well as leading to increased ratings of trustworthiness, 
synchronous IMS also led to increased ratings of affiliation. One possible 
explanation for the disparity in the findings between effect of synchronous 
stimulation on the ratings of trustworthiness and the lack of such an effect in the 
behavioural measure of trust is that participants did not actually feel greater trust for 
the trustee in the trustworthy condition. Instead they may have felt a sense of greater 
general affiliation with the trustee which they then expressed by giving higher rating 
of trustworthiness when this question was presented to them but which did not 
translate into greater trust when it came to decision making. While this is possible 
given the results of experiment 5.1 the finding of effect of synchrony on trust 
behaviour in experiment 5.2 suggests that, at the very least, synchrony can lead to 
enough positive affiliation towards another to affect behaviour in an economic 
game.  It is also worth noting that in the principle component analysis conducted by 
Tajadura-Jiménez, Longo, et al. (2012), ratings of affiliation did not load on the same 
component as ratings of trust and attractiveness. This suggests that, in that study at 
least, multisensory stimulation affected judgements of trustworthiness and affiliation 
independently. It is also notable that in experiment 5.1 no effect of synchrony was 
found on the IOS scale measure, in contrast to the effect found by Paladino et al. 
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(2010), indicating that the effect of synchronous stimulation on affiliation in the 
current study varied depending on the measure used in a similar way to its effect on 
trust.  
  
In experiment 5.3, the manipulation of the trustworthiness of the other person led to 
effects for both judgements of physical similarity, and for the rating of the others on 
the IOS scale. This is in line with the finding by Ashraf, Bohnet and Piankov (2006), 
that trustworthy behaviour is most strongly predicted by general benevolence and 
suggests that the effect of the manipulation of amount of money returned on 
perceived physical similarity may have been driven by a general feeling of the trustee 
being a kind and generous person, rather than being specifically tied to that person 
being trustworthy. 
  
The question of what exactly drives the bidirectional relationship between trust and 
body representations observed here is fertile ground for future studies. One path of 
investigation would be to examine whether manipulating the other facets of 
trustworthiness described by Mayer et al. (1995), i.e. ability and integrity, also lead 
to increased perceived facial similarity.  For example would discovering that a 
person was competent versus incompetent in advising the participant on how to 
complete a task such as judging the number of dots in an array (Paladino et al., 
2010)or judging which of a series of gratings has a greater contrast than the others 
(Bahrami et al., 2010) lead to greater perceived similarity?  
  
Alternatively one could investigate whether manipulations that are not based on trust 
but which are designed to increase feelings of interpersonal closeness such as 
similarity of interests, tastes or personality lead to increased perceived facial 
similarity. Given that similar personal tastes have been found to correlate with 
feelings of interpersonal liking (Bakagiannis & Tarrant, 2006; Lydon, Jamieson, & 
Zanna, 1988) a finding of a similar effect to the one found in experiment 5.3 after 
these manipulations would suggest that the effect found here is primarily based on 
feelings of similarity in personality between self and other rather than trust per se. 
  
Finally further investigation is needed to identify the mechanism by which synchrony 
of IMS has an effect on participants‟ trust behaviour. One potential fruitful avenue 
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would be to examine the mediating role of other known effects of IMS, such as 
increased perceived facial similarity or increased affiliation as measured in 
questionnaire items or the IOS. If the effects of synchrony on trust behaviour found 
in experiment 5.2 are driven by the power of IMS to increase physical similarity 
between self and other then one would expect the PSE of a post-stimulation self-face 
recognition task to mediate the amount of money offered. If on the other hand the 
effect of synchrony on trust is due to increased social affiliation between self and 
other then scores on the IOS scale and ratings of affiliation and trustworthiness 
would be expected to be mediating variables.    
  
In conclusion the studies presented in this chapter show evidence for a bidirectional 
relationship between representations of physical similarity between self and other 
and both explicit and behavioural measures of the trustworthiness of the other 
person.  In the following chapter the relationship between trust and body 
representations is again investigated but this time with a focus on shared neural 
representations of the actions of oneself and others.   
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Chapter 6. Trust in Action: Effect of 
Trustworthiness on Neural Systems for 
Action Observation. 
 
“Behaviour is the mirror in which everyone shows their image” 
   Johann Wolfgang von Goeth, (1906, p. 36) 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter of this thesis examined the relationship between trust and face 
perception.  Experiment 5.2 revealed that synchronous IMS led to increased trust in 
others as measured by the amounts sent in a trust game while experiment 5.3 
demonstrated that discovering that a person is trustworthy leads to an increase in 
perceived similarity between one‟s own face and that of the other person. Expanding 
upon the results of experiment 5.3, the experiment reported in this final experimental 
chapter used fMRI to examine the effects of perceived trustworthiness on a different 
measure of bodily overlap between self and other, namely the activation of the motor 
system when observing the actions of others. 
 
As discussed in chapter 1 there is now a vast amount of evidence that the observation 
of the actions of another person leads to the activation of a network of neural regions 
involved in the execution of those actions (for recent reviews see: Bonini, Ferrari, & 
Fogassi, 2013; Fogassi, 2011; Molenberghs, Cunnington, & Mattingley, 2012; 
Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010). While mirror neurons were orgininally identified in 
the premotor cortex of the maccaque by G Rizzolatti et al. (1988; see also di 
Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992; Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & 
Rizzolatti, 1996), they have since been found in humans using single cell recordings 
(Mukamel et al., 2010).  There have also been a large number of imaging studies that 
suggest the existence of a similar shared neural system of shared representations of 
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action execution and observation in humans.  Originally this network was believed to 
consist mainly of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), the inferior parietal lobe (IPL) and 
also the superior temporal sulcus (STS), which is activated by action observation but 
not action execution (Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006).  However further studies have 
revealed a number of other neural regions that have been found to exhibit shared 
representations of action observation and action execution, including the ventral 
premotor cortex (vPMC), the dorsal premotor cortex (dPMC), the intraparietal sulcus 
(IPS), the superior parietal lobe (SPL), the precuneus, the insula, the primary 
somatosensory cortex (SI), the cingulate suclus and the cerebellum (Cattaneo & 
Rizzolatti, 2009; Molenberghs et al., 2012).  
 
The existence of these “mirror neuron” regions appear to offer a link between 
perceiving the actions of others and generating one‟s own motor actions and have 
been hypothesised to be involved in a number of social cognitive processes including 
imitation, empathy and mind reading (Bonini et al., 2013; Gallese, 2009; Hurley, 
2008; Iacoboni, 2009; Oberman & Ramachandran, 2007). It has become clear that 
mirror mechanisms also exist in areas involved in somatosensory (Avenanti et al., 
2005; Bufalari et al., 2007; Keysers & Gazzola, 2009; Keysers et al., 2004; Keysers, 
Kaas, & Gazzola, 2010; Thomas et al., 2006) and emotional (Bastiaansen et al., 
2009; Jabbi et al., 2008; Wicker et al., 2003) processing. Given the diversity of areas 
that show mirror properties and the varying accounts of what brain areas make up the 
classic motor “mirror neuron system”, for the sake of clarity I will henceforth refer to 
the network of specifically motor neural regions that are activated by the observation 
of actions under investigation in this chapter as the action observation network 
(AON).   
 
The claims made about the importance of mirror neurons for social cognition in 
general raise the question of how far the AON network is modulated by social 
factors. Several studies have sought to examine the effect of various social factors on 
the AON using a number of different neuroimaging methodologies.  One commonly 
used methodology for the investigation of the mirror neuron system has been to 
examine the electrophysiological signals produced by action observation. Of 
particular interest is the mu suppression (8-13Hz) bandrange (Gastaut & Bert, 1954) 
which has been linked to motor simulation due to the fact that mu suppression to 
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observation of movements is similar to that during execution of movements (Cochin, 
Barthelemy, Lejeune, Roux, & Martineau, 1998; Lepage & Théoret, 2007; 
Muthukumaraswamy & Johnson, 2004). 
 
Mu suppression has been shown to be modulated by a number of social factors. 
Indeed Gastaut and Bert (1954), in the first study to identify mu suppression, noted 
that suppression seemed particularly strong when a participant identified themselves 
with a person on the screen. The first study to systematically investigate the social 
modulation of mu suppression by social relevance (Kilner, Marchant, & Frith, 2006) 
found that mu suppression over the parietal cortex was stronger when observing the 
actions of another person face to face than when the same actions were observed 
with the person‟s back facing the participant.  Oberman, Pineda and Ramachandran 
(2007) demonstrated that mu suppression increased with the amount of social 
interaction observed, and a second study by the same researchers found greater mu-
suppression when observing human actions than when observing actions carried out 
by a robotic arm (Oberman, McCleery, Ramachandran, & Pineda, 2007).  
 
Two other studies that investigated the effect of social interaction on mu suppression 
did so by measuring EEG signals during social interaction.  Kourtis, Sebanz and 
Knoblich (Kourtis, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2010) focused on the amplitude of the 
contingent negative variation (CNV) (Walter, Cooper, Aldridge, McCallum, & 
Winter, 1964), the late part of which is considered a marker of motor preparation and 
predominantly reﬂects SMA and MI activity (for a review, see Leuthold, Sommer, & 
Ulrich, 2004), and also measured activity in the beta bandrange.  They found that 
when observing the actions of a partner in an interaction, both signals showed greater 
activation of the late CNV and greater suppression of beta signals compared to when 
the same actions were performed by a „loner‟ who did not interact with the 
participant. A similar paradigm was used by Meyer, Hunnius, van Elk, van Ede and 
Bekkering (2011) who showed greater mu suppression in 3 year olds when observing 
the actions of an adult when they were playing a game with them compared to when 
they were not interacting with that adult. Perry, Stein and Bentin (2011) also showed 
a greater effect of mu suppression when participants view a person acting during a 
social interaction compared to outside of a social interaction.  However in this case 
the interaction was competitive rather than cooperative. 
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Finally Gutsell and Inzlicht (2010) examined the relationship between mu 
suppression in EEG and ingroup/outgroup racial groups, and found greater mu 
suppression for a racial ingroup compared to a racial outgroup during the observation 
of simple actions.  In addition the authors note that this mu suppression for the out 
group was negatively correlated with racial prejudice, with less mu suppression for 
negatively judged racial outgroups than for positively judged outgroups. Further 
studies (Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2013) showed that this ingroup bias in mu suppression 
could be modulated by creating a greater sense of closeness between one‟s self and 
the outgroup. Furthermore ingroup bias was present when participants watched a 
friendly action by either ingroup or outgroup, but when they observed a hostile 
action the bias disappeared. This finding indicates that the AON is sensitive to 
contextual factors such as the valance of an action as well as the identity of the 
observed actor. 
 
As well as EEG studies, TMS induced measures of corticospinal (CS) excitability 
have also indicated that the AON is sensitive to the ingroup/outgroup status of an 
observed actor.  Molnar-Szakacs, Wu, Robles and Iacoboni (2007) found that that CS 
excitability was modulated by both the ethnicity of an actor and the meaning of the 
gestures being made, with American participants showing higher CS excitability 
towards an American actor making American cultural gestures and higher CS 
excitability towards a Nicaraguan actor making Nicaraguan cultural gestures than 
vice versa. In contrast however Désy and Théoret (2007) found increased 
corticospinal activation when participants observed a hand of a different skin colour 
performing an action compared to a hand of their own colour. This discrepancy may 
be due to the different nature of the hand actions observed in the two 
studies; Molnar-Szakacs et al. used communicative gestures while Désy and 
Théoret used simple finger movements. Despite the differences, both studies point to 
the sensitivity of the AON to the ethnic identity of an actor. 
 
Additional TMS evidence for the social modulation of the AON comes from two 
studies.  Möttönen, Farmer and Watkins (2010) used signs from British Sign 
Language to show that the AON is sensitive to the communicative value of gestures, 
with greater CS excitability in the left hemisphere once participants are informed that 
the actions they are observing have a communicative meaning.  Hogeveen and Obhi, 
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(2012) split participants into 4 groups, each of which either took part in social 
interaction then observed human actions, took part in social interaction then observed 
robot actions, only observed human actions or only observed robot actions. The 
study found that prior social interaction led to increased MEPs when watching 
human actions but not when watching robot actions.  Additionally those who were 
involved in social interactions were split between mimickers and non-mimickers, and 
it was found that mimickers had higher MEPs than non-mimickers when watching 
human actions but not when watching robot actions.   
 
The final methodology to reveal evidence of social modulations of the AON is a 
series of fMRI studies (Liew, Han, & Aziz-Zadeh, 2011; Molenberghs, Halász, 
Mattingley, Vanman, & Cunnington, 2013; Sobhani, Fox, Kaplan, & Aziz-Zadeh, 
2012). Liew, Han and Aziz-Zadeh had Chinese participants watch either Chinese or 
Caucasian actors performing familiar and unfamiliar gestures.  The study found that 
watching actors of the same race led to greater BOLD activation in the IPL, a key 
part of the AON, but also, surprisingly given the results of Molnar-Szakacs et al. 
(2007), greater activation of the IPL when watching unfamiliar as opposed to 
familiar gestures. The other two studies that investigated this issue both sought to 
study the effect of purely social (as opposed to racial) differences between observed 
action. Molenberghs et al. divided participants into two teams and asked them to 
observe members of their own team and the other team making hand gestures in a 
competitive setting.  They found that participant‟s judged hand actions of their own 
team members as relatively faster than those of member of the other team and found 
using fMRI that observation of one‟s own team led to a preferential activation of the 
IPL.    
 
The final fMRI study to investigate the effect of social modulation was carried out by 
Sobhani et al. (2012) and bares the most similarity to the study reported in this 
section.  In this study Jewish participants observed the actions of actors who belong 
to either a dislikable group (neo-Nazis) or a likable group (tolerant people).  Apart 
from being labelled as a member of one or other groups all actors were of a white 
ethnic background and performed the same actions. An MVPA analysis found that a 
classifier trained on brain activation patterns successfully discriminated between the 
likable and dislikable action observation conditions within the right ventral premotor 
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cortex. These two studies indicate that the AON is sensitive to the membership of a 
social ingroup/outgroup per se rather than only being affected by the physical 
similarity or dissimilarity of an observed actor.   
 
However, despite the fact that there was no physical difference between the actors in 
the two groups used by Molenberghs et al. (2012) and Sobhani et al. (2012), in both 
studies the actors were made to be socially closer or more distant to the participant 
based either on the decision of the experimenter as to how to split people into groups 
(Molenberghs et al., 2012) or via a verbal cue (Sobhani et al., 2012).  As yet there 
have been no studies that have examined how judgements about an individual, based 
on prior experience of that individual‟s behaviour, affects the AON.  Investigating 
the question of whether the AON is sensitive to such interpersonal, as opposed to 
intergroup factors, is important as, more often than not, we interact with individuals 
from the same social milieu (e.g. at work, school and socially) and therefore simple 
ingroup/outrgoup distinctions  may not capture the full range of variability of our 
social life. Thus it is important to investigate how specific others, rather than an 
unspecified unknown “other group”, are represented in the AON. The current study  
therefore addressed this lacuna by investigating whether manipulating the perceived 
trustworthiness of an actor leads to a greater activation of the AON, indicating a 
greater overlap between self and other, for a trustworthy actor than for an 
untrustworthy actor.  
 
As well as examining the general effect of trustworthiness the current study was also 
interested in determining whether the AON would be active during the actual social 
interaction between the participant and each of the actors.   Therefore a novel, multi-
round economic game was developed to be played within the scanner, in which the 
actions of each of the observed actors also served to indicate the choice they had 
made in the game.  The possibility that the AON may be differentially activated by 
actions with different reward value has been suggested by several recent studies.  
The first by Caggiano, Fogassi, Rizzolatti, Casile and Giese (2012) measured the 
activations of single neurons in the monkey brain and found a set of neurons in F5 
that fire during both the observation and execution of the grasping of an object and 
are modulated by the value the monkey associates with the grasped object.  The 
majority of the neurons measured (61%) fired specifically when the grasping or 
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observing the grasping of food while a small minority (7%) showed a preferential 
response to non-food objects. 
 
A number of studies have also found evidence that the AON in humans shows a 
preferential activation when observing rewarding actions (E. C. Brown, Wiersema, 
Pourtois, & Brüne, 2013; Cheng, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2007).  Cheng et al. found that 
participants who had not eaten showed greater activation in the IFG and posterior 
parietal cortex when observing another person grasping food than did those who had 
eaten recently.  In addition a recent study by Brown et al. showed that mu 
suppression was delayed when participants watched actions that were financially 
punishing compared to when they watched actions that were financially rewarding, 
indicating that the AON is also modulated by the processing of more abstractly 
rewarding stimuli.  
 
Given that AON responds to observed actions and is modulated by social factors, the 
current study investigated whether observing an actor‟s actions that indicate a fair 
(i.e. monetarily positive choice) response towards the participant during an economic 
game will result in greater/higher AON responses as opposed to the observation of an 
actor‟s actions that indicate an unfair (i.e. a monetarily negative) choice.  Participants 
made a series of decisions whether or not to accept or reject the offers of their 
interaction partner, during which they observed recorded videos of actors who could 
be either acting in a trustworthy or untrustworthy manner. One actor was consistently 
making positive choices, and thus building a positive/trust reputation, while the other 
actor was consistently making negative choices, thus building a negative reputation. 
Importantly however, the participant‟s only means to ascertain whether a particular 
action was likely to be positive or negative was the identity of the actor making the 
action, thus allowing the study to focus on the effects of prior reputation on the 
AON.  
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6.2. Methods 
 
6.2.1. Design 
 
In this study, participants viewed the actions of two people (henceforth referred to as 
interaction partners) during multiple rounds of an economic game. To investigate 
activity that occurred when participants were monitoring other‟s actions, activity 
time-locked to the onset of videos of each interaction partner‟s actions was 
examined. Participants were told that the videos were recordings of each of the 
interaction partner‟s decisions on how to split a pot of money, which could be either 
a fair or unfair split. This created a 2x2 factorial design. The first factor called 
“trustworthiness” was whether the interaction partner made fair or unfair splits of a 
£10 pot on the majority of trials. The second factor called “indicator” was whether 
the interaction partner indicated their choice of how to split the money by grasping 
one of the lamps or by using a hidden remote control to turn on one of the lamps (see 
table 6.1).  
 
Table 6.1.  Design of experiment 6.1.  
Condition Trustworthiness Indicator 
 
1 
Trustworthy Grasping 
2 Trustworthy Light 
3 Untrustworthy Grasping 
4 Untrustworthy Light 
 
Following the videos, participants were presented with a screen where they could 
either reject or accept an offer from the person seen in the video (before they knew 
the offer).  To allow the investigation of activity while participants were deciding 
whether to accept or reject the offers made by their interaction partner, activity time 
locked to the presentation of the participants decision screen was examined.  A one 
factor design was used for this analysis. The factor was whether participants decided 
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to reject or accept the split made by the interaction partner.  In addition, to ensure 
that the manipulation affected participants‟ judgements of the trustworthiness of their 
interaction partners and to ensure that there was no significant difference between 
pre-interaction judgements of trustworthiness for the trustworthy and untrustworthy 
interaction partners, pre and post-interaction ratings of trustworthiness and 
attractiveness were gained from the participants.  Missed trials were not included in 
this analysis.         
 
6.2.2. Apparatus 
 
The behavioural and fMRI data for this study was collected using the same 
experimental setup and apparatus (see fig.6.1 for a schematic). Participants were 
scanned using the 3tesla Siemens Trio scanner housed at Royal Holloway, University 
of London. During data collection, participants lay supine in the scanner with the 
fingers of the right hand positioned on a  MRI-compatible 4-button response box. 
Stimuli were projected onto a screen behind the participant and viewed in a mirror 
positioned over the participant‟s head. Presentation software (Neurobehavioral 
Systems, Inc.) was used for the presentation of stimulus and the collection of 
participants‟ responses. A custom-built parallel port interface connected to the PC 
running Presentation received transistor-transistor logic (TTL) pulse inputs from the 
response keypad and also received TTL pulses from the MRI scanner at the onset of 
each volume acquisition, allowing events in the experiment to become precisely 
synchronized with the onset of each volume acquisition. Behavioural data analysis 
was performed offline, and event timings were prepared for subsequent general 
linear model (GLM) analyses of fMRI data. Analyses of fMRI data were conducted 
in SPM8. 
 
6.2.3. Procedure 
 
6.2.3.1. Experimental Task 
The main experimental task used in this study involved making a series of economic 
decisions using a modified version of the Ultimatum Game (Bolton & Zwick, 1995; 
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Güth, Schimittberger, & Schwarze, 1982; Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & 
Cohen, 2003; Thaler, 1988). In the standard Ultimatum Game, two players are given 
the opportunity to split a sum of money. One player is deemed the proposer and the 
other, the responder. The proposer makes an offer as to how this money should be 
split between the two. The second player (the responder) can either accept or reject 
this offer. If it is accepted, the money is split as proposed, but if the responder rejects 
the offer, then neither player receives anything. According to rational choice theory, 
responders should accept all non-zero offers. In reality, responders typically reject 
offers in which the proposer‟s share exceeds 80% of the total, preferring to gain 
nothing rather than accept an inferior share of the winnings (Bolton & Zwick, 1995; 
Güth et al., 1982).  
 
 
Figure 6-1 Apparatus used in scanning session 
 
The task used in the current study had the same basic setup as the ultimatum game, 
with the participant taking the role of responder and their interaction partner that of 
proposer.  In the current task participants were told that they would be interacting 
with two different proposers and would take part in multiple interactions with each. 
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However a number of alterations were made to the game in order to allow it to take 
place in the scanner and to ensure that a number of key aspects of the central 
hypothesis of the study were maintained.  The greatest change to the game was that, 
rather than participants first receiving a proposal and then making a decision  
whether to accept or reject that offer, in the current study participants first had to 
decide whether to accept or reject the offer and only subsequently discovered what it 
was.  This modification, which in effect made the current study‟s task a hybrid of the 
ultimatum game and the trust game, was made to ensure that participant‟s based their 
decision on whether to accept or reject each amount only on their past experience of 
how each proposer had decided to split the money rather than basing their decision 
on the way the money was split in each particular trial. This allowed for the 
examination of the reputational effects on AON responses. 
 
A second change was that participants were informed that they would not be taking 
part in a live interaction with the proposers but that instead the two proposers had 
each made multiple choices on how to split the pot, based on a forced choice 
between two possible ways to split the pot offered by the experimenter.  Participants 
were informed that although the proposers had already made their decisions, both the 
participant and the proposer would each be paid based on the decisions made by both 
the participant and proposer in one of the trials in which they interacted. This change 
was made so that, despite the use of video stimuli of the proposers‟ actions, 
participants still believed that their decisions would have an effect on both their own 
payment for the study and also on the payment that the proposers themselves 
received. 
 
A third change to the standard ultimatum game was that before making the decision 
to accept or reject the offer participants viewed a video of the proposer. In each video 
the proposer was seated at a table with two lamps on each side of them and with their 
right hand placed in the centre of the table and their left hand hidden. Participants 
were informed that while these videos were being filmed the experimenter had been 
standing behind the camera with two options of how to split the money they had been 
given for the pot, one on the left side of the proposer and the other on the right.  
Participants were told that in some trials the proposers had been told to indicate the 
choice of which proposal they wished to make by reaching and grasping the lamp on 
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one side or the other and in other trials the proposer had indicated which of the 
proposals they wished to make by using a hidden remote to turn on one or other of 
the lights.   
 
In fact the proposers were confederates who had not actually made any decisions 
during these videos.  The decisions attributed to them were in fact manipulated by 
the experimenter to ensure that one of the proposers usually made a fair division, 
offering either 40%, 50% or 60% of the pot to the participant, while the other 
proposer always made an unfair division, offering either 5%, 10% or 15% of the pot 
to the participant.  However, in the scanning session there were also seven “catch 
trials” in which the proposer made offers of the opposite trustworthiness from the 
offer they usually made. This ensured that participants did not become too habituated 
to the correspondence between the fair and unfair splits and the identity of the two 
proposers,  so that they treated their decision on each trial as being of equal 
importance.  To ensure that participants had a chance to learn the correspondence 
between the trustworthiness of the split and the identity of the proposer, the catch 
trials only appeared after the first ten trials, five with each of the proposers.   
 
A final alteration from the standard ultimatum game was the means by which 
participants indicated whether they were willing to accept or reject the offer being 
proposed. In order to ensure that participants focused on the grasping action in the 
grasping condition, participants were told to press either a left or right button to 
indicate whether they wished to accept or reject the offer.  Which button meant 
accept and which meant reject varied according to which of the lamps was reached 
for/lit up by the proposer and was indicated in the following decision screen.  In half 
of the trials, to accept the offer participants were told to press the button 
corresponding to the side of the screen that the proposer had indicated and in the 
other half, to accept the offer participants were told to press the button corresponding 
to the opposite side of the screen that the proposer had indicated.  In all trials 
participants were told to respond using an egocentric reference frame rather than the 
reference frame of the proposer, so that when the proposer reached to the left side of 
the screen from the participant‟s perspective, and the following decision screen said 
to press the same side, they would press the left button,  Importantly, participants 
only discovered whether each trial required them to use the same or opposite button 
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to indicate accept after they had finished observing the video for that trial, thus 
ensuring that any activation in the motor cortex observed during the duration of the 
video was not due to motor preparation but must instead have been due to action 
observation.  
 
These modifications allowed the current study to investigate the effect on the AON 
on observing the action of someone known to be trustworthy compared to the action 
of someone known to be untrustworthy, and also allowed the contrast between a 
visually observed action (the grasping condition) and a non-action based indicator 
(the light condition).  The fact that, apart from the identity of the proposer, the setup 
looked identical at the onset of all videos ensured that participants could not 
determine whether each video would be a light or action video.  The fact that in each 
video the proposer indicated their choice with reference to the position of the lamps 
ensured that all videos were equivalent in terms of their demands on spatial attention, 
meaning that any difference in the motor system between the grasping and light 
conditions had to be due to a differential effect of processing the observed action.    
 
As a result of these changes to the ultimatum game, each trial of the task in the 
current study was divided into four different periods (see Figure 6-2).  In the first 
period participants observed a 2 second “indicator” video in which the proposer 
indicated their decision on how to split the pot as described above.  In the second 
period participants had to decide whether they wanted to accept or reject the division 
of the pot that the other person had made in the indicator video, using one of the two 
direction buttons as detailed above. In  this period of the trial participants saw a 
screen with either the word “same” or “different” on it, which indicated whether they 
had to press the button corresponding to the same side of the screen the proposer had 
indicated  or to the opposite side.  This “decision” screen was always present for 3 
seconds.  In the third period participants saw an “outcome” screen which was made 
up of a picture of the face of the proposer and information about how they had 
decided to split the pot of money between themselves and the participant. The 
“outcome” screen was also present for 3 seconds and ensured that participants had a 
chance to learn the difference between the trustworthy and untrustworthy proposer in 
terms of how they split the pot of money.  Finally, in the fourth period participants 
received feedback on what their decision had been.  This was in the form of either 
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the word accepted or rejected or, in cases where participants failed to press either 
button before the end of the “decision” screen, the word missed. This “feedback” 
period was displayed for 500 ms. The purpose of the “feedback” period was to 
ensure that participants understood how to use the buttons to correctly express their 
decisions and also to provide them with an additional prompt to make sure they 
responded to the “decision” period within the 3 seconds.        
 
6.2.3.2 Training Session 
In order to ensure that participants were able to understand and complete the task 
correctly all participants attended a training session no more than 14 days before they 
took part in the MRI scanning session.  During this training session participants first 
saw images of the faces of the two people they would interact with during the 
scanning session, along with 8 gender matched faces and an additional 10 faces of 
the opposite gender. They were first asked to rate the faces for attractiveness and 
then again for trustworthiness. The faces were presented in a random order. Each 
face was presented for 2 seconds and participants then had to rate the face using a 
small marker on a horizontal scale which could be moved along the scale using the 
keyboard.  In all the scale had 30 possible positions. After rating all 20 faces for 
attractiveness the faces were presented again in a random order and participants rated 
each face for trustworthiness.   
 
Following the face rating, participants were given the instructions for the main 
experimental task that they would undertake during both the training phase and in the 
scanner.  They were then given a shorter version of the main experimental task 
consisting of 60 trials, which were equally distributed between the four experimental 
conditions (15 trustworthy grasping, 15 untrustworthy grasping, 15 trustworthy light 
and 15 untrustworthy light). The training version of the experimental task used 
videos where both proposers were from the opposite gender to the participant and 
participants were informed that the pot of money being split in each trial was £5. In 
addition, due to the lower number of trials in the training session there were no 
“catch” trials in this session.    
  
 
2
3
4 
 
Figure 6-2 Outline of the time line of experimental trials during the main task. 
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In total 41 participants took part in the training session.  However, the current study 
was concerned with producing an affective reaction towards the two proposers. 
Therefore it was important to ensure that only those participants showing an affective 
response to the untrustworthy person, by rejecting more of their offers than they 
accepted, were invited to take part in the scanning session.  This screening procedure 
was used for two reasons.  First it ensured that all participants for the scanning 
session were able to learn the correspondence between the identity of the proposer 
and the trustworthiness of the offers.  Second it removed those participants who 
employed the optimal strategy according to rational choice theory and accepted all 
offers made by either proposer. This was necessary because those who accepted all 
or almost all offers did not have to pay any attention to the identity of the proposer 
and so might not be expected to have a strong affective reaction to either proposer. 
Although removing participants from the study based on their failure to perform as 
desired in the behavioural task does reduce the generalizability of the current study‟s 
results, the expense of scanning participants in an MRI study meant that this 
screening process was necessary in order to ensure that the participant‟s tested did 
experience the two proposers as trustworthy and untrustworthy.  Out of the 41 
participant‟s tested in the training session 28 showed the desired pattern of responses 
and of those, 21 were subsequently scanned and 18 were included in the final 
analysis (for more details see section 6.2.4).  
 
6.2.3.3 Scanning Session 
In the scanning session participants first had the experimental task explained to them 
again and were then told that in this version of the task the amount of money being 
split by each proposer was £10.  Participants were then positioned in the scanner and 
first carried out a practice block of ten trials of the main task described in section 
6.2.3.1. The practice session had two purposes. First it allowed participants to 
become familiar with the screen and button box setup used in the scanner and second 
it allowed participants to learn the relationship between the two proposers and their 
likely responses, meaning that during the main scanning session they were already 
aware of the trustworthiness of their proposers.    During this practice session a high 
resolution T1-weighted structural image was acquired. These anatomical images 
were used for the purposes of normalization (see below) and displaying results.  
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Following the completion of the practice block and anatomical scan participants then 
began the main experimental task. The task consisted of  140 trials, which were 
equally distributed between the four experimental conditions (35 trustworthy 
grasping, 35 untrustworthy grasping, 35 trustworthy light and 35 untrustworthy 
light). Events in each trial took place across five TRs (0–15 s; TR=3s). The interval 
between scan onset and “indicator” period onset was varied over the first TR from 
trial-to-trial. To optimally sample the decision a randomly varying interval between 
the scan onset and these cues was introduced over the second and third TRs. This 
achieved an effective temporal sampling resolution much finer than one TR for the 
conditions of interest. These intervals were uniformly distributed for each condition, 
ensuring that Evoked Haemodynamic responses (EHRs) time-locked to the events 
were sampled evenly across the time period following each “indicator” or “decision” 
period.  
 
Subsequent participants carried out the face rating task which they had performed at 
the beginning of the training session, again rating each face for attractiveness and 
trustworthiness.  While participants rated the faces phase and magnitude, maps were 
collected using a GRE field map sequence. 
 
Following the completion of the face rating task participants were removed from the 
scanner and were debriefed as to the true nature of the study.  Participants were 
informed that they would not be paid based on their responses as had previously been 
claimed but instead would be paid £15 plus whatever money they had earned in the 
training session. The field maps were used to unwarp the images post-hoc in order to 
minimize artefactual effects. 
 
6.2.4. Participants 
 
In total twenty one participants were scanned.  All gave their informed consent to 
participate and were paid for their participation. All participants were healthy and 
right-handed and were screened for neurological disorders. Three participants were 
excluded from the analyses, two due to a high level of movement artefacts and one 
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due to a technical problem that led to a loss of their data.  This left a total of eighteen 
participants (mean age ± SD: 21.1 ± 2.4, 4 male)   The study was approved by the 
Departmental Ethics Committee, Royal Holloway, University of London.  
 
6.2.5. Functional imaging and analysis 
 
6.2.5.1 Data Acquisition 
720 EPI scans were acquired from each participant. In each scan 38 slices were 
acquired in an ascending manner, at an oblique angle (≈15˚) to the AC-PC line in 
order to decrease the impact of susceptibility artefacts in the orbitofrontal cortex 
(Deichmann et al., 2003).  A voxel size of 3×3×3 mm (20% slice gap, 0.6 mm) was 
used; TR=3 s, TE=32, flip angle=85°. The functional sequence lasted 36 minutes. 
Prior to the functional sequence high resolution T1-weighted structural images were 
acquired at a resolution of 1×1×1 mm using an MPRAGE sequence. Immediately 
following the functional sequence, phase and magnitude maps were collected using a 
GRE field map sequence (TE1 = 5.19ms, TE2 = 7.65ms). 
 
6.2.5.2. Image Preprocessing 
Scans were pre-processed using SPM8 (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The EPI images 
from each participant were corrected for distortions caused by susceptibility-induced 
field inhomogeneities using the FieldMap toolbox (Andersson, Hutton, Ashburner, 
Turner, & Friston, 2001). This approach corrects for both static distortions and 
changes in these distortions attributable to head motion (Hutton, Kyme, Lau, 
Skerrett, & Fulton, 2002). The B0 field map acquired after the EPI sequence was 
used to calculate static distortion and the EPI images were then realigned, and 
coregistered to the participant‟s own anatomical image. The structural image was 
processed using a unified segmentation procedure combining segmentation, bias 
correction, and spatial normalization to the MNI template(Ashburner & Friston, 
2005).  The same normalization parameters were then used to normalize the EPI 
images. Finally, the images were spatially smoothed in order to conform to the 
assumptions of the GLM implemented in SPM8 by applying a Gaussian kernel of 8 
mm FWHM. 
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6.2.5.3. First-level Analysis 
Two first-level GLMs were created for factorial analyses. In the first GLM there 
were five event types. Each event-type was used to construct a regressor by 
convolving the “indicator” video durations with the canonical HRF. Each of the four 
conditions specified in the design was modelled as a separate regressor. In addition, 
one regressor modelled the activity during the “decision” period (regardless of the 
condition the period was in). The residual effects of head motion were modelled as 
covariates of no interest in the analysis by including the six head motion parameters 
estimated during realignment.  
 
In the second GLM there were two event types, corresponding to decision trials in 
which participants had accepted an offer from the proposer and decision trials in 
which they had rejected an offer from the proposer. Each event-type was used to 
construct regressor by convolving the timing of the decision period onset with the 
canonical HRF.  Trials in which the participant failed to respond within 3s of the 
onset of the “decision” period were excluded from the model. The residual effects of 
head motion were modelled as covariates of no interest in the analysis by including 
the six head motion parameters estimated during realignment.  
 
6.2.5.4 Second-level Analysis 
For each of the two GLMs, random effects analyses (Full-Factorial ANOVAs) were 
applied to determine voxels significantly different at the group level.  SPM{t} 
contrast images from all participants at the first-level were input into second-level 
full factorial design matrices. t-contrasts were conducted in the second-level random-
effects analyses for each of the main effects in the first GLM and for the main effect 
of the second GLM. An F-contrast was conducted in the second-level random-effects 
analyses for the interaction of the first GLM. Whole-brain analyses are reported 
using significance level of p > 0.001 whole-brain uncorrected, with a spatial 
threshold of 10 voxel cluster size, an approach similar to that used in previous studies 
(Eisenberger et al., 2010; Kuhl, Shah, DuBrow, & Wagner, 2010; P. A. Lewis, 
Rezaie, Brown, Roberts, & Dunbar, 2011; Masten, Morelli, & Eisenberger, 2011; 
Slavich, Way, Eisenberger, & Taylor, 2010; Wittmann et al., 2005; Younger, Aron, 
Parke, Chatterjee, & Mackey, 2010). This approach provides a reasonable balance 
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with respect to type I and type II error concerns, consistent with the false discovery 
rate in typical behavioural science research, as outlined by Lieberman and 
Cunningham (2009). 
 
6.3. Results 
 
6.3.1. Behavioural Results 
 
6.3.1.1. Ratings of Proposers’ Faces Before Manipulation 
In order to ensure that there were no significant differences in participants‟ ratings of 
the two proposers prior to the scanning task, paired sample t-tests were carried out on 
the ratings given to the proposers faces in the training session.  These t-tests 
confirmed that there were no significant differences in ratings of attractiveness (t(17) 
= -.62, p = .55) or trustworthiness (t(17) = -.69, p = .50). 
 
6.3.1.2. Ratings of Proposers’ Faces After Manipulation 
To examine whether the experimental manipulation of trustworthiness had been 
successful, two analyses of covariance were carried out. In the first ANCOVA, the 
dependent variable was participants‟ ratings of attractiveness for the proposers‟ faces 
after the scanning session, the independent variable was the trustworthiness of the 
proposer and the covariate was participants‟ ratings of attractiveness for the 
proposers‟ faces during the training session.  This analysis found no significant effect 
of the experimental manipulation on ratings of attractiveness, F(1, 20.29) = 0.9, p > 
.05.  In the second ANCOVA, the dependent variable was participant‟s ratings of 
trustworthiness for the proposers‟ faces after the scanning session, the independent 
variable was the trustworthiness of the proposer and the covariate was participant‟s 
ratings of trustworthiness for the proposers‟ faces during the training session.  This 
analysis found a significant effect of the experimental manipulation on ratings of 
trustworthiness, F(1, 16.4) = 5.183, p < .05, because, taking into account their pre 
interaction rating, after social interaction participants judged the trustworthy 
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proposer  as being more trustworthy (M = 4.83, SD = 4.79) than the untrustworthy 
proposer (M = 1.5, SD = 5.94).        
 
6.3.1.3. Acceptance of Offers During Scanning Task 
In order to investigate whether participants had indeed learnt to associate the two 
proposers with the correct offers, the total number of offers accepted and rejected in 
the scanning task for each of the four experimental conditions was calculated for 
each participant.  These values were then used as the dependent variables in a 2 x 2 x 
2 analysis of variance, with response (accepted/rejected), indicator (grasping/light) 
and trustworthiness (trustworthy/untrustworthy) as the independent variables.  No 
main effects were found but a significant interaction between response and trust was 
found F(1, 17) = 104.5, p < .001 (see figure 6-3). Planned comparisons revealed that 
this interaction was driven by the fact that for the trustworthy proposer participants 
accepted (M = 61.94, SD = 8.91) more offers than they rejected (M = 7.28, SD = 
8.92). By contrast, for the untrustworthy proposer participants rejected (M = 54.11, 
SD = 16.16)  more offers than they accepted (M = 54.11, SD = 15.26).         
 
6.3.1.4. Reaction Times for Decisions During Scanning Task 
In order to investigate whether participants showed differential reaction times during 
the decision period for the different conditions, a 2 x 2 x 2 repeated measures 
ANOVA was conducted, with reaction time as the dependent variable and 
trustworthiness (trustworthy, untrustworthy), indicator (grasping, light) and response 
(accept, reject) as the independent variables (see Figure 6-3). Three participants were 
excluded from the analysis as they did not make any responses in one of the eight 
conditions. A main effect of trustworthiness was found as participants took longer to 
respond to the untrustworthy proposer (M = 1130.38, SD = 375.41) compared to a 
trustworthy proposer (M = 1060.55, SD = 525.35). A main effect was also found for 
response with participants taking longer to reject offers (M = 1288.83, SD = 291.33) 
than to accept offers (M = 1098.24, SD = 511.35) (see Figure 6-3). 
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Figure 6-3. Reaction Times for offers in each of the different conditions. Error bars 
represent SEM. 
 
6.3.2. Functional Imaging Results 
 
6.3.2.1. Main effect of Indicator 
Figure 6-4. and Table 6-2. show the results of the contrast Grasping > Light.  As can 
be seen this contrast revealed that observing grasping actions compared to lights 
turning on led to greater activation in bilateral occipital and temporal regions 
extending across the middle temporal gyrus and middle occipital gyrus and 
encompassing the left STS.  It also led to the activation of a cluster consisting of 
bilateral frontal polar regions and the left superior frontal gyrus and a cluster in the 
left middle frontal gyrus.   
 
Figure 6-4. and Table 6-3. show the results of the contrast Light > Grasping.  As can 
be seen this contrast revealed that observing lights turning on compared to grasping 
actions led to an increase in activation in the left superior frontal gyrus and the right 
inferior frontal gyrus. 
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Table 6.2 Grasping > Light. Peak voxel coordinates in MNI space and z-values for 
the fMRI contrast revealing areas more activated by observation of grasping than by 
observation of light turning on. Different colours indicate regions in the same cluster, 
* indicates a cluster that survived family wise error correction.  
Region (BA) Hemisphere X Y Z 
Z-
Score 
Cluster 
Size 
Middle Temporal Gyrus* 
(19/V5) 
R 48 -60 0 5.44 1597 
Lateral Occipital Sulcus R 38 -80 6 4.47 
 
Middle Occipital Gyrus R 30 -82 0 4.47 
 
Middle Occipital Gyrus* L -50 -78 4 5.4 1445 
Superior Temporal Sulcus L -46 -60 10 4.88 
 
Frontalpolar Gyrus L -12 66 10 3.89 124 
Superior Frontal Gyrus L -10 62 0 3.49 
 
Frontalpolar Gyrus R 6 56 24 3.47 
 
Superior Frontal Gyrus L -18 32 44 3.54 10 
 
Table 6.3 Light > Grasping. Peak voxel coordinates in MNI space and z-values for 
the fMRI contrast revealing areas more activated by observation of light turning on 
than by observation of grasping. Different colours indicate regions in the same 
cluster. 
Region (BA) Hemisphere X Y Z 
Z-
Score 
Cluster 
Size 
Superior Frontal Gyrus (6) L -10 10 46 4.60 40 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus, 
Pars Opercularis (6/44) 
R 54 6 40 4.07 20 
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Figure 6-4. Brain areas showing greater activation for the observation of grasping 
(orange) or light (blue) and parameter estimates for peak voxels. Blue indicates 
estimates for the trustworthy proposer and red for the untrustworthy proposer. 
Coordinates are in MNI space. lMOG = left middle occipital gyrus; lSFG = left 
superior frontal gyrus; rLOS = right lateral occipital sulcus; lF-PG = left 
frontalpolar gyrus. Error bars represent SEM. 
 
6.3.2.4. Main effect of Trustworthiness 
No brain areas were significantly more active when observing a trustworthy proposer 
compared to an untrustworthy proposer. 
 
Figure 6-5. and Table 6-4. show the results of the contrast Untrsutworthy > 
Trustworthy.  As can be seen this contrast revealed that observing untrustworthy 
proposer compared to observing untrustworthy proposer led to an increase in 
activation in the left superior frontal gyrus and the left superior temporal sulcus. 
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Table 6.4. Untrustworthy > Trustworthy. Peak voxel coordinates in MNI space and 
z-values for the fMRI contrast revealing areas more activated by observation of an 
untrustworthy proposer than by observation of a trustworthy proposer. Different 
colours indicate regions in the same cluster.  
Region (BA) Hemisphere X Y Z Z-Score Cluster Size 
Superior Frontal Gyrus (6) L -26 -4 66 4.65 133 
Inferior Parietal Lobe (7) R 30 -48 52 3.77 17 
Precuneus (7) L -8 -62 54 3.64 27 
Superior Temporal Sulcus L -42 -46 12 3.54 24 
Precuneus (7) R 12 -58 52 3.44 22 
Superior Frontal Gyrus (6) R 30 -4 58 3.27 12 
 
 
Figure 6-4. Brain areas showing greater activation for the observation of 
untrustworthy proposers and parameter estimates for peak voxels. Blue indicates 
estimates for the trustworthy proposer and red for the untrustworthy proposer. 
Coordinates are in MNI space. rSFG = right superior frontal gyrus; rIPS = right 
interparietal sulcus lSFG = left superior frontal gyrus . Error bars represent SEM. 
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6.3.2.5. Areas Showing an Interaction between Indicator and Trustworthiness 
Figure 6-5. and Table 6-5. show the results of the interaction analysis between 
indicator and trustworthiness. This contrast revealed interaction effects in a number 
of bilateral occipital-temporal regions  the right precuneus, the right orbital gyrus, the 
left middle frontal gyrus (corresponding to the dPMC), the right inferior precentral 
sulcus expanding into Brodmann area 44, and the left STS. Inspection of parameter 
estimates revealed that almost all areas activated showed greater activation when 
participants observed a trustworthy proposer performing an action than when a 
trustworthy proposer turned on a light and greater activation when an untrustworthy 
person turned on a light than when they performed a grasping action. The one 
exception to this was activation in the left STS which showed the opposite pattern of 
activation. 
 
 
Figure 6-5. Brain areas showing an interaction between indicator and 
trustworthiness as well as parameter estimates for peak voxels. Blue indicates 
estimates for the trustworthy proposer and red for the untrustworthy proposer. 
Coordinates are in MNI space. rIPreCS = right inferior precentral sulcus; lMFG = 
left medial frontal gyrus. Error bars represent SEM. 
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Table 6.5 Interaction between Indicator and Trustworthiness. Peak voxel coordinates 
in MNI space and z-values for the fMRI contrast revealing areas that show an 
interaction effect between the trustworthiness of the proposer and the type of 
indicator observed. Different colours indicate regions in the same cluster. 
Region (BA) Hemisphere X Y Z 
Z-
Score 
Cluster 
Size 
Trustworthy Grasp, Untrustworthy Light > Untrustworthy Grasp, Trustworthy Light 
Inferior Occipital Gyrus 
(19/V3) 
L -18 -92 -10 4.43 153 
Lingual Gyrus (19/V4) L -24 -90 -18 3.60 
 
Precuneus (7) R 6 -62 46 4.14 47 
Middle Temporal Gyrus R 34 -54 10 3.92 69 
Middle Occiptal Gyrus R 28 -50 20 3.22 
 
Inferior Temporal Gyrus L -40 -12 -24 3.91 11 
Inferior Occipital Gyrus 
(19/V3) 
R 30 -86 -20 3.85 43 
Medial Orbital Gyrus R 18 36 -14 3.79 12 
Middle Frontal Gyrus (6) L -54 8 38 3.76 43 
Inferior Precentral Sulcus 
(44) 
R 44 6 32 3.66 19 
Inferior Temporal Gyrus R 56 -14 -30 3.57 12 
Untrustworthy Grasp, Trustworthy Light > Trustworthy Grasp, Untrustworthy Light 
Superior Temporal Sulcus L -32 -56 12 3.56 10 
 
6.3.2.5. Areas activated During Deciding Whether to Accept or Reject an Offer 
A further analysis focused on brain areas activated that were differentially activated 
while participants made a decision to accept or reject the proposers offer, in order to 
discover whether the brain regions activated during the observation of rewarding or 
unrewarding actions by another overlapped with those involved in decisions about 
whether to accept or reject the reward associated with those actions. Figure 6-5.and 
Table 6-6. show the results of the contrast accept > reject for the second GLM.   As 
can be seen this contrast revealed that when participants decided to accept offers, 
there was increased activation across a range of brain regions including bilateral 
 247 
 
precuneus activation, a cluster of activation centred on the right orbitofrontal cortex 
but extending into the cingulate sulcus and into the left orbitofrontal cortex, 
activation in the left middle and superior frontal gyri, activation in the left middle 
temporal gyrus and angular gyrus and activation in the right parahippocamal gyrus 
and into a cluster of activation centred on the right angular gyrus but extending into 
the middle occipital gyrus and the STS.      
 
Table 6.6 Accept > Reject. Peak voxel coordinates in MNI space and z-values for 
the fMRI contrast revealing areas more activated when participants decided to accept 
the offer from the proposer than when they decided to reject the offer. Different 
colours indicate regions in the same cluster, * indicates a cluster that survived family 
wise error correction. 
Region (BA) Hemisphere X Y Z Z-Score Cluster Size 
Precuneus (7)* L -8 -52 16 4.88 1465 
Precuneus (7) R 8 -52 24 4.56 
 
Medial Orbital Gyrus* R 4 32 -10 4.48 2078 
Cingulate Sulcus R 12 54 10 4.45 
 
Middle Temporal Gyrus* L -58 -12 -18 4.37 158 
Posterior Orbital Gyrus R 36 36 -10 3.97 39 
Middle Frontal Gyrus* L -20 30 40 3.94 227 
Superior Frontal Gyrus L -22 42 40 3.72 
 
Angular Gyrus (39)* L -38 -78 38 3.91 142 
ParaHippocampal Gyrus R 30 -32 -14 3.75 37 
Angular Gyrus (39) R 50 -62 28 3.62 144 
Middle Occipital Gyrus R 50 -72 26 3.28  
Superior Temporal Sulcus R 46 -62 16 3.28  
 
Figure 6-6. and Table 6-7. show the results of the contrast reject > accept for the 
second GLM.   As can be seen this contrast revealed that for offers participants 
decided to reject there was increased activation across a range of brain regions 
including activation in the left dPMC, a cluster of activation centred on the left 
precentral gyrus (posterior M1) and extending into the post central gyrus. There was 
also activation in the right hemisphere occipital regions, the right precuneus,  the left 
inferior parietal gyrus and lateral interparietal sulcus. 
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Table 6.7. Reject > Accept. Peak voxel coordinates in MNI space and z-values for 
the fMRI contrast revealing areas more activated when participants decided to reject 
the offer from the proposer than when they decided to accept the offer. Different 
colours indicate regions in the same cluster, * indicates a cluster that survived family 
wise error correction. 
Region (BA) Hemisphere X Y Z Z-Score Cluster Size 
Middle Frontal Gyrus (6)* L -26 -2 38 4.66 153 
Middle Frontal Gyrus (6)* R 28 -10 40 4.31 190 
Postcentral Gyrus* L -30 -32 40 4.11 63 
Calcarine Gyrus (17)* L -4 -92 0 3.98 312 
Lingual Gyrus (18) L -12 -84 -6 3.89 
 
Fusiform Gyrus (19/V4)* R 32 -78 -16 3.85 111 
Lingual Gyrus (18)* R 18 -72 -2 3.80 79 
Middle Occipital Gyrus* R 32 -72 30 3.77 73 
Inferior Parietal Gyrus (40/Pf) L -56 -44 36 3.53 22 
Interparietal Sulcus L -22 -66 38 3.48 27 
Interparietal Sulcus (40/Pf) L -48 -44 56 3.48 16 
Precuneus (7) R 16 -54 42 3.44 11 
  
6.4. Discussion 
 
The aim of the current experiment was to investigate whether the AON observation 
network is modulated by the perceived trustworthiness of an actor. Based on 
previous studies showing that liking (A. H. Fischer et al., 2012; Mcintosh, 2006) and 
percieved social closeness to another (Bourgeois & Hess, 2008; Liebert et al., 1972; 
Neely et al., 1973; van der Schalk et al., 2011; Weisbuch & Ambady, 2008; Yabar et 
al., 2006) can modulate imitation and studies showing a close link between areas 
involved in imitation and action observation (Buccino et al., 2004; Grèzes, Armony, 
Rowe, & Passingham, 2003; Heiser, Iacoboni, Maeda, Marcus, & Mazziotta, 2003; 
Iacoboni et al., 2001; Koski, Iacoboni, Dubeau, Woods, & Mazziotta, 2003; Leslie, 
Johnson-Frey, & Grafton, 2004; Molenberghs, Brander, Mattingley, & Cunnington, 
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2010; Molenberghs et al., 2012) it was hypothesised that observing the actions of a 
trustworthy person compared to the actions of an untrustworthy person would lead to 
greater activation of the AON. Due to the focus of the current study on regions in the 
AON, in this discussion I will focus on activations found in the areas that have 
previously been implicated as being activated by the observation of action.  These 
areas include the IFG;  the IPL, the STS; the vPMC; the dPMC; the IPS; the SPL,the 
precuneus, the insula, the primary somatosensory cortex (SI), the cingulate gyrus and 
the cerebellum.  
 
 
Figure 6-6. Brain areas showing greater activation for the decision to accept 
(orange) or reject (blue) offers from the proposer, as well as parameter estimates for 
peak voxels. Blue indicates estimates for the accept condition and red for the reject 
condition. Coordinates are in MNI space. rMFG =right middle frontal gyrus; 
lPrecuneus = left precuneus gyrus; rMOG = right medial orbital gyrus; lCG = left 
calcerine gyrus. Error bars represent SEM. 
 
6.4.1 Areas Activated in the Contrasts between Indicators 
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Contrasts between the two indicator conditions (grasping and light) revealed that 
observing a grasping action led to increased activation in a network of bilateral 
occiptial-temporal regions which in the right hemisphere centred on area V5 and in 
left hemisphere extended into the STS.  The greater activation of these areas during 
the observation of hand actions is consistent with findings reported by several studies 
that indicate that these regions are selectively activated by the observation of motion 
in genral (Beckers & Zeki, 1995; Lechak & Leber, 2011; Zeki & Stutters, 2013) and 
by hand and body actions in particular (Grèzes, Costes, & Decety, 1998; Grossman 
et al., 2000; Jastorff, Clavagnier, Gergely, & Orban, 2011; Kable & Chatterjee, 2006; 
Kable, Kan, Wilson, Thompson-Schill, & Chatterjee, 2005; Wiggett & Downing, 
2011).   
 
Increased activation during the observation of action was also observed in the frontal 
poles.  This region has been demonstrated to play an important role in inhibiting 
behaviour. Of particular interest to the results of the current study, damage to the 
frontal pole has been associated with the emergence of an imitation behavioural 
syndrome (Brass, Derrfuss, Matthes-von Cramon, & von Cramon, 2003; De Renzi, 
Cavalleri, & Facchini, 1996; Lhermitte, Pillon, & Serdaru, 1986) which has been 
linked to the failure of inhibitory processes and suggests a link between the frontal 
pole and the inhibition of action.  This link between the frontal pole and imitation 
inhibition has been supported by the results of several fMRI studies in healthy 
participants (Brass, Derrfuss, & von Cramon, 2005; Brass, Zysset, & von Cramon, 
2001; Ruby & Decety, 2001, 2003) which have shown increased activation in 
frontopolar areas in tasks that involve inhibiting one‟s own perspective while 
attending to the perspective of another.  The assumption of an inhibitory role of the 
frontopolar region is also in accordance with the finding that inhibitory neurons 
(GABA neurons) in the anterior cingulate and frontopolar cortex are lacking in the 
brains of patients who are susceptible to confusing self and other (Glantz & Lewis, 
2000; Selemon & Goldman-Rakic, 1999).  
 
The other area to show greater activation for observing grasping rather than light-
switching  was the superior frontal gyrus.  Activation in this region has been 
associated with both response inhibition (Beauregard, Lévesque, & Bourgouin, 2001; 
Booth et al., 2003; Kelly et al., 2004; Tamm, Menon, & Reiss, 2002) and working 
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memory (du Boisgueheneuc et al., 2006).  This link between frontal pole and 
superior frontal gyrus activity and imitation inhibition suggests that the frontal pole 
activation observed in the current experiment related to the need for participants to 
inhibit their own possible motor responses while having to attend to and memorise 
the spatiality of the proposer‟s grasping movement. 
 
The failure to find any activation in the AON in the contrast between grasping and 
light indicators was suprising. More suprising however was that the contrast to 
identify areas that showed greater activation for the light indicator than the grasping 
indicator revealed two clusters, one located in the left SMA and the other in the pars 
opercularis of the right inferior frontal gyrus.  Both of these areas are part of the 
AON and so might be expected to show a greater activation to the observation of an 
action than to the observation of a light turning on.  A possible explanation for this 
finding may lie in the details of the instructions participants were given about the two 
videos. Before the task, participants were told that in the light condition the 
proposers were activating the light during the video using a remote control that was 
hidden from view below the table. This was necessary in order to make participants 
believe that they were observing the proposers making their decision in both versions 
of the video.   
 
The fact that participants had been informed that the proposer was making an 
occluded action during the light videos may explain the activation of areas of the 
AON seen during those videos.  Several researchers (Csibra, 2008; Friston, Mattout, 
& Kilner, 2011; Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007a; Neal & Kilner, 2012; Schubotz, 
2007) have suggested that the AON can be usefully understoood as involved in 
implementing a Bayes-optimal predictive coding mechanism in order to predict the 
future states of an observed action and thus understand the goal of that action. If this 
is view is correct then it seems likely that the AON would simulate actions that are 
occuring, even if those actions are occluded or only detectable by their sensory 
consequences.   
In support of this view is evidence from single cell recordings that mirror neurons in 
monkeys will fire when observing an occluded action (Umiltà et al., 2001).  
Behavioural studies have shown that participnats are remakably accurate at judging 
the appropriateness of an action even after a long period of occlusion or when the 
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action is distorted (Parkinson, Springer, & Prinz, 2011, 2012; Sparenberg, Springer, 
& Prinz, 2012). It has also been found that these judgments can be affected by motor 
execution (Springer et al., 2011) and by TMS induced disruption of the premotor 
cortex (Stadler et al., 2012). Of particular interest, given the finding of left SMA 
activation in the current study, is the finding that judging occluded actions involves 
the recruitment of left SMA and dPMC areas (Stadler et al., 2011).  Furthermore, a 
number of imaging studies have demonstrated that parts of the AON are active prior 
to the observation of a predicted movement (Aglioti, Cesari, Romani, & Urgesi, 
2008; Kilner, Vargas, Duval, Blakemore, & Sirigu, 2004)and during the observation 
of still images of actions (Urgesi, Moro, Candidi, & Aglioti, 2006). Taken together 
this suggests that the AON is employed in the simulation of action even when the 
action is not directly observed.    
 
Further evidence for the fact that the AON is not only activated when visually 
observing actions comes from single cell recording in monkeys indicating the 
existence of a population of mirror neurons that activate when hearing the auditory 
consequences of an action (e.g. paper ripping, dropping a stick) as well as when 
seeing the same action (Keysers et al., 2003; Kohler et al., 2002).  Behavioural and 
TMS and fMRI studies also indicate that the human AON has a similar ability to 
activate to the sensory consquences of an action even when the action itself is not 
observed (Aziz-Zadeh, Iacoboni, Zaidel, Wilson, & Mazziotta, 2004; Bangert et al., 
2006; Fadiga, Craighero, Buccino, & Rizzolatti, 2002; Gazzola, Aziz-Zadeh, & 
Keysers, 2006; Pizzamiglio et al., 2005).   
 
Considering the evidence that the AON is tuned to both hidden actions and to the 
sensory consequences of unseen actions, it is perhaps less surprising that the light 
indicator condition in our study led to activation of areas of the AON.  However this 
does not explain why these areas were more active in the light condition than in the 
grasping condition.  There are two possible reasons why this should be the case.  The 
first is that the increase activation seen in the light condition reflects the fact that, in 
the absence of visual information about an action, greater activation of the motor 
system is required to simulate that action. This is because the cognitive burden for 
the prediction of that action falls solely on the motor simulation of the action rather 
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than on the integration of incoming sensory signals from the STS and other areas 
involved in the visual recognition of action and the motor system.   
 
An alternative explantion for the results is that, while both the grasping and light 
conditions could have allowed for motor simulation, in the grasping condition  this 
motor simulation was inhibited. Given the links reviewed above between the 
preforntal cortex and motor inhibition (Brass et al., 2005, 2001; Ruby & Decety, 
2001, 2003) this explanation would account for the greater prefrontal activations 
during the observation of grasping actions reported above.  Greater inhibition during 
the grasping condition would be due to the fact that the observed actions of the 
proposer could potentially conflict with the response to the offer the participant 
wished to make, while in the light conditions no directly observed action was present 
to require inhibition. Unfortunately the design of the current study does not enable 
these two accounts to be decisively evaluated.  However the results here do provide 
further evidence that the AON is involved in simulating actions, even when those 
actions are not directly perceivable . 
 
6.4.2 Areas Activated in the Contrasts between Trustworthiness 
 
In terms of brain regions that showed a general effect of the trustworthiness of the 
proposer regardless of the indicator used, no areas in the brain were found that 
showed a greater activation for the perception of the trustworthy proposer than 
perception of the untrustworthy proposer.  However, contrary to findings of Sobhani 
et al. (2012) that increased positive affiliation leads to increased activation of the 
AON, in the current study observation of the untrustworthy proposer led to increased 
activation in a number of areas implicated in the AON, including bilateral dPMC, the 
left STS, the right IPG and bilateral precuneus activations.   
 
The dPMC has been found to be particularly involved in the prediction of occluded 
actions (Stadler et al., 2011), in specifying the desired end state of an action 
(Majdandzic, Bekkering, van Schie, & Toni, 2009), in detecting errors in the actions 
of others (Desmet, Deschrijver, & Brass, In Press) and in predicting the sensory 
consequences of an action (Kilner, 2011).  This suggests that the activation seen in 
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dPMC in the current study might reflect a greater attempt by participants to predict 
the consequences of another‟s actions in the case of the untrustworthy proposer. This 
increased activation when observing an untrustworthy proposer is likely to be due to 
loss aversion (McGraw, Larsen, Kahneman, & Schkade, 2010; Yao & Li, 2013), a 
phenomenon in decision making in which a loss has more influence on choices than 
a gain of the same magnitude.  Given that our participants tended to reject offers 
from the untrustworthy proposer, making all untrustworthy trials effectively 
represent a loss of potential income, participants may have been more motivated to 
try to interpret the actions of the untrustworthy proposer than they were for the 
actions of the trustworthy proposer.  
 
There is some evidence that the AON can be modulated by the valence of particular 
actions and shows a bias towards interpreting actions with a threatening or negative 
outcome. Lotze et al. (2006) found that activation in the right STS was positively 
correlated with the negative valence of observed expressive valence, while Gutsell 
and Inzlicht (Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2013) showed that reduced mu-suppression for the 
observation of out-group actions was abolished when those actions had a threatening 
component. Additionally Sinke, Sorger, Goebel and de Gelder (2010) also found 
evidence for greater activation when observing another person making threatening 
gestures to a third party compared to when they were making teasing gestures. The 
finding of increased activation of the AON here adds to the literature showing that 
areas involved in action observation are sensitive to the social context of the actor. 
 
Activation in the precuneus is also interesting, as this region has been implicated in 
processing the mental states of self and others (Atique, Erb, Gharabaghi, Grodd, & 
Anders, 2011; Lombardo et al., 2010; Muscatell et al., 2012; Schnell, Bluschke, 
Konradt, & Walter, 2011; Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009).  Increased activity in the 
precuneus and other areas in the mentalising network (dorsal medial prefrontal 
cortex) has been shown to underlie greater accuracy in identifying the feelings of 
others (Zaki, Weber, Bolger, & Ochsner, 2009). Thus in the current study it was 
found that observing an untrustworthy proposer who was about to make a decision 
on how much money to offer the participant led to greater activation of regions 
involved in both more low level interpretation of actions and in high level 
mentalising.   
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6.4.3 Areas Activated by an Interaction between Indicator and 
Trustworthiness 
 
The key aim of the current study was to investigate whether the observation of 
actions was modulated by the trustworthiness of the observer.  To that end the key 
analysis to carry out was an interaction analysis between the factors of indicator and 
trustworthiness.  The F-contrast carried out revealed activation across a number of 
areas including a bilateral group of occipital temporal areas. These areas, which have 
been implicated in the visual recognition of bodies (Schwarzlose, Baker, & 
Kanwisher, 2005; J. C. Taylor, Wiggett, & Downing, 2007; Vocks et al., 2010) and 
faces (Kanwisher & Yovel, 2006; Schwarzlose et al., 2005), as well as in the 
recognition of actions (Pelphrey, Morris, Michelich, Allison, & McCarthy, 2005) and 
of emotional facial expressions (Jehna et al., 2011),  showed a differential response 
with greater activation for the trustworthy proposer in the grasping condition and the 
untrustworthy proposer in the light condition than vice versa. It is likely that the 
differential response seen in these areas is due to a combination of the difference in 
visual scene between the grasping and light conditions (in particular the change in 
illumination in the light condition) and the face of the proposer in the 
trustworthy/untrustworthy conditions. 
 
A number of regions in the AON including the precuneus and bilateral dPMC areas 
also showed the same pattern of response. This pattern of activation may reflect the 
decreased inhibition of observed gestures compared to unobserved gestures for the 
trustworthy proposer when compared to the untrustworthy proposer, suggesting that 
the systems involved in action observation are indeed sensitive not only to the nature 
of the action being observed (overt vs covert) and the trustworthiness of the actor 
being observed but also to the contextual combination of the two.   It is possible that 
the interaction in these areas is due to the fact that there was greater inhibition of 
overt actions made by the untrustworthy proposer than  of overt actions made by the 
trustworthy person. This interpretation would be in line with the original hypothesis 
that participants‟ AON would show greater overlap between self and other when 
observing the actions of trustworthy others compared to untrustworthy others. 
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Alternatively the fact that these areas showed greater activation for the untrustworthy 
light condition compared to the untrustworthy grasping condition may reflect the 
greater need for motor simulation in interpreting the actions of the untrustworthy 
participant in the light condition compared to the grasping condition, given that the 
light condition contained even fewer overt cues as to the proposer‟s intentions than 
did the grasping condition.   
 
Also noteworthy is the activation of the right orbital gyrus, an area that has been 
implicated in the processing of rewarding stimuli (Berridge & Kringelbach, 2013; 
Grabenhorst, Rolls, Parris, & D‟Souza, 2010; Klein-Flügge, Barron, Brodersen, 
Dolan, & Behrens, 2013; Kringelbach, 2005; O‟Doherty, Kringelbach, Rolls, 
Hornak, & Andrews, 2001; Rushworth, Noonan, Boorman, Walton, & Behrens, 
2011; Simmons et al., In Press; Wallis & Miller, 2003), suggesting that participants 
perceived the observing the actions of the trustworthy proposer as more rewarding 
than observing the actions of the untrustworthy proposer. The final brain area 
activated, the left STS, showed the reverse pattern from all other areas, with 
increased activation for the observations of the untrustworthy proposers grasping 
action compared to that of the trustworthy proposer and vice versa in the light 
condition.   
 
6.4.4 Areas Activated by the Decision to Accept or Reject an Offer 
 
Areas that demonstrated greater activation for accepted as opposed to rejected offers 
fell largely into two regions that have previously been found to be involved in social 
decision making. One of these regions was made up of activation in temporal-parietal 
regions including bilateral activation in the precuneus and angular gyrus and 
activation in the right STS. As mentioned above these regions have been linked to 
the processing of one‟s own and other‟s mental states (Apperly, Samson, Chiavarino, 
& Humphreys, 2004; Carter & Huettel, 2013). In addition they are also involved in 
the processing of decision making in the presence of uncertainty (Paulus et al., 
2001)and in decision making during economic games (Delgado, Locke, Stenger, & 
Fiez, 2003; Halko, Hlushchuk, Hari, & Schürmann, 2009; Kenning & Plassmann, 
2005; Kirk, Downar, & Montague, 2011; Knutson & Bossaerts, 2007; Ko et al., 
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2009; Rilling, Sanfey, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2004; W. van den Bos, van 
Dijk, Westenberg, Rombouts, & Crone, 2009). In the current context this parieto-
temporal activation may reflect a greater use of the mentalising system when 
processing the decision that the other person was likely to make and the risk of 
accepting a low offer. 
 
Also showing greater activation for accepted compared to rejected decisions were 
two areas in the prefrontal cortex: the right orbitofrontal cortex and the left 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC).  As well as being strongly linked to the 
processing of reward (see above)  the orbitofrontal cortex has also been strongly 
implicated in the processing of reward and social decision making (Nestor et al., 
2013; Zaki, López, & Mitchell, In Press), suggesting that activation in this area was 
due to the anticipation of a rewarding offer from the proposer.  
 
Several studies have implicated the left DLPFC in self-control. Figner et al. (2010) 
used TMS to disrupt  the  left DLPFC during decision making, leading to more 
impulsive behaviour as indicated by increased choices of immediate rewards over 
larger delayed rewards, while valuation judgments of the same rewards remained 
stable. Steinbeis, Bernhardt and Singer (2012) found that the left DLPFC mediated 
age-related and age-independent individual differences in strategic social behaviour. 
In addition the left DLPFC has been found to be activated during decision making in 
economic games. Single cell recording studies carried out in monkeys who had been 
trained to play economic games found that neurons in the DLPFC were involved in 
encoding strategic choices (Barraclough, Conroy, & Lee, 2004; Seo & Lee, 2007).  
Neuroimaging studies in humans have also implicated the left DLPC as being 
involved in the processing of fairness in the ultimatum game (Guo et al., In Press; 
Güroğlu, van den Bos, Rombouts, & Crone, 2010; F. Krueger, Grafman, & McCabe, 
2008; Sanfey et al., 2003; Yoshida, Seymour, Friston, & Dolan, 2010).  
 
Interestingly however, in most previous studies activation in the left DLPFC has 
shown a greater activation when being presented with unfair offers.  The reverse 
activation seen in the current study may reflect the fact that in the game used in the  
experiment, participants had to infer whether the offer was fair or unfair only from 
the identity of the proposer. It is possible therefore that the increased activation in the 
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DLPFC seen in this study reflects greater processing of the potential reward of 
rejecting or accepting an offer when presented with a high probability of that offer 
being fair compared to unfair.   
 
The final region to show an increased response to accepted as opposed to rejected 
offers is the parahippocampal gyrus. The parahippocampal gyrus has been implicated 
in processing spatial memory (Aminoff, Kveraga, & Bar, 2013; Bohbot et al., 1998; 
Ploner et al., 2000). Thus it seems likely that the increased activation seen for 
accepted offers reflects participant‟s greater motivation to recall the direction that the 
participants moved in so as to ensure that they did not accidently reject an offer from 
a trustworthy participant, a mistake that had a higher cost to the participant than 
accidently accepting an offer from an untrustworthy participant.     
 
The final contrast, examining areas that were more activated when participants 
decided to reject rather than accept an offer, found widespread bilateral activation 
within the AON including the premotor cortex, the post central gyrus, and the left 
inferior parietal gyrus and sulci, along with bilateral activation in occipital regions 
including the right fusiform face area.  Considering the role of the premotor cortex in 
motor planning (Liuzzi et al., 2010; Pastor-Bernier, Tremblay, & Cisek, 2012; 
Sugawara et al., In Press; Weinrich, Wise, & Mauritz, 1984) and the finding that 
participants took significantly longer to respond when making a decision to reject 
rather than accept an offer, this increased activation in the AON might be due to 
participant‟s taking longer to prepare their motor response in the reject condition. 
Another possibility however is that the greater activation in the AON is due to the 
fact that participants‟ greater focus on the actions of the proposer in the 
untrustworthy condition during watching the video continued even after the video 
ended and represents greater use of motor simulation when trying to interpret 
whether or not the the proposer was likely to be sending a fair or unfair offer. 
Activation in the right fusiform gyrus and related occipital areas known to be 
involved in the interpretation of facial expressions (Fu et al., 2004; Pessoa, Kastner, 
& Ungerleider, 2002; Schupp et al., 2004; Thielscher & Pessoa, 2007) also suggests 
that participants‟ exerted more effort in trying to interpret the actions and facial 
expressions of the proposer before rejecting a decision than before accepting it.     
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The final area showing greater activation for decisions to reject an offer was found in 
the right precuneus in a more posterior and lateral position than that which showed 
greater activation when accepting an offer.  Margulies et al. (2009) used resting-state 
fMRI to identify functional  distinctions between areas of the precuneus and 
demonstrated 3 subdivisions, with the anterior precuneus being functionally 
connected with the superior parietal cortex, paracentral lobule, and motor cortex, 
suggesting a role in sensorimotor, the central precuneus being functionally connected 
to the prefrontal and inferior parietal cortexes, suggesting a cognitive/associative 
region and the posterior precuneus being functionally connected to adjacent visual 
cortical regions. Thus the posterior precuneus activation seen here is likely connected 
to the increased activity in the right occipital cortex and reflects further visual 
processing of the face and action of the proposer when an offer is rejected compared 
to accepted.   
 
6.4.6. Conclusion 
 
In conclusion the current experiment sought to investigate the ability of trust to 
modulate activity in the human AON.  Contrary to predictions, greater activation was 
found in the AON during the observation of choices being indicated by turning on a 
light than by grasping a light. This was likely due to the inhibition of the AON 
during the observation of grasping actions to prevent those actions from interfering 
with the participant‟s response. Moreover, again contrary to predictions, the 
observation of the actions of an untrustworthy person compared to a trustworthy 
person led to the activation of regions in the left dPMC.  There was also however a 
significant interaction between the observation of actions and the trustworthiness of a 
proposer, with greater activation in the left PMC when participants observed the 
trustworthy proposer making an action compared to the untrustworthy person making 
an action and vice versa for the light condition. These findings offer evidence that the 
AON is sensitive to the interaction with other and in particular to the other‟s 
reputation as a trustworthy interaction partner.   
 
It should be noted however that some the results presented here, particularly that of 
greater activation of the AON when observing an untrustworthy other regardless of 
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the indicator used, contrast with the findings of previous studies that examined the 
AONs. The studies by Molenberghs et al. (2012) and Sobhani et al. (2012) found 
greater activation for liked others as opposed to disliked others. The discrepancy 
between the results of the current study and these previous studies could be due the 
relationship between the participant and the observed actions. In the previous two 
studies, participants observed the actions of others but those actions had no bearing 
on the participants themselves, in the current study by contrast the actions of the 
other people directly affected the amount of money participants thought they would 
receive from this study. It is possible therefore that while passively observing the 
actions of a disliked other leads to reduced mirror neuron activation, observing the 
actions of a disliked or untrustworthy other that have a direct impact on the 
participant leads to greater AON activation, as the participant has a greater need to 
process and predict potentially threatening actions. A second possible explanation for 
this discrepancy is the different ways that feelings of likableness or closeness to the 
participant were modulated in the different experiments. While the current study 
investigated responses to a specific interpersonal other whose likability to the 
participant was based on their reputation as trustworthy or untrustworthy towards the 
participant, in Molenberghs et al. and Sobhani et al. likeability was modulated by an 
in-group or out-group distinction.         
 
To conclude, the results of this study provides important evidence for the power of 
social cognition to modulate. Further research is in this area is needed however, in 
order to determine the exact functional role of AON modulation when observing 
actions conducted by positively or negatively evaluated others.  
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Chapter 7. Discussing the Body, the Self 
and Social Cognition 
  
“The human body is the best picture of the human soul. 
Ludwig Wittgenstien, (1953, p. 178e) 
 
7.1. Summary 
  
The studies presented in this thesis examined the relationship between the 
phenomenal self, constituted by the integration of representations of the body in 
different modalities, and the social self which is, in part, defined by representations 
of closeness to and similarity with others. Following the embodied cognition 
approach, it was postulated that these representations of the social self‟s relationship 
to others would be closely linked to perceptions of physical closeness being both 
affected by and in turn affecting representations of bodily similarity. Therefore, the 
experiments presented in the previous chapters all sought to manipulate the 
perception of bodily similarity between self and other(s) and then to investigate the 
effects of this manipulation on some fundamental aspects of social cognition, such as 
implicit biases (Chapters 2 and 3), stereotype activation (Chapter 4) and trust 
(Chapters 5 and 6). 
  
As highlighted in the introduction the studies considered in this thesis can be broadly 
split into two strands. The first examined the relationship between the representations 
of one‟s own body and different social groups and comprised of the studies reported 
in chapters 2, 3 and 4. The second strand examined the relationship between body 
representations and interpersonal interactions, modelled using economic games. A 
brief summary of the findings of the studies in this thesis are presented below. 
  
7.1.1. Chapter 2 – Skin Colour and Body Ownership 
  
The experiments covered in chapter 2 investigated the effect of skin colour on body 
ownership. Both experiments found that participants could indeed experience body 
ownership over a rubber hand with the skin colour of a racial out-group. Experiment 
2.1 showed that, while subjective reports of ownership were significantly lower for a 
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hand with the skin colour of a racial out-group compared to a hand of a similar skin 
colour to the participant, the change in feelings of ownership due to VT-stimulation 
was of the same magnitude for hands of both skin colours. In addition, no significant 
effects of skin colour were found for the more objective measures of body 
ownership, proprioceptive drift and SCR to threatening stimuli. Experiment 2.1 also 
found limited support for the power of body ownership to affect participants‟ implicit 
attitudes towards members of a racial out-group. It was found that a linear regression 
which included both participants‟ ratings of ownership over the rubber hand with the 
skin colour of a racial in-group and their ratings of ownership over the rubber hand 
with the skin colour of a racial out-group as predictors significantly predicted post 
VT-stimulation implicit racial bias, with greater ownership leading to lower bias. 
However, the within participants nature of experiment 2.1‟s design meant that it was 
not possible to determine whether this effect was due to a generalised effect of body 
ownership or whether it was specifically due to ownership over the out-group rubber 
hand. Experiment 2.2 further investigated the effect of feeling ownership of the out-
group rubber hand on SCR to threatening stimuli and also introduced a new control 
condition, that of synchronous stimulation delivered to a hand seen from a third 
person perspective. The results of this experiment replicated those found for 
experiment 2.1 showing main effects of skin colour on feelings of ownership but not 
for SCR responses. It also extended the findings by showing that the increased SCRs 
found after synchronous stimulation were only present when the hand was seen from 
a first person perspective and also that only those participants who experienced a 
feeling of body ownership over the out-group hand showed a subsequent increase in 
SCR when that hand was threatened. 
  
7.1.2. Chapter 3 – Body Ownership and Implicit Bias 
 
The experiments reported in chapter 3 sought to expand on experiment 2.1‟s finding 
of an effect of experiencing body ownership over a hand from a racial out-group by 
investigating whether experiencing ownership over the hand of a racial out-group 
would lead to more positive attitudes towards that out-group as measured by implicit 
racial bias (experiment 3.1) and sensorimotor empathy for pain (experiment 3.2). 
Experiment 3.1, used a between participant design and found evidence that 
synchronous multisensory stimulation over a hand with the skin colour of a racial 
out-group led to more positive implicit attitudes towards that racial out-group while 
experiencing asynchronous stimulation over the hand led to a more negative implicit 
attitudes. Although no direct effect of ownership was found in this study there was a 
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strong relationship between synchrony of multisensory stimulation and ownership of 
the rubber hand. Experiment 3.2 used single-pulse TMS to measure somatosensory 
evoked potentials to painful and tactile stimuli being applied to in-group and out-
group hands both prior and subsequent to the delivery of synchronous or 
asynchronous VT-stimulation. The experiment found that after synchronous 
multisensory stimulation participants showed reduced z-scored MEP size when 
watching tactile or painful stimuli applied to a black hand. In contrast after 
asynchronous stimulation participants showed an increase in z-scored MEP size in 
response to painful and tactile stimuli, further suggesting that asynchronous 
stimulation, as well as synchronous stimulation, leads to an alteration in racial bias. 
   
7.1.3. Chapter 4 – Age, Body Ownership and Motor Imagery 
 
The experiments in chapter 4 moved from investigating the effect of body ownership 
of a hand of a different skin colour to examining the effect of body ownership on a 
hand of a different age to that of the participant. Specifically the studies in this 
chapter sought to investigate whether feeling body ownership over an elderly hand 
would lead to activation of the elderly stereotype and thus cause participants to 
imagine their movements as being slower on a motor imagery task. Experiment 4.1 
used a between subjects design and found that it was possible, using synchronous 
VT-stimulation, to induce ownership over the elderly hand. However the attempt to 
find an effect of ownership of the old hand on speed of motor imagery was 
confounded by a significant difference in participants‟ pre VT-stimulation motor 
imagery times. Experiment 2.2 sought to avoid this issue by using a within 
participant design. No significant effect of synchrony of VT-stimulation was found. 
It was however found that when participants‟ movement time in the pre VT-
stimulation period was taken into account participants who experienced higher levels 
of ownership in the synchronous condition imagined their movements as being 
slower. This finding suggests that experiencing ownership over a hand belonging to 
an elderly person does indeed lead to the activation of stereotypes related to the 
elderly. 
  
7.1.4. Chapter 5 – Trust and Face Representation 
 
The experiments in chapter 5 moved from investigating the relationship between 
body ownership and different social groups to investigating the relationship between 
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body representations and interpersonal social relationships. Experiments 5.1 and 5.2 
both investigated whether synchronous IMS would lead to increased trust as 
measured by the amount of money sent to the other person in a trust game. The 
results of these two studies found mixed evidence for the power of IMS to affect 
trust. Experiment 5.1, which used a between participants design found that 
synchronous IMS led to higher ratings of trust than did asynchronous stimulation but 
not higher amounts sent in the trust game. Experiment 5.2 used a within participants 
design with a larger number of trials per participants and small increments of money 
that could be sent to the trustee. It found a significant effect of IMS, with 
synchronous stimulation leading to higher amounts being offered in the trust game. 
Experiment 5.3 investigated the reverse relationship between trust and 
representations of facial similarity and found that participants perceived the face of a 
trustee as being significantly more similar to their own after the trustee had shown 
themself to be trustworthy compared to when the trustee had shown themself to be 
untrustworthy. 
  
7.1.5. Chapter 6 – Trust and the Action Observation Network 
  
The final study of the thesis, experiment 6.1, employed fMRI to investigate whether 
the trustworthiness of an observed actor led to a differential activation of the AON. 
Based on the findings of previous studies it was hypothesised that observing a 
trustworthy actor would lead to a greater activation of the AON than would 
observing an untrustworthy actor. In fact the results of experiment 6.1 showed the 
opposite pattern with greater activation in the AON for actions made by an 
untrustworthy actor. In addition, it was found that covert unobserved actions led to a 
greater activation of the AON than did overtly observed actions. This finding 
suggests an evolutionarily important role for the AON with a focus on the simulation 
of potentially threatening actions.      
   
7.2. Methodological Issues 
 
Before discussing the key theoretical implications of the experiments reported in this 
thesis I will briefly discuss two methodological issues that the studies in this thesis 
highlight, the use of multiple measures and the calculation of sample size. 
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7.2.1. The Use of Multiple Measures  
 
Several of the studies reported in this thesis involve the use of multiple dependent 
variables in order to probe the same underlying phenomena. Notably experiment 2.1 
used introspective reports, proprioceptive drift and SCR to threatening stimuli in 
order to examine the effects of VT-stimulation on embodiment of a rubber hand 
while experiment 2.2 used introspective reports and SCR to threatening stimuli to 
examine the same issue. In addition experiment 5.1 measured trustworthiness using 
both participants‟ ratings of trust and their behaviour and expectations in the trust 
game. The use of multiple measures in order to examine a particular phenomenon of 
interest does however raise the question of which measures should be considered an 
appropriate test of that phenomenon and whether such measures are measuring the 
same or difference phenomena. 
 
The problems with the use of multiple measures are particularly acute in the case of 
the experiments mentioned above because in all three cases the different measures 
used did not show identical effects. The results of experiments 2.1 and 2.2 
demonstrated a distinction between participants‟ introspective reports of their 
feelings of body ownership and the behavioural (proprioceptive drift) and 
physiological (SCR) measures of ownership in regards to skin colour. Although 
participants‟ introspective reports suggested that they felt less ownership over the 
black hand than they did for the white hand no effect of skin colour was found for the 
more objective measures of proprioceptive drift and SCR. In a similar way 
participants‟ in experiment 5.1 rated the face of another person as significantly more 
trustworthy after synchronous IMS than after asynchronous IMS but showed no 
effect of synchrony of IMS in the amounts of money they were willing to give . 
 
The distinctions between the results of different measures in these three experiments 
allow for an examination of a number of questions including: Which measures are 
most appropriate for examining a particular issue?; Whether combining different 
measures can provide a more complete view on a subject?; and which measure 
should be given greatest priority if the results of two measures disagree? In the case 
of all of these questions it is important to be aware of the phenomena which one‟s 
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research is designed to investigate. To demonstrate this I will first consider each 
question in regard to the investigation of the sense of body ownership carried out in 
chapter 2 and then move to consider them in the context of the investigation of trust 
carried out in experiment 5.1.  
 
When considering the experiments investigating body ownership reported in chapter 
1 it is important to be clear on exactly what the central meaning of the concepts of 
body ownership and embodiment in general are. As Longo, Schüür, et al. (2008) 
point out the concepts of embodiment and body ownership are essentially 
experiential. Such a view is also echoed by Tsakiris (2010) who defines body 
ownership as the experience of a body as being mine. The experiential nature of 
embodiment has presented a challenge to its scientific study due to a methodological 
distrust of introspective reports as opposed to the behavioural correlates of an 
experience. This distrust of relying purely on introspective reports has motivated 
researchers to find behavioural (Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005b), physiological (Armel 
& Ramachandran, 2003) and neurological (Ehrsson et al., 2004; Kanayama, Sato, & 
Ohira, 2009) correlates of the experience of body ownership. Such measures are 
often seen as more reliable than merely relying on participants‟ reports of their 
experience. However, as Longo et al. and Lewis and Lloyd (2010) point out, solely 
concentrating on these objective measures of the illusion runs the risk of ignoring the 
phenomenological core of body ownership. This risk is especially great as some 
recent studies have shown that the phenomenal and objective measures of 
embodiment can be come apart. For example several studies (Holle et al., 2011; 
Holmes et al., 2006; Rohde et al., 2011) have demonstrated that it is possible for 
subjects to display proprioceptive drift without the accompanying experience of body 
ownership. These findings raise the issue of whether researchers studying 
embodiment should favour subjective reports or objective measures in cases where 
the two forms of measure come into conflict.  
 
In the current thesis this problem is highlighted by the findings of experiments 2.1 
and experiments 2.2 that, while participants reported experiencing a stronger feeling 
of body ownership when the observed hand was white as opposed to black, there was 
no effect of skin colour on either proprioceptive drift or SCR. This raises the 
question of whether to ignore participants‟ introspective reports and concentrate on 
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the objective measures. Likert scales and other self-report measures do have a 
number of problems, such as being open to social desirability, cognitive biases, and 
the lack of a clear idea of whether all participants assign the same value to a 
particular point on the scale Schwartz (N. Schwartz, 1999). Indeed, this last problem 
can be seen in the current thesis by the fact that in the within subject studies in 
chapter 2 participants reported significantly higher ownership over the white hand 
but in experiment 3.1 which used a between subjects design no such difference was 
found.  
 
Despite the weaknesses in the use of such measures however, it is also clear that we 
lack a reliable objective correlate of body ownership. While measures such as 
proprioceptive drift and SCR normally seem to go along with the experience of body 
ownership both can come apart from it as in studies 2.1 and 2.2. In such cases it is 
important to remain focussed on the ultimate goal of the research. If one is most 
closely interested in how proprioception is influenced by vision and touch then it 
might be justified to ignore the participant‟s reports in favour of the proprioceptive 
drift measure. When however the purpose of the experiment was to discover how 
body ownership itself is modulated by a property of the rubber hand, e.g. skin colour, 
then to dismiss participant‟s reports of their own experience simply because they 
clash with a behavioural measure appears to be an incorrect approach which risks 
fetishizing the appearance of scientific objectivity over gaining a fuller 
understanding of the phenomena under investigation.  
 
The importance of remembering the research question being asked in a study is also 
illustrated by the case of experiment 5.1. In this study the focus of the study was on 
whether synchronous IMS led to greater amounts of trust, as measured by the amount 
sent in a trust game and by ratings of trustworthiness, towards another than did 
asynchronous stimulation. The results of experiment 5.1 found that while IMS 
increased ratings of trustworthiness it appeared to have no effect on trusting 
behaviour which raises the question of which measure is more relevant when 
deciding the effect of IMS on trust.  
 
As discussed in the introduction to chapter 5 trust has generally been thought of as a 
behavioural phenomenon. We determine the amount of trust a person has for another 
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not on their words but on their actions. For example if I say that I trust you but then 
refuse to lend you money because I don‟t think you will pay me back the most 
obvious interpretation is that my claim to trust you was false. Thus in the case of 
experiment 5.1 the discrepancy between people rating of trustworthiness and their 
actual behaviour in the trust game seem to suggest that the higher ratings of 
trustworthiness were not really measures of trust but rather tapped into a more 
general, but weaker, form of prosociality such as general affiliation or closeness 
rather than a real willingness on the part of participant to place their trust in the 
trustee.           
 
In conclusion the difference between the choice of which type of measure, 
introspective report or behaviour, to give priority to in the experiments discussed in 
this section highlights to importance of keeping clear exactly what the focus of an 
experiment is and exactly what each form of measure is actually measuring when 
using a multiple measures approach. However, provided this is done the multiple 
measure approach can be helpful in revealing different aspects of the phenomenon 
under investigation.     
 
7.2.2 Sample Size  
 
One potential limitation with the studies described in this thesis is the fact that the 
samples used in experiments that found significant effects varied from a low of 12 
participants providing two data points in the data set each, leading to 24 data points 
in experiment 4.2, to a high of 59 participants each providing data for two conditions, 
leading to 118 data points in experiment 5.3. It is worth noting here that although the 
difference in sample sizes between these studies is large it is to some extent justified 
due to the varying nature of the question under investigation. In the case of 
experiment 4.2 the key dependent measure was time taken in a motor imagery task, a 
measure that generally has little variation between participants. By contrast in 
experiment 5.3 the key dependent variable was performance in a self-face 
recognition task which was far more likely to be affected by individual differences 
such as the objective physical similarity between the face of the participant and that 
of the trustee.  
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Despite these differences in experimental design the high variance in sample size 
between the different experiments in this thesis does raise the question of the correct 
methodology to be used when determining sample size. The failure to use the correct 
sample size in an experiment can lead to misleading interpretations of the results of 
that research in two ways. First and more obviously the failure to recruit a large 
enough sample of participants can lead to a study being underpowered therefore 
increasing the risk of a Type II error in which the null hypothesis is accepted despite 
the fact that a significant difference exists between the two experimental conditions. 
While the possibility of making a Type II to error due to an underpowered study is 
well known, the second potential source of misinterpretation due to not calculating a 
correct sample size is that with a large enough sample size any chance difference 
between groups can become statistically significant, leading to a situation which the 
null hypothesis is rejected even though there is no substantial difference between 
conditions.  
 
This second source of misinterpretation due to lack of sample size calculation is 
based in the use of null-hypothesis significance testing (NHST) as the key statistical 
measure in psychology. Despite the near ubiquitous use of NHST in psychological 
and neuropsychological research both psychologists (e.g. Killeen, 2006; J. Krueger, 
2001; Nickerson, 2000) and statisticians (Krantz, 1999; Wilkinson & Task Force on 
Statistical Inference, 1999) have long been aware of the potential problems with 
using NHST as a measure of the importance of an effect. At the heart of the problem 
is that fact that NHST tests for the null-hypothesis i.e. that there is absolutely no 
difference between two conditions. However, there is always likely to be some 
difference between any two conditions, even if that difference is just due to chance 
variations. As increasing the sample size of a study will lead to an increase in 
statistical power it is possible to find a significant difference between two conditions 
in almost any sample simply by increasing the statistical power of the study via 
increasing the sample size. This flaw in NHST can lead to researchers simply 
continuing to add data to a study in order to reach significance despite the fact that 
the real amount of difference between two conditions is minute and thus risks 
making the entire exercise of determining significance becoming trivial. 
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Several possible solutions have been suggested in order to deal with the problems 
associated with calculating sample size. The most radical solution is to replace 
NHST with a different methodology such as Bayesian (Killeen, 2006) or model 
fitting  (Anderson, Burnham, & Thompson, 2000) data analysis. While these 
methodologies do have a number of merits, they also have several draw backs. In the 
case of model fitting Nickerson (2000) notes that many of the procedures for 
assessing the goodness of fit of a model themselves involve a form NHST which 
seems to only move the problems with NHST back a step in the statistical analysis. 
Likewise Frick (1996) raises several problems with Bayesian hypothesis testing. First 
the determination of the prior probabilities of competing hypotheses is inherently 
subjective. The second problem is that the subjectivity inherent in determining priors 
means that it is possible to construct prior probabilities to ensure that the conclusion 
of the analysis matches that expected by the researcher making Bayesian analyses 
particularly prone to confirmation bias. The third problem is that the prior 
probabilities for any result would also change over time meaning that any Bayesian 
analysis would only apply for a short period and would need to be repeated with new 
priors in order to ensure that its conclusion was still warranted. In the end both Fick 
(1996) and Nickerson (2000) conclude that despite its ability to be misunderstood or 
misused provided good judgement is used the use of NHST can be justified.               
 
The suggestions proposed above act as a control for the aforementioned issue of 
trivially significant results however in order to also protect against the risk of having 
insufficient power to detect a real difference between two means it is necessary to 
carry out a calculation of sample size prior to conducting an experiment. There are 
two general methods for conducting sample size, the first of these is to use a fixed 
sample size calculation. On this method a researcher should perform a sample size 
calculation prior to carrying out the study which will determine the optimal size of 
the sample to be used. A sample of that size is then collected and statistical tests are 
performed once on that sample with the results of those tests being considered final. 
In order to calculate the sample size it is necessary to consider a number of factors 
(Kirby, Gebski, & Keech, 2002).  
 
First it is necessary to set an acceptable level of significance in order to guard against 
Type I errors, this is conventionally set at 0.05 (i.e. a 5% chance of making a Type I 
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error). Second it is necessary to determine the power of the study in order to ensure 
that Type II errors are not made, conventionally this is set at a higher value than the 
significance level with a power of 0.80 (i.e. a 20% chance of a Type II error) being 
the standard. Third it is necessary to estimate the size of the effect under examination 
with a larger effect size requiring a smaller sample size to be detected and finally it is 
necessary to estimate the standard deviation of the population to be examined. 
Neither the expected effect size nor the standard deviation of the population can be 
set by convention and so both must be estimated by examining previous studies.  
 
While fixed sample size calculations have the advantage of setting a clear and 
determinate sample size they also have several disadvantages. Frick (1998) identifies 
several weaknesses with such procedures including the fact that they may lead to 
collecting an inefficiently large number of participants if a significant effect is either 
assured or very unlikely after testing a much smaller number of participants than had 
originally been planned, that it seems unreasonable to abandon a study if the p value 
is small but significant and that in the case of exploratory studies in an area that has 
not previously received much investigation, such as those reported in this thesis, it 
may well be very unclear exactly what the effect size should be. In place of carrying 
out a fixed sample size calculation Frick recommends instead using a sequential 
stopping rule in which a statistical test can be carried out at any point during data 
collection and if the outcome of that test is that p < .01 the researcher is justified in 
rejecting the null hypothesis while if the outcome of the test is p > .36 the researcher 
stops testing without rejecting the null hypothesis. For p values between .36 and .01 
further subjects are added to the pool. Using Monte Carlo simulations Frick 
demonstrates that using this COAST method leads to results having an effective α of 
5%. Therefore the sequential stopping rule   
 
While the calculation of sample size does serve an important role in experimental 
design such calculation were not conducted for the studies in this thesis due to the 
exploratory nature of the studies and the lack of previous research on the relationship 
between body representation and social cognition. However, another alternative to 
the problem of trivial but significant findings is to report a measure of effect size 
alongside p values in order to allow the magnitude of the significant effect to be 
observed (Wilkinson & Task Force on Statistical Inference, 1999). Although this 
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approach does not control for the risk of type II errors it does allow readers to judge 
the size of the effect and to decide for themselves whether or not the effects being 
reported are truly meaningful or not. There are a number of different ways to report 
effect size but the most commonly used methods either report the magnitude of the 
difference between two groups and variable, e.g. are Cohen‟s d or estimate the 
shared variance between variables or between an interaction term such as Pearson‟s r 
or Eta squared statistics (Ferguson, 2009; Vacha-Haase & Thompson, 2004). While 
reporting such measures of effects has not been done in the current thesis, the mean 
and standard deviation of all groups with significant differences has been reported, 
allowing for the reader to calculate Cohen‟s d for all reported findings if they so 
wish. 
 
7.3. Implications for the Relationship Between Bodily 
and Social Selves 
 
7.3.1. The Relationship Between Body Representation and Social 
Groups 
 
A key hypothesis underlying the studies carried out in this thesis was that the 
phenomenal experience of selfhood, which is dependent on the multisensory 
integration of body-related information, is closely related to, and provides the 
foundations of more conceptual and socially constructed representations of selfhood. 
One key aspect of these social representations of the self is what McAdams (2013) 
has termed the self as actor, the concept of the self as being situated within, and 
constituted by, a network of complex social relationships and identities. In 
investigating the relationship between body representation and social identity the 
studies reported in this thesis sought to explore three distinct questions. First, do 
surface features of the body indicative of different social groups have an effect on the 
experience of body ownership? Second, do participants‟ pre-existing social attitudes 
have an effect on their experience of body ownership? Third, does an updated 
representation of a participant‟s bodily self lead to changes in the way in which they 
perceive and relate to other(s)? 
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7.3.1.1. Is the Experience of Body Ownership Affected by Social Features? 
Previous research on the RHI has shown that the visual form of the stimulated object 
(Haans et al., 2008; Tsakiris et al., 2010; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005b) and the posture 
of the object compared to the participant‟s own hand (Lloyd, 2007; Makin et al., 
2008; Preston, 2013; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005b) both play an important role in 
determining whether participants experience the feeling of body ownership over the 
stimulated object. There is less evidence however that the surface features of a hand 
shaped object can modulate body ownership. In the current thesis, experiments 2.1, 
2.2 and 3.1 are the first studies that have systematically compared the experience of 
body ownership over a hand with the same skin colour to that of the participant with 
the experience of body ownership over a hand with a different skin colour. In 
addition experiments 3.2, 4.1 and 4.2 all sought to induce feelings of body ownership 
over a hand that differed from those of the participants‟ own hands either with 
respect to skin colour (experiment 3.2) or age (experiments 4.1 and 4.2), although, in 
these studies no direct comparison was made between feelings of ownership for 
hands with similar and dissimilar surface features. 
  
The findings of these experiments suggest that differences between the surface 
features of a stimulated hand and the participant‟s own hand do not play a major role 
in modulating the experience of body ownership. Synchronous VT-stimulation 
successfully induced a feeling of ownership over a hand that is different in its surface 
features from the hand of the participant in at least 50% of participants in all of the 
experiments in this thesis. There is however an apparent discrepancy between the 
findings of experiments 2.1 and 2.2 and the results of experiment 3.1. The 
experiments in chapter 2 found significantly lower feelings of ownership over a 
dissimilar (black) hand as opposed to a similar (white) hand while experiment 3.1 
found no such effect. This discrepancy between the three studies is likely to be due to 
the fact that, while the experiments in chapter 2 utilised a within participant design in 
which participants experienced VT-stimulation over both hands, experiment 3.1 used 
a between participants design where participants were unable to directly compare 
their experience of ownership for the similar and dissimilar hands. This suggests that 
there may be an effect of the similarity of surface features on participants‟ experience 
of body ownership but that this effect is only observable when participants are able 
to compare for themselves the difference in ownership over the two hands. In support 
of this interpretation is the fact that Maister, Sebanz, et al. (2013) which used a 
between participants design found no significant effect of skin colour on ratings of 
ownership while Haans et al. (2008) who used a within subjects design did find an 
effect of the texture of the rubber hand on ratings of ownership. It is also worth 
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noting however, that even when a within subjects design was used there was no 
difference in behavioural (proprioceptive drift) and physiological (SCR to painful 
stimuli) measures of ownership. This raises the possibility that participants did in fact 
experience roughly comparable feelings of body ownership in both conditions but 
that the obvious dissimilarity between their own hand and the black hand biased their 
introspective judgements of ownership (for an application of the distinction between 
feelings and judgements to the issue of agency see Haggard & Tsakiris, 2009). 
  
From a functional perspective the decreased importance of surface features of an 
object for the experience of body ownership compared to factors like the anatomical 
form or posture makes sense. For, while it is very unlikely that a hand will 
experience large changes in its basic shape or postural relationship with the rest of 
the body, changes to the surface features of our hands happen all the time. We gain 
experience of our hands changing their surface features every time we put on gloves 
or, to give an example that is more valid for our evolutionary history, get mud or 
other substances on them. Therefore it would be maladaptive for the experience of 
body ownership to change along with changes in our hands‟ surface features. 
Furthermore knowledge of the current state of the surface features of the body is 
more reliant on direct visual inspection than either the general form or the posture, 
both of which are partially specified by proprioceptive information. Since in the RHI 
setup visual information about the current state of the body is absent the system 
determining body ownership will have less contradictory information regarding 
surface features than it does for posture and visual form. 
  
7.3.1.2. Is the Experience of Body Ownership Affected by Social Attitudes? 
The second question, of whether participants‟ own social attitudes affected their 
feelings of ownership over the rubber hand is relevant due to the considerable 
evidence from previous research that has indicated that the activation of shared 
bodily representations for action (Désy & Théoret, 2007; Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2010; 
Liew et al., 2011; Molnar-Szakacs et al., 2007), pain (Avenanti et al., 2010; Azevedo 
et al., 2013; Hein, Silani, Preuschoff, Batson, & Singer, 2010; Xu et al., 2009) and 
emotion (Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2012) are modulated by whether or not the person being 
observed is a member of an in-group or an out-group. These findings suggest that 
group membership, and more specifically the attitudes of the observer towards the 
group that the observed person is a member of (Avenanti et al., 2010; Gutsell & 
Inzlicht, 2010), is capable of exerting a top-down influence on some forms of shared 
body representation. There is also evidence that some types of individual difference 
in cognitive processing can affect the strength of body ownership. For example Asai 
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et al. (2011) found that people high in empathic concern and positive schizotypal 
traits were more susceptible to the RHI while MacLachlan, Desmond and Horgan 
(2003) found that experiencing those who scored highly in psychometric measures of 
body plasticity, somatic preoccupation, and creative imagination were significantly 
more likely to experience the RHI and other forms of body illusion. In light of this 
evidence experiments 2.1, 3.1 and 3.2 all examined the relationship between 
participants pre-existing attitudes towards black people and their experience of 
ownership over a black rubber hand.  
  
Interestingly, given the above literature, the studies in this thesis consistently found 
that pre-existing attitudes towards black people did not influence how likely people 
were to experience ownership over a black rubber hand. This finding was consistent 
across all three studies whether the attitude being assessed was participants‟ bias 
against black people relative to white people (experiments 2.1 and 3.2) or their 
attitudes to black people alone (experiment 3.1). It is also consistent with the findings 
of a similar experiment using the rubber hand conducted by Maister, Sebanz, et al. 
(2013) and a study by Peck et al. that employed virtual reality to give participants 
ownership over a black avatar. (Peck et al., 2013; M. Slater, personal 
communication, 24th Sepetember, 2013). The discrepancy between the findings of 
top-down effects of social group on bodily representations involved in the mirroring 
of action, pain and emotion and the lack of any top-down effects of social group on 
perception of body ownership found in the studies included in this thesis may be due 
to the fact that, in the case of body ownership, participants experienced a direct 
matching between the sensory stimuli they were receiving and the sensory stimuli 
being delivered to the body of the other. These sensory cues for ownership of the 
observed body part may be so strong that they simply override any modulating 
influence that social attitudes might exert on the perception of an observed object as 
being part of one‟s body. In the case of shared neural representations of self and 
other described above however no direct sensorimotor cues suggesting that the 
observed object is part of one‟s own body are present and thus the power of top-
down influences such as social attitudes to modulate the activation of these 
representations may be correspondingly greater. 
  
7.3.1.3. Does the Experience of Body Ownership Alter the Perception of Social 
Groups? 
The second key question that the studies in the chapters 2, 3 and 4 aimed to 
investigate was the extent to which changing participants‟ representations of their 
own bodies by using synchronous VT-stimulation to make them feel ownership of a 
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hand belong to a different social group would lead to a change in their social 
cognition towards that group. For experiments 2.1 and 3.1 this was investigated by 
examining whether experiencing a hand with the skin colour of a racial out-group led 
to changes in attitudes towards that group. In experiment 3.2 this was investigated by 
examining whether changes to body ownership led to a change in sensory motor 
empathy as measured by MEPs in response to painful stimuli and in the two studies 
in chapter 4 it was investigated by examining whether experiencing ownership over 
an elderly hand led to the activation of the elderly stereotype and consequently 
slower performance in a motor imagery task. 
  
The results from these studies were largely supportive of the hypothesis that 
experiencing ownership over a body part that belongs to a different social group can 
lead to an increased association between the self and that group.  Experiment 2.1 
made a first step in this process by showing that participants‟ ratings of ownership 
over the black rubber hand significantly predicted their post VT-stimulation implicit 
racial bias as measured by the IAT with those who experienced greater ownership of 
the hand showing less racial bias. This finding was followed up in experiment 3.1 
which found a significant effect of VT-stimulation on racial bias with synchronous 
stimulation of the black hand leading to more positive attitudes towards black people 
while asynchronous VT-stimulation led to more negative attitudes. When the robust 
relationship between synchrony of VT-stimulation and the experience of body 
ownership is taken into account these findings support a link between the bodily 
representations of the self and implicit attitudes towards social groups. 
  
The results of experiment 3.2 also found some support for the hypothesis that 
multisensory stimulation over a hand belonging to a different racial group can lead to 
a change in responses towards that group. In this experiment the measure of interest 
was sensorimotor empathy to pain, as measured by MEP response to painful stimuli. 
The study found that after synchronous multisensory stimulation participants showed 
a reduction in z-scored MEP size after watching a black hand in pain, indicating 
increased sensorimotor empathy. Interestingly this affect was also found for tactile 
stimulation. In contrast after asynchronous stimulation participants showed an 
increase in z-scored MEP size in response to painful and tactile stimuli, further 
suggesting that asynchronous stimulation, as well as synchronous stimulation, leads 
to an alteration in racial bias. 
  
The results of experiment 4.2 also support the hypothesis of strong links between 
body representation and the perception of social groups. In this experiment, rather 
than directly affecting participants‟ implicit attitudes towards the elderly, 
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experiencing body ownership over an elderly hand led participants to imagine 
moving more slowly in a motor imagery task. This finding of slower motor imagery 
speeds after experiencing ownership of the hand fits into to a wider literature 
showing that being primed with stimuli associated with the elderly led participants to 
move more slowly due to the associations between old age and slowness (Bargh et 
al., 1996). Interestingly in experiment 4.2 this effect was only found when people felt 
ownership over the elderly hand despite the fact that in all conditions participants 
were exposed to the visual stimuli of the elderly hand. Therefore it seems that for 
elderly stimuli to affect motor imagery performance it was necessary for participants 
to associate this stimulus with their own body. This finding mirrors Wyer et al.‟s 
(2011) finding that slower walking speeds following the priming of elderly stimuli 
were mediated by the association of the elderly stereotype with the self-concept. In 
the case of experiment 4.2 it seems likely that greater association between the elderly 
hand and the bodily self would have led to a greater integration of the elderly 
stereotype in participants‟ self-concept and that this integration led to the change in 
motor imagery.  
   
The link between representations of one‟s own body and representations of social 
group found in the studies described above is in line with the embodied approaches 
to cognition in which off line representations of the body are thought to play an 
important role in scaffolding more cognitively abstract forms of representation 
(Barsalou, 1999, 2010; Lakoff, 2012). In particular these studies highlight the 
possibility that representations of the self as situated in a social context with an 
identity defined by being the member of particular social group may be modulated by 
and even dependent on representations of the self which are based on the integration 
of sensory information about the current state of the body. Considering the failure to 
find any significant effect of social attitudes on the experience of body ownership it 
appears that the relationship between these forms of self representation is largely a 
bottom up one. Thus while changes to the experience of the bodily self are capable of 
changing social attitudes and activating social stereotypes the reverse relationship in 
which attitudes towards a social group lead to a modulation in experience of 
ownership over a body part that appears to belong to those social groups does not 
appear to hold. 
  
Another important point to highlight here is the fact that the social salience of the 
stimuli used in the experiments was relatively limited. In all these experiments 
participants experienced VT-stimulation over their own hand and a hand with some 
characteristic from the other social group but these hands contained relatively little 
information about the group that they had come from apart from direct visual cues of 
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skin colour and age. This limited amount of social salience can be contrasted with the 
much greater amount of social information that can be gained from the face of 
another (Schmidt & Cohn, 2001). The fact that even feeling ownership over a hand 
from a different social group was enough to affect social attitudes towards that group 
or activate behavioural stereotypes associated with them speaks both to the strength 
of modulation that can be exerted by changes in perception of the bodily self and to 
the ubiquity of perceptual social cues of group membership.  
 
7.3.2. The Relationship Between Body Representation and 
Interpersonal Interactions 
 
As well as investigating how changes in bodily self-representation can alter peoples‟ 
perception of other social groups this thesis also sought to investigate the relationship 
between body representation and interpersonal interactions. This was an important 
second strand of the thesis due to the fact that in real life we are often interacting 
with specific people who we consider members of a social in-group. Therefore a 
large part of our social interaction with others is concerned more with the specific 
personalities of those people than generalisations based on social group. The 
experiments investigating this relationship used economic games, specifically 
variants of the trust game, as a proxy form of social interaction. Such games provide 
a useful tool for research as they allow the investigation of particular forms of social 
interaction within the controlled environment of the lab. As with the investigation of 
the relationship between body representation and social groups the investigations 
into the relationship between body and interpersonal trust sought to address this 
question from both angles. First, does changing the representation of the bodily self 
exert a bottom-up effect on judgments about the trustworthiness of the other? 
Second, does learning about the trustworthiness of the other person through your 
interaction with them change how we represent the similarity between their body and 
our own? 
 
7.3.2.1. Is Interpersonal Trust Affected by the Experience of Body Ownership? 
Experiments 5.1 and 5.2 both sought to investigate the effects of IMS on 
interpersonal trust. The studies both found evidence that interpersonal trust could be 
modulated by IMS. Experiment 5.1 replicated the finding of Tajadura-Jimenez, 
Longo, et al. (2012) that synchronous IMS applied to the face of one‟s self and 
another lead participants to give higher ratings of trust towards that other than did 
asynchronous VT-stimulation, and experiment 5.2 went further and showed an effect 
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of synchronous IMS on the amount of money participants were willing to offer in a 
trust game. At present this behavioural effect must however be treated with some 
caution due to the failure to find such an effect in experiment 5.1 and the possibility 
that the effect seen in experiment 5.2 was due to demand effects. A third study 
investigating this questions is currently being conducted using the same basic setup 
as experiment 5.2 but with a between subjects, rather than within subjects design to 
avoid any possibility of demand effect. 
  
Assuming that the effect of synchronous IMS on behavioural measures of trust is 
indeed genuine, it is important to recognise that there are a number of possible 
mechanisms through which this effect could be caused. The first is that IMS‟s effects 
on trust are mediated by its established effects on face perception. As covered in 
chapter 5 a number of studies (Sforza et al., 2010; Tsakiris, 2008) have 
demonstrated, using variants of the face self-recognition task, that IMS changes 
perceptions of similarity between one‟s own face and that of the other. There is also 
a large literature showing that faces that are more physically similar to one‟s own are 
perceived as more trustworthy although whether this fact is due to a specific 
evolutionary adaptation for prosocial behaviour towards kin, a more domain general 
effect of self positivity or a combination of the two is unclear. On this account the 
effect of multisensory stimulation on trust behaviour would be mediated by its effect 
of self-recognition. An alternative possibility is raised by the fact that shared 
experiences have been shown to lead to an increase in interpersonal trust and 
closeness (Fraley & Aron, 2004; Strikwerda & May, 1992).  It may be that the 
increased trust generated by IMS derives simply from the fact that participants 
undergo a shared experience with the other person without any intervening 
modulation of judgements of facial similarity. One possible way to dissociate these 
two hypotheses would be to measure the perception of self other overlap in physical 
appearance after interpersonal multisensory integration using the self-face 
recognition task (Kircher et al., 2001) and to investigate how strongly that correlates 
with the amount of money sent in trust games.  
  
7.3.2.2. Does Interpersonal Trust Affect Representations of Bodily Similarity? 
Experiment 5.3 and experiment 6.1 both investigated the relationship between 
knowledge of the trustworthiness of an interaction partner on the overlap between 
self and other. However, the two experiments investigated the effect on trust on very 
different forms of body representation. Experiment 5.3 showed that the effect of 
altered face representation on trust behaviour shown in experiment 5.2 was bi-
directional. Not only do interventions that make the other‟s face seem more 
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physically similar to one‟s own also have an effect on one‟s social behaviour towards 
the other but receiving behavioural evidence of another person‟s trustworthiness led 
to that person‟s face being perceived as more similar to one‟s own and also to them 
judging the other person as being socially closer to them. This finding further 
indicates the strong relationship between perceptions of social closeness and 
perceptions of physical similarity. 
 
In contrast experiment 6.1 investigated the effect of observing actions being made by 
a trustworthy person compared to an untrustworthy person on the activation of brain 
areas that form the AON. In this case however there was little evidence that 
increased trust towards the other person led to greater overlap between bodily 
representations of self and other. In fact overall there was greater activation of the 
AON when watching the untrustworthy person compared to the trustworthy person. 
  
This difference between the two studies may be based on the distinct functional roles 
occupied by the different forms of body representation under investigation. While 
perception of facial similarity appears to be adapted for the detection of kin (Krupp, 
DeBruine, Jones, & Lalumière, 2012) the activation of motor areas of the cortex 
during the observation of action has been interpreted as involving the predictions of 
another‟s motor actions whether on the level of the goal of the action (e.g. Gallese, 
2009) or on the precise kinematic of the action (Neal & Kilner, 2012). In an 
evolutionary context, while it may have been beneficial to see those who were 
known to be trustworthy as more similar to one‟s self, in order to benefit from 
adaptations for the favouring of kin, it is also very important to be able to understand 
and predict the actions of a person who intends to betray you. Thus if the AON is 
indeed involved in determining the goal of an action rather than simply being the 
result of neural connections formed by associative learning (Heyes, 2013), it is not so 
surprising that it is activated more by the actions of an untrustworthy person than by 
a trustworthy one.  
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7.4. Body Representation and Social Cognition 
 
 7.4.1. Body Ownership and Social Synchrony  
 
I will now briefly draw two wider implications of the work presented in this thesis. 
The first of these relates to the relationship between interpersonal synchrony and 
social cognition. Although the findings in this thesis on the power of changes in body 
representation to alter intergroup and interpersonal social behaviours and attitudes all 
employed passive VT-stimulation their results neatly mirror those from studies that 
have shown that synchronous movement can also lead to increased pro-social 
behaviour in economic games (R. Fischer et al., 2013; Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009) 
and that non-conscious mimicry can alter both interpersonal and group based 
perceptions of others (Chartrand & Lakin, 2013). The results of the current thesis 
suggest that these effects of synchronous and similar movements on social cognition 
may ultimately be derived from the effect that such synchrony has on the perception 
of self and other. This insight is captured well by McNeill, a military historian, in his 
description of the similarity between his experience of carrying out military drill 
during his time in the army and the experience of participants during communal 
dancing: 
  
“Boundary loss” is the individual and “feeling they are one” is the collective way of 
looking at the same thing: a blurring of self-awareness and the heightening of fellow-
feeling with all who share in the dance. It matches my own recollection of what 
close-order drill felt like…” (McNeill, 1995, p. 8). 
  
The studies in this thesis demonstrate that multisensory stimulation has the power to 
alter the social relationship between self and other as well as the physical relationship 
but this lesson appears to have been appreciated by cultures and institutions across 
the world since the dawn of humanity. Religions, armies and political movements 
have used the power of synchronous movements to create a sense of closeness and 
unity amongst their members while cultures across the world use dance as a way to 
create feelings of bonding and closeness. While these synchronous movements 
usually do not evoke the feeling of body ownership shown in the studies here they 
may create enough of a match between the representation of one‟s own body and the 
body of others to promote feelings of self-identification and communality with the 
other. Indeed it is interesting to note that the increased recent interest in the 
importance of bodily synchrony is already prompting the development of new 
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interventions to aid in the development of emotional and cognitive forms of empathy 
(Behrends, Müller, & Dziobek, 2012). 
 
 7.4.2. A Model of the Bodily Self and Social Cognition.  
 
The second implication of the current research relates to the basic embodied 
cognition hypothesis of a strong link between sensorimotor processes and higher 
level cognition, in particular how sensorimotor representations of the bodily self can 
modulate social cognition processes. In the introduction to this thesis I highlighted a 
number of different ways that the state of the body has been tied to concepts within 
social cognition. The experiments in the previous chapters have sought to investigate 
the way that the bodily representations underlying one of the most basic and 
fundamental form of self representation can also influence, and be influenced by, the 
more abstract and cognitive representations of the self involved in social cognition. 
The findings from this thesis offer support for the hypothesis that changes in bodily 
self-representations do indeed modulate social cognition and also that some aspects 
of social cognition, namely perception of another‟s trustworthiness, can modulate 
bodily representations of self and other. What is less clear however is the exact 
mechanisms by which these modulations occur. Here I will briefly outline a possible 
model of the relationship between bodily selfhood and social cognition that might 
explain the results found in this thesis along with other findings in the literature. 
 
The model (see figure 7-1) suggests that, during social interaction, sensorimotor 
signals from both self (path a) and other (path b) serve as the input to a comparator 
process that computes the similarity of signals from self and other. The error signal 
of that comparator process is then fed forward to the processes underlying bodily 
self-representation in the manner outlined by Tsakiris (2010) (path c). These changes 
in the representation of the bodily self can then lead to changes in the activation of 
shared sensorimotor representations of others (experiment 3.2) and to a top-down 
modulation of future predictions regarding the match between sensorimotor signals 
from self and other (path d, e.g. VRT; Cardini, Tajadura-Jiménez, Serino, & Tsakiris, 
2013). In addition the changes in bodily self-representation modulate various social 
cognitive processes (path e). These process including: stereotype activation 
(experiment 4.2), implicit attitudes (experiments 2.1 and 3.1), and interpersonal 
appraisal, e.g. trustworthiness (experiments 5.1 and 5.2). Finally these social 
cognitive processes can themselves serve to inform the comparisons between self and 
other (path f). In this way the model can explain the evidence that stereotype 
activation can lead to changes in motor acts, e.g. slower movement speeds (Bargh et 
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al., 1996); that interpersonal interaction can affect representations of the bodily self 
(experiment 5.3); and that attitudes towards an out-group (Avenanti et al., 2010; 
Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2010; Serino et al., 2009) and interpersonal appraisal (experiment 
6.1, Mcintosh, 2006; Sobhani et al., 2012) can both modulate shared body 
representations between self and other. Finally the sensorimotor signals of other‟s 
can lead to the direct activation of the processes involved in social cognition (path g; 
e.g. Zaki, 2013). 
  
 
Figure 7-1: A model of the relationship between bodily representations of the self 
and social cognitive processes. Ovals represent incoming sensorimotor signals. 
Rectangles represent cognitive processes. Crossed circle indicates a comparator.  
  
This model sees the relationship between social cognitive processes and bodily self-
representation reported here as being direct, with changes in the bodily self 
separately affecting the different social processes that have been examined in this 
thesis. There is however an alternative possible model of this relationship in which 
changes to the bodily self are directly related only to changes to a more abstract 
social form self-representation. On this account the effects of changes to the bodily 
self on social cognition would be mediated by the extent to which those changes 
affected this social form of self-representation.     
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It is important to note that despite the fact that each of the modules in this model is 
presented as being a unitary block this is merely for conceptual convenience and is 
not intended to represent a claim that the processes within each module are 
necessarily unitary or modular. It is clear for example that there are a variety of 
different forms of body representations in different areas of the brain (see e.g. 
Berlucchi & Aglioti, 2010) and that many of these areas display shared 
representations of self and other (Keysers & Gazzola, 2009). In a similar way the 
processes involved in social cognition are likely to be implemented in a number of 
different neural networks. For example it seems likely that the cognitive processes 
involved in interpersonal appraisal and stereotype activation will be largely distinct 
from one another (Sugiura, 2013). In addition the comparison process itself is not 
intended to be a unitary phenomena. Instead the comparator in the current model 
represents a number of different comparison processes including the physical 
similarity between self and other and the temporal and spatial synchrony of sensory 
signals from self and other. Despite such limitations however, the model given above 
does provide some motivations for potential future directions of research in this area, 
three of which I will briefly outline in the next section. 
  
7.5. Future Directions 
  
Given the relatively unexplored nature of the topic of this thesis it should come as no 
surprise that the findings reported within it raise more questions than they answer. 
Much further research is needed to establish the exact scope and nature of the 
relationship between bodily self-representation and social cognition and at this point 
many of the mechanisms which underlie this relationship remain unclear. On the 
basis of the research reported in this thesis however, it is possible to highlight three 
areas of future research in this area which could shed light on some of these 
questions. 
  
7.5.1. Bodily and Cognitive Self-Representations 
  
The first of these areas is the question of whether the bidirectional relationship 
between bodily self-representation and social cognitive processes revealed by the 
studies in this thesis operates in a direct manner, as in the model in figure 7-1, or 
whether it is mediated by changes to some cognitive form of self-representation such 
as the self-concept (Epstein, 1973). There are few current studies that have directly 
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investigated the role of cognitive self-representation in changing states of the body or 
mediating changes in social cognition. What studies that have been conducted 
however, support the view that cognitive forms of self-representation may play a 
mediating between changes in social cognition and changes in bodily states. For 
example, Wryer et al. (2011) demonstrated that the effects of stereotype activation on 
behaviour were modulated by the extent to which participants associated the primed 
stereotype with the self, while Banakou et al. (2013) demonstrated that embodying 
the body of a child led to greater implicit associations between the self and children. 
  
Two further studies recent studies investigated the relationship between the self-
concept and participants‟ awareness of their interoceptive states. Maister and Tsakiris 
(2014) examined differences in interoceptive awareness between Western and East 
Asian participants and found that while observing one‟s own face during the 
interoceptive awareness task led to increased accuracy in the Western group the same 
effect was not found for East Asian participants. The authors attributed this finding 
to the known cultural differences in self construal between Western and East Asian 
people, with Westerners generally showing a more independent construal of the self 
and Asians generally showing a more interdependent construal (Heine, 2001). They 
hypothesised that while for their Western participants observation of their own face 
activated bodily self-awareness which led to enhanced processing of interoceptive 
signals, for East Asian participants viewing the external appearance of the self led to 
greater activation of higher-level, social aspects of self-identity. The second study by 
Ainley and colleagues, including the author of the current thesis, (Ainley, Maister, 
Brokfeld, Farmer, & Tsakiris, 2013) demonstrated that the observation of self-
relevant words e.g.  the school they most recently attended or the name of the most 
important person in their life led to the same increase in interoceptive awareness as 
viewing one‟s own face suggesting that more cognitive and social self-related stimuli 
is as effective as viewing one‟s own body in increasing the perception of signals 
from one‟s own body. 
  
The initial studies reviewed above speak in support of higher level self-
representation having a reciprocal relationship to bodily self-representation. Further 
research could use tools such as priming different forms of self-construal (Gardner, 
Gabriel, & Lee, 1999), investigating associations between the self and a particular 
social group (Banakou et al., 2013; Wyer et al., 2011), or individual differences in 
factors related to social self-processing such as peoples‟ amount of self-monitoring 
(Snyder, 1974) or body objectification (Tiggemann & Kuring, 2004) to investigate 
how these more higher level forms of self-representation mediate the relationship 
between social cognition and the bodily self found in this thesis.  
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7.5.2. A Neurocognitive Account   
 
The second key area for future research suggested by the findings in this thesis 
relates to the neural mechanisms that underlie the effects reported in this thesis. 
Speculating on the neural mechanisms behind these effects is somewhat difficult due 
to the confusing and somewhat contradictory findings in the current literature on the 
neural basis of self-representation. Indeed two recent reviews of the relevant 
literature concluded that the current literature on the neural basis of self-
representation is inadequate. Gillihan and Farah (2005) noted that neuroimaging 
studies had failed to demonstrate any brain areas that specifically processed self-
related stimuli, while Legrand and Ruby (2009) concluded that “standard ways to 
tackle the self by considering self-evaluation do not target the self in its specificity”. 
Despite these pessimistic diagnoses of the present state of the neuroscience of self-
related processes I do wish to make some tentative suggestions as to possible models 
of how the bodily self and social cognitive processes might affect each other on the 
neural level. 
  
In making these suggestions I will draw on two recent models of how higher level 
social cognitive processes interact with bodily states. The first of these is the 
STORM model of how social factors modulate imitation proposed by Wang and 
Hamilton (2012). In this model of imitation, imitation is directly implemented by the 
classic mirror neuron areas of the IFG, IPL and STS. However, areas of the brain 
involved in social cognition are considered to have reciprocal connections with the 
classic mirror neuron system and are able to exert a top down effect on imitation and 
well as having their own activity modulated by imitation thus explaining the social 
effect of and modulations on imitation reviewed in the introduction to this thesis (see 
also Chartrand & Lakin, 2013). Wang and Hamilton particularly highlight the medial 
prefrontal cortex (mPFC) as playing a role in modulating activation within the mirror 
system. The mPFC has been shown to respond to social cues such as eye gaze and 
social status (Kampe, Frith, & Frith, 2003; Singer, Kiebel, Winston, Dolan, & Frith, 
2004; Zink et al., 2008) and to have key role in monitoring other social processes 
(Teufel, Fletcher, & Davis, 2010). 
  
Wang Ramsey and Hamilton (2011) tested this model by using dynamic causal 
modelling (Friston, Harrison, & Penny, 2003) to investigate how activation in the 
mPFC modulated the activation of the mirror system during an imitation task in 
which another person either directed their gaze to or averted their gaze from the 
target to be imitated. They demonstrated that there was strong intrinsic connectivity 
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between the mPFC and both the STS and the IFG, suggesting that the mPFC 
constantly exerts top-down control on the mirror neuron system. Further they showed 
that having the gaze of another focused on the imitation target led to increased 
connections between the mPFC and the STS suggesting that the mPFC did indeed 
modulate activation in the mirror neuron system involved in imitation. Given the 
close overlap between brain areas implicated in alterations to body representation 
and those that make up the mirror neuron system (Apps, Tajadura-Jiménez, Sereno, 
Blanke, & Tsakiris, In Press; Ehrsson et al., 2005, 2004; Petkova et al., 2011) it 
seems likely that the same areas that are involved in the STORM model could also be 
involved in changes in social cognition caused by changes to bodily self-
representation.    
  
The second model I will briefly highlight is that presented by Sugiura (2013) who 
proposes a hierarchical layer structure model of the self with three distinct forms of 
self-processing realised in different networks of brain areas. While the scope of this 
model is too great to go into detail here it does possess a number of aspects which 
may be of use in identifying how the interactions between bodily self-representations 
and more cognitive self-representations can interact to produce the effect reported in 
this thesis. Firstly Sugiura divides self-representations in the brain into three strands. 
The first of these is physical self, approximately the same as the bodily self discussed 
in this thesis, which is supposed to be supported by the sensory and motor 
association cortices particularly those in the right hemisphere. The second is the 
interpersonal self, representing the attention or intentions of others directed at the 
self, which is supposed to be supported by several amodal association cortices in the 
dorsomedial frontal and lateral posterior cortices. Finally the social self, which 
represents the self as a collection of context-dependent social-values, is supported by 
the ventral aspect of the medial prefrontal cortex and the posterior cingulate cortex. 
  
Of particular interest to the findings of the current thesis is Sugiura‟s division 
between the interpersonal self and the social self. This division roughly maps on to 
the division between the two strands of research reported in the current thesis. The 
studies in chapters 2, 3 and 4 of this thesis, which focused on the relationship 
between the bodily self and different social groups would in Sugiura‟s terminology 
be investigating the between the physical self and the social self. By contrast the 
studies in chapters 5 and 6 of the current thesis would be investigating the 
relationship between the physical self and the interpersonal self. This division 
between different forms of social self-representation is useful in two ways. First it 
helps shed light on the differences in the directionality of the relationship between 
the bodily self and social cognition found in the current study. As mentioned above, 
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while evidence for a reciprocal relationship between bodily self-representation and 
interpersonal interaction was found in experiments 5.3 and 6.1 no such relationship 
was found for the studies on social groups reported in chapters 2, 3 and 4. Using 
Sugiura‟s framework one could consider this evidence that while reciprocal 
connection exists between physical and interpersonal self-representations no such 
relationship exists between the physical and social self-representations. The second is 
that due to the predictive coding nature of the model it offers the promise of situating 
the relationship between social representations and the bodily self within the growing 
number of predictive coding accounts of the bodily self (Apps & Tsakiris, In Press; 
Limanowski & Blankenburg, 2013)  
 
7.5.3. The Affective Self   
 
The final promising area for future research I wish to highlight is the question of how 
bodily selfhood might interact with more emotional aspects of social cognition. 
While the studies in this thesis were concerned largely with the relationship between 
the bodily self and cognitive aspects of social cognition involved in self 
representation, the role of emotion in social cognition is undeniable and the way we 
act towards others is often coloured by an affective aspect be that affection, love or 
hate. To date only two studies have touched on the question of the relationship 
between body ownership and emotion. Both of these studies investigated the 
relationship between perceiving another‟s emotion and the IMS induced overlap 
between self and other. Maister, Tsiakkas, et al. (2013) demonstrated that the 
enfacement illusion also facilitates emotion recognition, specifically fearful facial 
expressions while Beck et al. (2012) found that the effect of synchrony was 
abolished if the other person displayed a fearful facial expression. However, to date 
the relationship between one‟s own emotions and different forms of body 
representation has not been explored. 
  
The link between alterations in the perception of the bodily self and emotion is 
particularly salient currently due to the resurgence in popularity of somatic theories 
of emotion. These theories posit that emotions are constituted by the perception of 
bodily states and have been strengthened by recent findings of a convergence 
between brain areas utilised in processing emotions and those which play a key role 
in the perception of and regulation of the body (Damasio, 2003; Zaki, Davis, & 
Ochsner, 2012) and between interoceptive sensitivity and emotional arousal (Barrett, 
Quigley, Bliss-Moreau, & Aronson, 2004; Dunn et al., 2010). In investigating the 
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relationship between bodily self-representation and emotional aspects of social 
cognition it therefore seems natural to move away from exteroceptive representations 
of the bodily self and instead focus on interoceptive modalities of bodily information. 
The relationship between interoception and emotions may be particularly salient in 
the case of the so called self-conscious moral emotions (e.g. shame, guilt and pride) 
given the close relationship between these emotions and self-focus (Sheikh & Janoff-
Bulman, 2010).  Of these shame is a particularly important emotion to investigate in 
future research given its close links to a wide variety of mental disorders (Rizvi, 
2009).  
   
7.6 Conclusion 
  
This thesis investigated the relationship between the bodily self and social cognition. 
The experiments conducted during this investigation used a variety of different 
methodologies to demonstrate that strong reciprocal links exist between perceptions 
of the bodily self and the perceptions of other‟s whether in the context of social 
groups or interpersonal interactions. The findings of this thesis thus offer support to 
views of the self as being grounded in bodily perceptions and the importance of a 
low level bodily self, underlied by the integration of sensory and motor signals from 
the body, in the formation of more abstract and socially focused forms of self 
representation. In this way the current thesis‟ findings add support to the claim that 
incorporating the other into our own body representations plays an important role in 
structuring social cognition. 
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